Modelling and Testing Financial Risk by Leong, S. H.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Leong, S. H. (2021). Modelling and Testing Financial Risk. (Unpublished Doctoral
thesis, City, University of London) 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/26864/
Link to published version: 
Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, 
University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights 
remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to.
Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, 
educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. 
Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a 
hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is 
not changed in any way. 
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Modelling and Testing Financial Risk
Soon Heng Leong
Centre for Econometric Analysis
Faculty of Finance
Bayes Business School
City, University of London





This dissertation represents the tangible outcome of my doctoral studies at the Centre for Econo-
metric Analysis (CEA), Faculty of Finance, Bayes Business School, City, University of London and
was written from September 2017 to September 2021. I am grateful to Bayes Business School, CEA
and Timberlake Consultants for providing generous research funding including the “2017/2021
PhD Studentship in Memory of Ana Timberlake” along with expenses on numerous academic
conferences and visits.
I wish to express my gratitude to a multitude of people for their supports in many ways
throughout this journey: my PhD advisor and mentor Giovanni Urga, for always providing research
advice, discussions, supports and opportunities; Lynda Khalaf, for acting as my PhD external
examiner, for her feedback on my work and for sharing her life advice during our visit to Oxford in
September 2019; Babara Casu, for her suggestions on my summer project in 2018 and for acting
as my PhD internal examiner; Thorsten Beck and Fa Wang, for their feedback on my work, for
acting as my transfer examiners, for their advice about the academic job market, for acting as my
references and for their kind offers to provide further assistance; Ian Marsh, for a series of valuable
advice about academic job interviews.
Finally, I thank my mother Lay Sen Ang, for her unconditional love and my fiancée Luqi, for





List of figures vii
List of tables ix
Abstract 1
Introductory remarks 3
1 Modelling and testing systemic risk 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Data, variables and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.1 Data preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.2 Shadow insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.3 Dependent variables: ∆CoV aR and SRI SK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.4 Explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.5 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix 1.A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.A.1 Full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.A.2 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2 Modelling and testing volatility spillover 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Multivariate Granger causality in variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2.1 From univariate to multivariate Granger causality in variance . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.2 Test statistic and asymptotic properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.3 Bidirectional Granger causality in variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
vi Contents
2.4 Monte Carlo simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.1 The bivariate case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.2 Higher dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5 Empirical application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Appendix 2.A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix 2.B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Appendix 2.C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appendix 2.D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Appendix 2.E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Appendix 2.F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Appendix 2.G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Appendix 2.H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.H.1 Simulation results of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for all M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.H.2 Monte Carlo study of the bidirectional test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.H.3 GARCH misspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.H.4 Computational efficiency study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3 Unifying and testing causality-based risk measures 101
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5.1 Model estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.5.2 Causality results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.5.3 Implications for investors and policymakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119




1.1 Market capitalisation. The figure displays the market capitalisation of our sample
of 215 insurers over the period 2004Q1–2017Q4, in billion US dollar. Data source:
Datastream. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Total reinsurance ceded. The figure displays the growth of the reinsurance industry
over the period 2004–2017, in billion US dollar. Data source: Market Intelligence. . . 12
1.3 Shadow insurance. The figure displays the growth of shadow insurance activity over
the period 2004–2017, in billion US dollar. Data source: Market Intelligence. . . . . . 13
1.4 Shadow insurance (public) vs shadow insurance (non-public). The figure displays
the amount of shadow insurance practised by entity belonging to a public company
vs non-public company over the period 2004–2017, in billion US dollar. Data source:
Market Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Time evolution of systemic risk. The figures plot the mean quarterly systemic risk
measures ∆CoV aR and SRI SK of all insurers (solid line), shadow insurers (dashed
line) and non-shadow insurers (dotted line), over the full sample period 2004Q1–
2017Q4. The positive dollar term of SRI SK is used. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Systemic risk and shadow indicator series of Manulife. The figures plot the quarterly
shadow indicator (dashed line) and systemic risk measures ∆CoV aR and SRI SK
(solid lines) of Manulife over the full sample period 2004Q1–2017Q4. The positive
dollar term of SRI SK is used. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 Crude oil imports. This figure plots the crude oil imports in China (solid line) and
in the US (dashed line) over the 2005–2019 period, in million barrels per day. Data
source: Datastream and EIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Sample composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Shadow insurers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Descriptive statistics: Shadow and non-shadow insurers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5 Correlation matrix: Full period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Correlation matrix: Distress period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.7 Regression results: LS estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.8 Regression results: GMM estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.A.1 Main sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.A.2 Regression results: Robustness 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.A.3 Regression results: Robustness 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.A.4 Regression results: Robustness 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.A.5 Regression results: Robustness 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.1 Empirical sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2 Empirical powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Empirical sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 Empirical powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5 Diagnostic tests (UK–NA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.6 Spillover results (UK–NA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.7 Diagnostic tests (EU–NA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.8 Diagnostic tests (EU–NA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.9 Spillover results (EU–NA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.H.1 Empirical sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.H.2 Empirical powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.H.3 Empirical sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.H.4 Empirical powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.H.5 Empirical sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
x List of tables
2.H.6 Empirical powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.H.7 Empirical sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.H.8 Empirical powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.H.9 Diagnostic tests (UK–NA, Control) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.H.10 Spillover results (UK–NA, Control) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.H.11 Diagnostic tests (UK–NA, Misspecified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.H.12 Spillover results (UK–NA, Misspecified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.2 Model estimations and diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.3 Model estimations and diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.4 Model estimations and diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.5 Causality results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
ABSTRACT
This dissertation centres on the modelling and testing of risk with the emphasis on gauging novel
issues in finance. The first chapter models the stability of financial system using prominent
systemic risk measures, and examines for various risk factors affecting financial stability including
the risky practice of shadow insurance. The collected dataset suggests that shadow insurance has
been increasingly exploited to reduce risk exposure and that entities exploiting shadow insurance
are generally riskier and more interconnected with the financial system. Using panel analysis,
I find statistical evidence that the practice of shadow insurance does affect financial stability
based on two distinct systemic risk measures. In the second chapter, I propose a new multivariate
econometric strategy for examining the spillover of volatility — the most fundamental risk measure.
The asymptotic theory of the testing strategy is established under regularity conditions. The
chapter includes an extensive simulation study to confirm the finite sample performance of the
proposed econometric strategy and an empirical study based on the new test to examine volatility
spillover between the North American and European financial markets before and after the Brexit
referendum. In the third chapter, I consolidate the comprehensive literature on Granger causality
methods, and I apply the unified methodology to examine different components of risk spillover
between international crude oil and the Chinese equity markets that are fuel intensive. This unified
analysis disentangles the complex oil-equity nexus to find that it has been nontrivially related to
various factors such as demand and supply of oil, economic growth rate, government subsidies
and the Chinese oil pricing reformation.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
This dissertation centres on the modelling and testing of financial risk. I derive from the central
topic three pieces of self-contained research papers — composed as the dissertation chapters —
covering different aspects of risk in finance with their economic and policy implications.
Chapter 1 focuses on modelling systemic risk and testing for its risk factors, where systemic
risk can be regarded as the risk an entity poses to the financial system. To quantify systemic risk,
I summarise the existing literature to obtain four widely used methods: the delta conditional
value-at-risk (∆CoV aR), the marginal expected shortfall (MES), the systemic expected shortfall
(SES) and the systemic risk measure (SRI SK ). I then exclude the MES because it captures largely
the market beta instead of systemic risk (see, e.g., Benoit et al., 2017). Since SES is closely related to
MES, the chapter therefore focuses on modelling the ∆CoV aR and SRI SK systemic risk proxies.
Besides, I include in the chapter various factors that could potentially affect systemic risk such
as size and interconnectedness. Additionally, I construct a shadow indicator based on the lesser
known risky practice of shadow insurance. This shadow activity deserves public attention and
scrutiny because it is exploited by leading insurance entities to increase risk exposure (see, e.g.,
Koijen and Yogo, 2016). Naturally, I construct a representative dataset covering global insurance
entities and their shadow activities. Based on the data universe, I estimate ∆CoV aR and SRI SK to
find that both measures are able to capture the well-known financial crises, with ∆CoV aR being
relatively more reactive to the period of US subprime crisis in 2008–2009 while SRI SK being more
responsive towards the period of UK Brexit in 2016. My findings highlight the distinctive features
between the two systemic risk measures. This is expected because the two measures are unique by
construction: ∆CoV aR is a function of value-at-risk whereas SRI SK is based on expected shortfall.
As a result, they capture different aspects of risk in the financial system. In testing for the factors
driving systemic risk, I use both measures for rigour. My panel analysis suggests that the shadow
indicator is one of the key determinants that increases systemic risk. This finding is robust across
both measures. The conclusion in this chapter implies that the practice of shadow insurance does
affect financial stability, and calls for new policies to regulate this risky activity.
The application of the systemic risk measures discussed in Chapter 1 is limited to cases where
risk is transmitted or spilled in a single direction. In the absence of prior information, it is appro-
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priate to first determine the direction of risk spillover. Therefore, in Chapter 2 I propose a novel
(bi)directional test for volatility spillover, where volatility spillover is defined using the notion of
Granger causality in variance. By definition, there is evidence of volatility spillover from X to Y
if any of the past variances of X is able to predict the current variance of Y . The chapter focuses
on volatility since it is the most fundamental risk measures. The new test can handle markets
consisting of multiple countries such as the North America and European Union markets. The
proposed test can be viewed as the multivariate generalisation of the univariate results in Hong
(2001). To compute the test statistic, conditional volatility has to be first estimated. Because
modelling volatility can be challenging in the higher dimension, I further provide a new nonpara-
metric specification to facilitate the estimation of volatility and hence the computation of my test
statistic. The new model can be viewed as an extension of the Constant Conditional Correlation
(CCC) model in Bollerslev (1990), where I propose to use the general infinite order autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity [ARCH(∞)] process to minimise the risk misspecification. In terms
of estimation, the chapter proposes consistent least-squares estimators which are free from the
complications of their likelihood-based counterparts such as convergence issue. Moreover, I
develop the asymptotic theory of the new approach. An extensive simulation study shows that the
proposed method has reasonable finite sample performance in the higher dimension. The chapter
completes with an empirical study in which I apply the new method to examine spillover relations
between the North American and European equity markets before and after the Brexit referendum.
Other practical applications of the new approach include the identification of risk transmitters
and recipients in the financial system, which could assist policymakers to shape targeted policies
to protect vulnerable risk recipients whenever necessary.
Although volatility is considered the most fundamental risk measure, the causality literature
has proposed other methods to capture different components of financial risk spillover where
each component has its own interest (see, e.g., Candelon and Tokpavi, 2016; Du and He, 2015;
Hong, 2001; Hong et al., 2009). This calls for a unification. In Chapter 3 I consolidate the extensive
literature on causality tests to show that various forms of spillover can be examined. The unified
framework allows examining spillovers in the mean, variance, risky quantiles (both positive and
negative) and distribution, where each element uncovers a unique relation. The causality-in-mean
analysis reveals return spillover, whereas the presence of variance causality can be viewed as
volatility spillover. The causality-in-risk analysis detects the existence of extreme risk spillovers
and it covers both positive and negative relations. The long-term spillover effects can be evaluated
by the causality-in-distribution examination. Because all of the analyses are based on causality
methods within the same family, inferential biases due to methodological disparities are minimised.
I apply the unified methodology to study spillover relations between international crude oil and the
Chinese oil-intensive industries. I use subsample analysis to study changes in spillover nexus after
the Chinese domestic oil reformation in 2013. My findings highlight that government intervention
may distort the spillover relations between the Chinese sectors and global oil. For instance, my
analysis suggests that the Chinese industries are not significantly affected by extreme international
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oil price movement before the reformation because domestic oil price in China is capped and
strictly regulated by its central government. Consequently, the Chinese sectors are mostly shielded
against large fluctuations in global oil price. As the Chinese markets become more exposed to
international oil after the reformation, extreme negative returns of global oil benefit most oil-
intensive sectors while positive outlook in Brent adversely affect most the industries. The findings
in this chapter encourage policymakers to be cautious when implementing similar regulations in
the future because they may distort statistical relations on an international level.

CHAPTER 1
THE CONTRIBUTION OF SHADOW
INSURANCE TO SYSTEMIC RISK*
1.1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to assess the contribution of shadow insurance to systemic risk
of the global financial sector. To this aim, we use a sample of 215 public insurance entities across
40 countries over the period 2004–2017. To detect shadow activities, we examine all reinsurance
agreements from the Schedule S filings. To measure interconnectedness between the insurance
and banking sectors, we analyse an additional sample of 745 traditional banks. On the basis of both
delta conditional value-at-risk (∆CoV aR) and systemic risk measure (SRI SK ), we find statistically
significant evidence that the practice of shadow insurance affects the stability of global financial
system.
In recent years, the financial stability literature has proposed a large number of systemic risk
measures. A comprehensive review is provided by Benoit et al. (2017), who distinguish measures
that study sources of systemic risk from global approaches that could support a more efficient
regulation. The prominent global measures are the ∆CoV aR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016),
the SRI SK of Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2017), the marginal expected shortfall
(MES) and systemic expected shortfall (SES) of Acharya et al. (2017). These measures have been
used extensively to identify determinants that drive systemic risk, with more emphasis on the
banking sector. For instance, López-Espinosa et al. (2012) use ∆CoV aR to study a sample of 54
large international banks to find that short-term wholesale funding increases systemic risk. Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2016) study the systemic relevance of all publicly listed financial entities in the
United States to find that leverage, maturity mismatch and size are the main drivers of systemic
*A research article (joint with C. Bellavite Pellegrini and G. Urga) based on the results in this chapter entitled “The
contribution of shadow insurance to systemic risk” has been published in the Journal of Financial Stability (2020), vol.
51, p. 100778/1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100778.
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risk. Brownlees and Engle (2017) employ SRI SK to find that major banks such as Bear Stearns,
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley play a significant role in systemic
risk contribution. Using both ∆CoV aR and SRI SK , Laeven et al. (2016) study a panel of 412 large
banks from 56 countries to find that systemic risk grows with bank size. Abedifar et al. (2017)
combine both Islamic and conventional financial entities to find that traditional banks with Islamic
windows are highly interconnected during the subprime financial crisis.
The aforementioned literature revolves around the financial sector or the banking industry,
with minimal emphasis on the insurance sector. Traditionally, insurance entities are not deemed to
be of systemic relevance to destabilise the greater financial system. Unlike banks, insurers are not
subject to a bank run and therefore do not face the potential of sudden liquidity risk. However, the
bailout of American Insurance Group (AIG) in 2008 suggests otherwise. Using MES, SRI SK and
∆CoV aR , Bierth et al. (2015) analyse the exposure and contribution of 253 international insurance
entities to systemic risk between 2000 and 2012. The authors find that interconnectedness with the
financial system increases insurers’ systemic risk exposure and highly levered entities contribute
more to systemic risk. The authors, however, do not address the role played by shadow insurance.
The risk profile of insurance entities becomes increasingly complicated when they practice
shadow insurance to move blocks of liability to affiliated reinsurers. Koijen and Yogo (2016) define
shadow insurance as “reinsurance ceded to affiliated and unauthorised reinsurer without A.M. Best
rating”. In this paper, we adopt a more stringent definition by also considering Fitch, Moody’s
and S&P ratings. In a typical shadow insurance deal, a parent insurance entity first sets up a
“captive” subsidiary, which is essentially a shell company that is often located offshore with a looser
reserve requirement. The shell entity is usually unauthorised to sell insurance to third parties,
and its primary function is to re-insure the parent company. Next, an operating entity belonging
to the company group cedes a portion of existing liability to the subsidiary. Consequently, the
insurance group can reduce its risk-based capital to underwrite more contracts. By practising
shadow insurance, a “shadow insurer” could increase its risk exposure to drive potential return. We
define shadow insurer as the ultimate parent company of an insurance group practising shadow
insurance.
Lawsky (2013) describes shadow insurance as “a little-known loophole that puts insurance
policyholders and taxpayers at greater risk”, and suggests that the practice of shadow insurance
could disrupt the stability of the entire financial system. Schwarcz (2015) conjectures that shadow
insurance could increase the interconnectedness between the insurance and banking sectors, thus
driving systemic risk. Using A.M. Best rating of insurance entities, Koijen and Yogo (2016) propose
a theoretical framework to estimate the term structure of default probabilities of a company
practising shadow insurance. Under plausible assumptions, the authors show that an entity using
shadow insurance is three and a half times more likely to default over ten years. Koijen and Yogo
(2017) document that a large portion of shadow insurance is funded through letters of credit, which
is mostly written by banks. These documentations suggest further that there is a remarkable level
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of interconnectedness between the shadow insurance business and the entire banking system,
which raises systemic concern.
In this paper, we empirically examine the contribution of shadow insurance to systemic risk of
the global financial industry. To this aim, we collect all reinsurance agreements from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Schedule S filings to identify 29 publicly listed
shadow insurers. We also document that about 2.8 cents every dollar ceded were shadow in 2004
with the amount growing substantially to 21 cents every dollar in 2017. For a global study, we
include all publicly listed insurance entities across the world as our main sample. To measure
the interconnectedness between our sample insurers and the banking industry, we employ the
principal component measure proposed by Billio et al. (2012). In particular, we compute the
interconnectedness between our main sample and the banking system by further considering all
publicly listed banks available in Datastream.
In terms of systemic risk measures, we employ the prominent global measures ∆CoV aR of
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and SRI SK of Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle
(2017). We do not use the MES measure because it is proportional to market beta that captures only
systematic risk (Benoit et al., 2017, p. 136–137). Conversely, SRI SK is less related to beta because it
also depends on the debt and market capitalisation of an entity. Although Benoit et al. (2017) show
that the dynamics of ∆CoV aR matches value-at-risk (V aR) in the time series dimension, there is
only a weak relationship between them in the cross-sectional dimension. An entity might not be
risky individually with a low V aR , but it could be of significant systemic relevance as indicated by a
high ∆CoV aR . On the one hand, ∆CoV aR measures the V aR of the financial system, conditional
on an insurer being in distress. On the other hand, SRI SK evaluates the expected shortfall (ES) of
an insurance entity, conditional on a distressed financial system.
Both ∆CoV aR and SRI SK measures quantify the contribution of an entity to systemic risk of
the financial system. However, Benoit et al. (2013) show that ∆CoV aR and SRI SK do not provide
similar systemic rankings unless under certain strict conditions such as the correlation with the
financial system of riskier insurers is always higher than that of less risky entities. Moreover, Zhang
et al. (2015) find that ∆CoV aR is more reactive to the subprime financial crisis than other popular
measures including SRI SK . To accommodate the distinct features of the employed measures,
we analyse both the full sample period and a subsample that focuses on the period of financial
distress.
From the descriptive statistics, we find that shadow insurers are typically larger, riskier, more
interconnected with other market participants and more likely to contribute to financial instability
compared with non-shadow entities. Next, we perform panel analyses to examine the hypothesis
that the practice of shadow insurance increases systemic risk of the global financial system, after
controlling for factors such as the magnitude of shadow insurance, size of the entity and its degree
of interconnectedness with the banking system. In line with the theory and regulatory expectations,
our findings confirm the pivotal role played by size and interconnectedness in the spreading of
systemic risk. We also find that the practice of shadow insurance increases systemic risk, with
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∆CoV aR showing a stronger effect during distress period and SRI SK suggesting a more profound
long-run impact. Overall, our results suggest that shadow insurance poses non-trivial risks to the
financial system, which confirms the main hypothesis of the paper.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.2, we describe the data
and methodology used in the study. Section 1.3 presents the results of our analysis. Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 Data, variables and methodology
In this section, we present the procedures outlining the preparation of our dataset and the detection
of shadow activities. We describe the formulation of our systemic risk measures, which serve as
the main dependent variables, and introduce the explanatory and control variables involved in the
study. Finally, we summarise all of the variables.
1.2.1 Data preparation
We select all public and active insurance entities that are available in Datastream. Next, we select
entities that are continuously listed between the first quarter of 2004 (2004Q1) and the fourth
quarter of 2017 (2017Q4), leading to a total of 56 quarters for the analysis. We focus on primary
issues and therefore we exclude secondary listings from the selection. Insurers with unavailable
share price and total asset data are omitted. Insurance entities with zero share price data are
further excluded. We also exclude entities whose daily share price does not fluctuate for more than
a quarter. With this filter, we obtain a sample of 215 insurers across 40 countries. Missing data
points of a few entities are estimated using the nearest observation. Lastly, we collect the data
in US dollar to minimise potential bias due to currency risk. In Table 1.1, we report the number
of entities by country in our main sample. Given that United States is the leading country in the
global financial industry, it is not surprising that its entities make up about a quarter of our sample.
The names and Datastream Mnemonics of the full sample are reported in the Appendix. Fig. 1.1
plots the market capitalisation of our sample. We observe that the global insurance industry was
growing steadily until the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 that saw a sharp decline in the market
value of the sector. After the financial crisis, the industry remained stagnant for a few years, and it
began to grow gradually from 2012.
1.2.2 Shadow insurance
To detect shadow insurance, we collect current and past reinsurance agreements from the Schedule
S filings, available to us through Market Intelligence, a data provider owned by S&P Global. As
of April 2018, we have collected a total of 195,717 reinsurance contracts. In each agreement,
we observe the name of the operating entity, the name of the ultimate parent company of the
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Table 1.1 Sample composition
Country # Entities Country # Entities
Australia 4 Kenya 1
Austria 2 Korea, Republic of 7
Belgium 1 Malaysia 6
Bermuda 8 Malta 1
Brazil 1 Mexico 2
Canada 10 Morocco 2
Chile 2 Netherlands 2
Cyprus 2 New Zealand 1
Denmark 2 Norway 1
Egypt 1 Pakistan 8
Finland 1 Singapore 4
France 5 South Africa 5
Germany 9 Spain 2
Greece 1 Sri Lanka 3
Hong Kong 2 Switzerland 7
India 3 Taiwan, Province of China 9
Ireland 1 Thailand 8
Israel 8 Turkey 5
Italy 6 United Kingdom 9
Japan 2 United States 61
NOTES: The table reports the number of insurance entities by country in our international sample. Data source: Datastream.
operating entity, the name of the reinsurer and the amount of reinsurance ceded to the reinsurer.1
Moreover, we observe whether the reinsurance is authorised, whether the reinsurer is affiliated
with the ceding entity and whether it is rated.2
Fig. 1.2 summarises the growth of the reinsurance industry. We observe that reinsurance has
become increasingly popular in the insurance sector as a practice to transfer risks and liabilities
to other parties. The amount grew nearly two and a half times from about $550 billion in 2004 to
about $1300 billion in 2017. Fig. 1.3 reveals the dollar amount of shadow insurance ceded in the
industry. We observe an upward trend in the practice of shadow insurance, growing considerably
from about $15 billion in 2004 to over $250 billion in 2017. In particular, about 2.8 cents every
dollar ceded was shadow in 2004 with this figure rising significantly to 21 cents every dollar in 2017.
Overall, we observe a substantial increase in the practice that is used to artificially boost risk-based
capital buffers reported to the regulators.
Fig. 1.4 disentangles shadow insurance practised by those belonging to a public parent com-
pany from the non-public counterpart. The plot reveals that a large portion of shadow insurance
business involves entities that belong to publicly listed shadow insurers. This finding conveniently
allows us to analyse the balance sheet data of these shadow insurers using prominent global
systemic risk measures such as ∆CoV aR and SRI SK to evaluate the impact of shadow insurance
on global financial stability. In the following, we refer to publicly listed shadow insurers simply as
shadow insurers.
1Following Koijen and Yogo (2016), we define reinsurance ceded as the sum of reserve credit taken and modified
coinsurance reserve ceded.
2An authorised reinsurer is subject to the same capital requirement as the ceding entity.
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Figure 1.1 Market capitalisation. The figure displays the market capitalisation of our sample of
215 insurers over the period 2004Q1–2017Q4, in billion US dollar. Data source: Datastream.










Figure 1.2 Total reinsurance ceded. The figure displays the growth of the reinsurance industry over
the period 2004–2017, in billion US dollar. Data source: Market Intelligence.
We identify a total of 29 shadow insurers by scrutinising every reinsurance agreement from the
Schedule S filings for the period 2004–2017.3 We report the names of these shadow entities, their
corresponding locations and the extent to which they are involved in shadow insurance in Table
1.2. Particularly, we compute the shadow index to measure how aggressive an entity participates
in shadow activity. The shadow index is computed as the ratio of total shadow insurance to the
average reserve held. A high shadow index suggests high aggressiveness as the shadow activities
3In the main analysis, we omit 7 of the 29 shadow insurers due to them being relatively new companies and lack
sufficiently long historical data. The omitted entities are Brighthouse Financial, Inc., Dai-ichi Life Holdings, Inc., FGL
Holdings, Genworth Financial, Inc., National General Holdings Corporation, Primerica, Inc. and Voya Financial Inc.
Although Voya Financial Inc. was recently listed in 2013, the entity was an operating subsidiary under ING Group. Hence,
we include ING Group as shadow insurer to obtain 23 shadow insurers in total. The magnitude of shadow insurance
practised by the omitted entities is relatively small, and we keep a significant portion of shadow insurance in the analysis.
Specifically, the omitted amount represents 6.7% of the total shadow insurance.




































Figure 1.3 Shadow insurance. The figure displays the growth of shadow insurance activity over the
period 2004–2017, in billion US dollar. Data source: Market Intelligence.
have been carried out with a low insurance reserve on average. For instance, although the dollar
amount of shadow insurance practised by MetLife, Inc. ($238,144 million) is higher than Unum
Group ($181,381 million), the latter, however, has been engaging the shadow business with higher
risk exposure. This is revealed by a shadow index of 4154 from Unum Group compared with 700
from MetLife, Inc.
1.2.3 Dependent variables: ∆CoV aR and SRI SK
The ∆CoV aR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) makes use of the value-at-risk (V aR).
The q%-V aR is the expected maximum dollar loss within the q% confidence level. Formally, the
q%-V aR of an entity i , denoted by V aRqi is given by:
P(Xi 6V aR
q
i ) = q%, (1.1)
where Xi is the stock return of entity i . We employ historical simulation method to estimate V aR
q
i .
In particular, we compute V aRqi for a given quarter t using daily stock returns observed in that
quarter, scaled using the root-T rule. The computation is repeated for every quarter to obtain a
time-varying quarterly V aRqi t series.
Next, CoV aR is defined as the V aR of the financial system conditional on some event C (Xi )




Xm |C (Xi )6CoV aRqm|C (Xi )
)
= q%, (1.2)
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Figure 1.4 Shadow insurance (public) vs shadow insurance (non-public). The figure displays the
amount of shadow insurance practised by entity belonging to a public company vs non-public
company over the period 2004–2017, in billion US dollar. Data source: Market Intelligence.
where Xm is the return of the global financial system, computed using the MSCI World Financials
Index.4 An entity’s contribution to systemic risk is measured by ∆CoV aR, namely the difference
between CoV aR conditional on the entity being in distress and CoV aR in the median state of the
entity. As far as the estimation method is concerned, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) to
employ quantile regressions to estimate CoV aR.
The estimate of the q%-quantile of Xm given the value of Xi is given by:




i Xi t , (1.3)
where α̂qi and β̂
q
i are obtained by performing q%-quantile regression of Xmt on Xi t . From the
definition of V aR in (1.1), we have that:
V aRqmt |Xi t = X̂
q
mt |Xi t . (1.4)
Using predicted value of Xi t = V aRqi t yields the CoV aR
q
i t measure. More formally, within the
quantile regression framework, the CoV aRqi t measure is:
CoV aRqi t =V aR
q
mt |Xi t=V aRqi t




i t . (1.5)
The ∆CoV aR of entity i for a given quarter t is given by:




i t −V aR50i t ). (1.6)
4Our conclusions remain unchanged if we use an alternative FTSE World Financials Index. See Appendix 1.A.2.
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Table 1.2 Shadow insurers
Shadow insurer Country Shadow Shadow
insurance index
AEGON N.V. Netherlands 68,287.88 499.647
Allianz Group Germany 1,748.39 3.125
American International Group, Inc. United States 68,460.47 204.889
AXA France 100,183.64 184.810
Brighthouse Financial, Inc. United States 2,109.62 -
Centene Corporation United States 13.64 10.056
Chubb Limited Switzerland 6.73 0.133
Cigna Corporation United States 0.45 0.018
Dai-ichi Life Holdings, Inc. Japan 8,590.69 -
FGL Holdings United States 7,720.02 -
Genworth Financial, Inc. United States 13,994.92 -
Legal & General Group Plc United Kingdom 15,154.48 60.311
Lincoln National Corporation United States 63,208.69 766.231
Manulife Financial Corporation Canada 831,154.11 5262.104
MetLife, Inc. United States 238,144.41 700.263
National General Holdings Corporation United States 0.01 -
Primerica, Inc. United States 26,166.18 -
Prudential Financial, Inc. United States 13,306.91 48.574
Prudential Plc United Kingdom 0.49 0.001
Reinsurance Group of America, United States 15,500.06 1076.965
Incorporated
SCOR SE France 113.08 4.341
Security National Financial Corporation United States 0.11 0.276
Sun Life Financial Inc. Canada 30,496.34 368.483
Swiss Re AG Switzerland 37,335.80 279.541
Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc. Japan 23.23 0.181
Torchmark Corporation United States 33,341.90 3276.872
Unum Group United States 181,380.69 4153.791
Voya Financial, Inc. United States 64,801.15 -
Zurich Insurance Group AG Switzerland 23,667.59 126.654
NOTES: The table displays the names of shadow insurers and the corresponding countries they are located. Besides, the table reports
the amount of shadow insurance practised (in million US dollar), aggregated over 2004–2017. The shadow index is the ratio of total
shadow insurance to the average quarterly reserve held. We do not report the shadow index of some entities as these entities are
subsequently dropped in the analysis due to data availability. Data source: Market Intelligence.
To simplify the notation, in the following q is always set to be 5%, so that CoV aRi t identifies the
system losses predicted on the 5%-V aR of entity i , while ∆CoV aR i t identifies the deterioration in
the system, when entity i moves from its median state to its 5% worst scenario.
The SRI SK measure of Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2017) is based on the
notion of expected shortfall (ES). Formally, the conditional ES of a system with N financial entity






Ri t |Rmt <C
]
, (1.7)
where C is a threshold, and it is set to be the worst 5% daily return of the global financial system
Rmt in each quarter, Ri t is entity i ’s stock return, and wi t is the weight of entity i . As in ∆CoV aR,
we use the return of MSCI World Financials Index as a proxy for Rmt . Next, the daily marginal
expected shortfall (MES) is given by the partial derivative of the system expected shortfall ESmt
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with respect to the weight of entity i :




Ri t |Rmt <C
]
. (1.8)
Subsequently, the quarterly systemic risk measure SRI SK (in dollar) is given by:
SRI SKi t = kDi t − (1−k)Wi t (1−LRMESi t ), (1.9)
where k is the prudential capital fraction, Di t is the book value of debt, Wi t is the market value
of equity, and LRMESi t stands for long-run MESi t . Following Brownlees and Engle (2017), we
set k to be 8%. We approximate LRMESi t using LRMESi t ≃ 1− exp(−18MESi t ) following the
suggestion of Acharya et al. (2012). The contribution of entity i to SRI SK is given by:
SRI SK %i t = (SRI SKi t )+∑N
i=1(SRI SKi t )+
, (1.10)
where (x)+ denotes max(x,0).
1.2.4 Explanatory variables
In this subsection, we present all explanatory variables used in this study.
Shadow indicator
To measure the impact of shadow insurance, we construct the following indicator:
Shadowi t (SIi t ,T Ri t ) =
SIi t /T Ri t if SIi t > SI0,0 otherwise, (1.11)
where SIi t is the amount of shadow insurance practised by entity i at time t ; and T Ri t is the total
insurance reserve entity i has at time t which serves as the scaling variable.5 A large value of
Shadowi t is an indication of high risk because it means that insurer i is heavily engaged in shadow
insurance with little reserve, at time t .6 Finally, SI0 is set to be zero as we are interested in all the
shadow insurance deals regardless of the dollar amount.
Size and interconnectedness
We include size and interconnectedness in the analysis as these regulatory metrics are often criti-
cised for being the leading factors driving systemic risk. As a proxy for size, we use the log of total
market equity for each entity divided by the log of the cross-sectional average of market equity
5Note that we observe shadow insurance and total reserve on the yearly and quarterly basis, respectively. To solve the
mixed frequency problem, we create quarterly SIi t by taking the simple average of annual shadow insurance.
6Replacing total reserve with total assets does not alter our conclusions. See Appendix 1.A.2.
1.2 Data, variables and methodology 17
following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).7 The default of a large financial institution might
create a domino effect leading to the failure of other entities in the financial system. Thus, we
expect size to be positively related to systemic risk.8
To measure the interconnectedness of our sample insurers with the banking system, we use
the principal component approach proposed by Billio et al. (2012). For a given quarter, we let
σ2i denotes the variance of entity i ’s daily return. We then denote Zi as the standardised daily
stock returns of entity i and V = Cov(Zi , Z j ) as the covariance matrix of the standardised daily
returns across a total of N financial entities.9 Next, we decompose matrix V by means of principal
component analysis to obtain eigenvalues λ1, ...,λN , and a matrix L = (Li k )i k that contains the








σiσ j Li k L j kλk . (1.12)
The univariate measure (in logarithm) of an entity’s interconnectedness with the system is given
by:










where hn = ∑nk=1λk/∑Nk=1λk . Following Billio et al. (2012), H is set to be 0.33. In general, the
literature agrees that a high degree of interconnectedness with the financial system increases an
entity’s systemic relevance. We therefore expect this variable to be positively related to systemic
risk.10
Insurer-specific control variables
In addition to the main explanatory variables, we include insurer-specific features as control
variables. However, some insurers do not report the control variables needed for our analysis.
Specifically, 13 entities do not report loss ratio; 11 insurers do not report total reserves; 5 entities do
not report total operating expenses; 2 insurers do not report return on assets; and 8 entities do not
report return on equity. These missing series are estimated using the cross-sectional average.
To control for entity idiosyncratic risk, we use both V aR defined in (1.1) and leverage.11 Clearly,
the former is more related to ∆CoV aR, whereas the latter is more relevant for SRI SK because
SRI SK is a function of debt and market value of equity. Indeed, our empirical analysis shows
that leverage and V aR are often redundant in the regression of ∆CoV aR and SRI SK , respectively.
Therefore, we include according V aR in the analysis of ∆CoV aR and leverage in the regression of
7Our conclusions remain unaltered if we replace total market equity with total assets. See Appendix 1.A.2.
8See, e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), Bierth et al. (2015), Huang et al. (2012) and Laeven et al. (2016).
9We consider an additional of 745 banks worldwide available on Datastream for the computation of interconnected-
ness between our main sample and the banking system. This leads to a total of N = 960 financial entities.
10See, e.g., Billio et al. (2012), Cai et al. (2018), Drehmann and Tarashev (2013), Koijen and Yogo (2017) and Schwarcz
(2015).
11We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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SRI SK for parsimony. To proxy for leverage, we follow Acharya et al. (2017) to use the book value
of assets net book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by the market value of
equity.
We also include other insurer features previously studied by Bierth et al. (2015) as control
variables. We use debt maturity which is computed using long-term debt divided by total debt to
control for the financial health of an entity.12 To control for insurance portfolio quality, we include
the loss ratio. Loss ratio is computed by adding claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance
reserves, divided by premiums earned. We use market-to-book ratio as another control variable
to capture market’s perception of an entity’s value, calculated using the ratio between the market
value of equity and book value of equity. To control for manager quality, we include expense ratio
that is computed as the ratio of operating expenses to total book assets. We use other income to
control for the degree to which an insurer engages in non-traditional and non-insurance activities.
As a proxy for profitability of the insurance entity, we employ the conventional return on assets
(RoA).13
1.2.5 Descriptive statistics
Given the evidence in Zhang et al. (2015) that the extent to which ∆CoV aR and SRI SK react
to economic downturn vary, we conduct our analysis over two periods: The full sample period
and a subsample that focuses on financial distress. In particular, our subsample spans from
2006Q1 to 2011Q2, covering both the United States subprime mortgage crisis and the European
great depression. We begin from 2006 because there exists evidence suggesting that is when the
accumulation of risk leading to the subprime financial crisis started (see, e.g., Dou et al., 2014;
Garriga and Hedlund, 2020). The most notable spillover effect from this crisis is the economic
depression in Europe, with Greece being one of the hardest hit countries (Ureche-Rangau and
Burietz, 2013). From November 2009 to April 2010, the spread of Greek bonds over German ones
increased by an astonishing 451 basis points (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011). Finally, the credit
rating of Greece was downgraded by S&P to its lowest rating in 2011Q2, which marks the end of
our subsample.
Table 1.3 summarises the quarterly variables for both sample periods. Note that a low (high)
∆CoV aR (SRI SK ) estimate is the indication of systemic risk relevance. Besides, we summarise
the positive dollar term of SRI SK for ease of comparison with the literature. For the full sample
period, the mean estimate of ∆CoV aR yields -0.14 with a maximum and a minimum of 0.16
and -1.77, respectively. We observe that the average ∆CoV aR estimate is closer to its maximum
than its minimum, suggesting fat tail on the left side of the distribution. This is confirmed by a
skewness estimate of -3.29, indicating that the systemic importance of average insurers is less
significant economically than certain entities, over a certain period of time. The descriptive
12Among all observations for debt maturity, 21 are erroneous (lager than one), and we replace them with the value of
one.
13Replacing return on assets with return on equity does not alter our conclusions. See Appendix 1.A.2.
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statistics for SRI SK over the entire sample period yield similar pattern. The mean estimate of
SRI SK is $2.5 million with a positive skewness of 6.65, highlighting that on average, certain
insurance entities significantly contribute more to financial instability, at certain points in time.
During the period of financial distress, the mean estimates of ∆CoV aR (-0.17) and SRI SK ($2.7
million) are, respectively, lower and higher than their full sample counterparts. This is expected
because systemic risk measures should reflect the financial downturn, though the average SRI SK
is relatively less sensitive to the event. Overall, the descriptive statistics of the distress period show
similar pattern to those obtained under the full sample.
Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Skew. Kur.
Full period (2004Q1–2017Q4)
∆CoV aR -0.1400 0.1139 -1.7713 0.1637 -3.2869 24.9535
SRI SK (in billions) 0.0025 0.0098 0.0000 0.1619 6.6536 62.2597
Shadow 0.0014 0.0098 0.0000 0.1855 9.9587 116.4354
Si ze 0.9111 0.1018 0.5558 1.1528 -0.1726 2.2689
Inter connectedness -10.5645 1.2537 -18.7689 -4.7360 -0.8222 5.9034
V aR -0.2832 0.2144 -4.0539 0.0000 -3.9369 34.1056
Lever ag e 8.3289 10.5084 1.0066 298.0079 7.4118 128.9634
Debt matur i t y 0.7885 0.3400 0.0000 1.0000 -1.5208 3.7719
Loss r ati o 159.0058 1869.8982 -1097.2800 79649.2800 34.7699 1313.3755
M ar ket to book 1.6024 1.2586 -5.9023 22.5108 3.4185 25.0726
Oper ati ng expenses 2.2513 113.7546 -0.5462 9027.2415 76.4974 5914.9003
Other i ncome 0.0155 1.4927 -0.4524 162.0860 106.6433 11550.5592
Ro A 2.5750 16.8849 -919.1300 1056.2500 24.6892 3060.3365
Distress period (2006Q1–2011Q2)
∆CoV aR -0.1725 0.1473 -1.7713 0.1564 -3.0127 18.6358
SRI SK (in billions) 0.0027 0.0113 0.0000 0.1619 6.7317 60.2114
Shadow 0.0011 0.0094 0.0000 0.1855 11.5949 158.9202
Si ze 0.9113 0.1022 0.6587 1.1497 -0.1639 2.2449
Inter connectedness -10.6507 1.3150 -18.7689 -5.5103 -1.1110 6.2675
V aR -0.3463 0.2591 -4.0539 0.0000 -3.2934 24.5015
Lever ag e 8.2505 12.4927 1.0232 298.0079 9.5724 157.1713
Debt matur i t y 0.7867 0.3440 0.0000 1.0000 -1.5130 3.7186
Loss r ati o 89.1225 123.9234 -1097.2800 1928.9600 7.6980 110.5074
M ar ket to book 1.6673 1.2767 -0.7595 13.1590 2.9601 16.5473
Oper ati ng expenses 1.1155 15.3583 -0.2476 357.5246 15.9248 268.4476
Other i ncome 0.0340 2.3570 -0.3863 162.0860 68.7305 4725.9244
Ro A 2.6214 6.9056 -55.9100 111.7700 6.7756 113.9995
NOTES: The table reports descriptive statistics of the systemic risk measures ∆CoV aR and SRI SK estimated at quarterly frequency
for a sample of 215 insurance entities worldwide. The positive dollar term of SRI SK is used. Besides, the tables reports descriptive
statistics for the set of quarterly independent variables. We report the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and
kurtosis. Data source: Datastream and Market Intelligence.
To compare the response of ∆CoV aR and SRI SK , in Fig. 1.5 we plot the time evolutions for
the cross-sectional means of the two systemic risk measures. Focusing on the average of all entities
(solid lines), we observe that∆CoV aR is relatively more reactive to the distress period while SRI SK
exhibits much more resilience. For instance, ∆CoV aR displays the expected spike at the height
of the subprime crisis, while the response from SRI SK is less profound. This is consistent with
Zhang et al. (2015), who find ∆CoV aR to be the most subprime-sensitive among other measures
including SRI SK , based on a diverse group of 240 international financial institutions. We also
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notice that SRI SK is relatively more reactive to other economic events such as the UK’s Brexit
and China’s economic slowdown in 2016. This pattern is in line with Coleman et al. (2018), who
focus on a group of Canadian insurance entities. Next, we disentangle the systemic risk of shadow
insurers (dashed line) from non-shadow insurers (dotted line). We observe that the dashed line is
always lower (higher) than the dotted line for∆CoV aR (SRI SK ), implying that an entity practising
shadow insurance is, on average, more likely to destabilise the financial system. Interestingly, the
SRI SK of shadow insurers is more responsive to financial distress than that of non-shadow entities,
suggesting that the resilience feature of average SRI SK is primarily driven by those entities not
participating in the shadow banking activity.



























Figure 1.5 Time evolution of systemic risk. The figures plot the mean quarterly systemic risk
measures ∆CoV aR and SRI SK of all insurers (solid line), shadow insurers (dashed line) and non-
shadow insurers (dotted line), over the full sample period 2004Q1–2017Q4. The positive dollar
term of SRI SK is used.
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To understand the driving forces behind an entity’s systemic relevance, Table 1.4 summarises
several risk-related factors of our sample by periods of study and by whether it uses shadow insur-
ance. For both periods, we observe that entities engaging in shadow insurance are more systemic
relevant than their non-shadow counterparts with the shifts in SRI SK being more profound, as per
Fig. 1.5. Besides, we notice that shadow insurers are, on average, larger and more interconnected
with the financial system. They also carry higher idiosyncratic risk as shown by a lower V aR and
a higher leverage. This is consistent with Benoit et al. (2013), who show that if an entity is more
interconnected with the financial system and exhibits higher idiosyncratic risk, it should be more
systemic relevant irrespective of which of the two systemic risk measures is used. Interestingly,
the leverage of shadow insurers experiences some major upshifts during financial distress, while
that of non-shadow entities encounters a weak opposite alleviation. Because SRI SK is closely
related to leverage, this explains why, in Fig. 1.5, the SRI SK of shadow entities is relatively more
responsive to financial distress than that of non-shadow insurers.
From the descriptive statistics reported thus far, we learn that an entity using shadow insurance
is generally more systemic relevant. Without taking into account the shadow activity’s magnitude
— as measured by the shadow indicator in (1.11) — we cannot yet imply that the practice of shadow
insurance has a direct impact on systemic risk of the financial system. To have an idea about the
relation between shadow activity and systemic relevance, in Fig. 1.6 we plot the shadow indicator
and systemic risk estimates of Manulife, the most active shadow entity in our sample. We observe
that the shadow indicator co-moves with∆CoV aR during financial distress. On the other hand, the
co-movement with SRI SK appears to be stronger in the long run. Overall, the plot suggests that
shadow insurance seems to drive the risk of financial system at various points in time depending
on the employed systemic risk measures. This visual inspection is, of course, unconditional and
specific to the case of Manulife.
1.3 Empirical results
In this section, we evaluate and report the factors driving an entity’s contribution to systemic risk.
First, we report the correlation matrix of the panel variables in Table 1.5. Given the negative (posi-
tive) nature of ∆CoV aRi t (SRI SK %i t ), negative (positive) correlation implies systemic relevance.
We observe a weak but statistically significant correlation between the two systemic risk measures,
in line with the cross-sectional averages in Fig. 1.5. The shadow indicator shows the expected nega-
tive and positive pairwise relations with∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t , respectively. This suggests that,
on average, the practice of shadow insurance poses unconditional risks to the financial system. The
regulatory metrics size and interconnectedness also display the expected signs of correlation with
systemic risk. Most of the control variables show statistically significant pairwise associations with
the systemic risk measures. Table 1.6 reports the correlation matrix focusing on the distress period.
We observe a strengthened absolute correlation between ∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t , suggesting
that they exhibit stronger co-movement during the period of financial distress. The key metrics
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(a) Manulife: ∆CoV aR and Shadow

















(b) Manulife: SRI SK and Shadow
Figure 1.6 Systemic risk and shadow indicator series of Manulife. The figures plot the quarterly
shadow indicator (dashed line) and systemic risk measures ∆CoV aR and SRI SK (solid lines) of
Manulife over the full sample period 2004Q1–2017Q4. The positive dollar term of SRI SK is used.
shadow indicator, size and interconnectedness display the expected stronger correlations with
∆CoV aRi t , but weaker associations with SRI SK %i t . In particular, the decrease in correlation is
more profound for the shadow indicator. Given the increase in co-movement between ∆CoV aRi t
and SRI SK %i t during financial distress, the weaker association between the shadow variable and
SRI SK %i t can be attributed to their stronger long-run correlation, as in the case of Manulife in
Fig. 1.6.
In what follows, we specify a panel model that allows testing for the main hypothesis of the
paper that shadow insurance increases global systemic risk while properly controlling for other
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26 Modelling and testing systemic risk
potential risk factors:
Sy stemi cRi ski t = β0 +β1 Shadowi t−1 +β2 Si zei t−1
+β3 Inter connectednessi t−1 +ΩContr ol s
′
i t−1
+αi +ηt +ϵi t ,
(1.14)
where i represents each entity and t represents each quarter; Sy stemi cRi ski t is one of the two
systemic risk measures (∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t ) that quantifies entity i ’s contribution to sys-
temic risk at time t ; Shadowi t−1, Si zei t−1, Inter connectednessi t−1, and Contr ol si t−1 denote,
respectively, the shadow indicator, size, interconnectedness, and the vector of control variables of
entity i at time t −1; αi are entity dummies; ηt are time dummies; and ϵi t is the error term. We
analyse both full sample and the distress period to investigate the behaviour of our results. We
use both least-squares (LS) and generalised method of moments (GMM) to estimate model (1.14).
The former is straightforward to implement, whereas the latter mitigates concern on possible
endogeneity of regressors. Specifically, the GMM estimation first-differences each variable so as to
eliminate any potential bias that may arise from unobserved entity-specific effects. We perform all
of the analyses with clustered standard errors at both country and time levels. Therefore, our setup
is such that the clustered standard errors allow for observations of multiple entities in a single
country to be dependent for each time period, whereas the inclusion of time dummies correct for
any potentially unobservable time-dependent effects that do not vary across entities.
Table 1.7 reports the estimates of model (1.14) using LS for both ∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t
systemic risk measures. Specification (i) reports the results using ∆CoV aRi t measure for the full
sample period. In line with the theory, we find statistically significant evidence showing an entity
that is highly interconnected with the financial system contributes more to systemic risk. Besides,
size shows the expected negative coefficient and is significant at the 5% level, implying that a
larger entity tends to be more systemic relevant because it contributes more to systemic risk. We
observe that the shadow indicator is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This
finding suggests that the practice of shadow insurance increases systemic risk, as we hypothesised.
In particular, an increase in the shadow indicator by one standard deviation leads to a decrease of
0.11% in∆CoV aRi t (0.0098 × -0.1108), in the long run. Specification (ii) reports the analysis results
using∆CoV aRi t for the period of financial distress. Size and interconnectedness continue to play a
crucial role in driving systemic risk. The shadow indicator shows the expected negative coefficient
and is significant at the 1% level. It also displays a higher economic significance: An increase
in the shadow indicator by one standard deviation leads to a decrease of 0.22% in ∆CoV aRi t
(0.0094 × -0.2328). To test whether the impact of shadow insurance is stronger during distress
period, in the full sample analysis we add an interaction term given by the shadow indicator and a
dummy variable that takes the value of one during financial distress.14 The results are reported
in specification (iii). Indeed, we observe a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the
14We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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interaction variable, suggesting that the practice of shadow insurance has a more pronounced
economic effect during the distress period. Besides, the impact is so significant that the non-
distress period effect diminishes, as implied by the insignificant shadow indicator.
Next, we refer to specifications (iv) and (v) in Table 1.7 that report the regressions of SRI SK %i t
over the full sample and the distress periods, respectively. For both estimation periods, size is
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a larger entity contributes more to systemic
risk. Interconnectedness also displays the expected positive sign and is significant at the 5%
level. Our shadow indicator shows the expected positive and statistically significant coefficient
for the analysis of both the full sample as well as the distress period. Particularly, a unit standard
deviation increment of the shadow indicator increases SRI SK %i t by 0.20% and 0.12% for the full
sample (0.0098 × 0.1999) and distress period (0.0094 × 0.1324), respectively. We test whether the
shadow variable has a lower impact during the distress period in specification (vi). Interestingly,
the shadow-distress interaction term displays a negative and significant coefficient, implying that
shadow insurance has relatively weaker effect on systemic risk during financial distress. From the
pairwise associations reported in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6, we note that the absolute correlation
between ∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t increases during financial distress. Specifications (i)–(iii) in
Table 1.7 further suggest that shadow insurance has a higher impact on ∆CoV aRi t during the
period of distress. Therefore, the relatively weaker impact on SRI SK %i t from the shadow variable
during financial distress can be attributed to their stronger long-run association that depreciates
other subsample effects. Overall, the analysis of SRI SK %i t provides further statistical evidence
that shadow insurance poses non-trivial risks to the financial system.
Table 1.8 reports the estimates of model (1.14) via GMM for both ∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t
systemic risk measures. First, we follow the conventional procedure by allowing the use of all
possible lagged values of each variable as instruments. Next, we rigorously reduce the number of
instruments as Roodman (2009) shows via simulations the potential detrimental effects on the
Hansen test given an extensive instrument collection. The author also suggests that the Hansen test
should be satisfied with a high p-value to avoid the danger of false positive. In this paper, we carry
out both Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests, and the p-values of the two tests are well above
the usual rejection level. The former ensures the joint validity of the selected instruments, whereas
the latter assures that instrument exogeneity is satisfied. Finally, we perform the Arellano-Bond
test for second-order serial correlation AR(2) to ensure the validity of our GMM results further.
Specifications (i) and (ii) in Table 1.8 report the analysis results using ∆CoV aRi t as the de-
pendent variable for the full sample and the distress periods, respectively. For both estimation
windows, we find that the regulatory systemic metrics size and interconnectedness yield the ex-
pected negative and significant coefficients; and we observe statistically significant evidence that
shadow insurance poses systemic threat to the global financial sector. In particular, an increase in
the shadow indicator by one standard deviation decreases ∆CoV aRi t by 0.26% and 0.60% for the
full sample (0.0098 × -0.2686) and the distress period (0.0094 × -0.6361), respectively. In specifi-
cation (iii), we observe a negative and significant coefficient for the shadow-distress interaction
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Table 1.7 Regression results: LS estimation
∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t
Full Distress Full Full Distress Full
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Shadowi t−1 -0.1108** -0.2328*** 0.1032 0.1999*** 0.1324*** 0.2288***
(0.0466) (0.0894) (0.0842) (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0199)
Si zei t−1 -0.0965** -0.1769** -0.0916** 0.0868*** 0.1127*** 0.0874***
(0.0451) (0.0860) (0.0450) (0.0105) (0.0249) (0.0105)
Inter connectednessi t−1 -0.0063*** -0.0108*** -0.0063*** 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0002**
(0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
V aRi t−1 0.3523*** 0.3731*** 0.3518***
(0.0106) (0.0150) (0.0107)
Lever ag ei t−1 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Debt matur i t yi t−1 0.0047** 0.0133*** 0.0047** -0.0065*** -0.0061*** -0.0065***
(0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Loss r ati oi t−1 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
M ar ket to booki t−1 0.0020** 0.0033* 0.0020** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0006***
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Oper ati ng expensesi t−1 0.0003 -0.0529*** 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0175) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000)
Other i ncomei t−1 0.0132 0.0756 0.0133 0.0016 -0.0002 0.0016
(0.0147) (0.0472) (0.0146) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0011)
Ro Ai t−1 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Shadowi t−1 -0.5206*** -0.0704***×1(Di str ess) (0.2003) (0.0125)
# Observations 9,319 3,642 9,319 9,319 3,642 9,319
# Entities 215 215 215 215 215 215
Adjusted R2 0.8262 0.8298 0.8268 0.8032 0.8763 0.8036
NOTES: The table reports the estimates of panel model regressions of quarterly ∆CoV aR and SRI SK % systemic risk measures for a
sample of international insurance entities on shadow indicator and various control variables using LS. The model is given by:
Sy stemi cRi ski t =β0 +β1 Shadowi t−1 +β2 Si zei t−1 +β3 Inter connectednessi t−1 +ΩContr ol s
′
i t−1 +αi +ηt +ϵi t ,
where i represents each entity and t represents each time period; Sy stemi cRi ski t is one of the two systemic risk mea-
sures (∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t ) that quantify the contribution of entity i to systemic risk at time t ; Shadowi t−1, Si zei t−1,
Inter connectednessi t−1, and Contr ol si t−1 are, respectively, shadow indicator, size, interconnectedness, and the vector of con-
trol variables for entity i at time t −1; αi are entity dummies; ηt are time dummies; and ϵi t is the error term. The full sample period
runs from 2004Q1 to 2017Q4, whereas the distress period runs from 2006Q1 to 2011Q2. 1(Di str ess) is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one during the distress period. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by country and time. ***, ** and *
represents the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data source: Datastream and Market Intelligence.
variable, suggesting that the impact shadow insurance has on the financial system is economically
more pronounced during the period of distress.
Next, specifications (iv) and (v) report the regressions of SRI SK %i t measure for the full sample
and the distress periods, respectively. For both estimation windows, size and interconnectedness
display the positive and significant coefficients as per our expectation. The coefficient of shadow is
positive and statistically significant for both the analysis of the full period and the financial distress.
In particular, a unit standard deviation increment of the shadow indicator increases SRI SK %i t
by 0.13% and 0.08% for the full sample (0.0098 × 0.1321) and distress period (0.0094 × 0.0817),
respectively. Finally, the interaction variable in specification (vi) provides marginal evidence that
shadow insurance has a more profound impact on systemic risk in the long run.
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To sum up, the regressions of ∆CoV aR and SRI SK via LS provide evidence that the shadow
indicator increases systemic risk in the distress period and the long run. For ∆CoV aR , the effect is
greater during financial distress, whereas SRI SK suggests a more pronounced long-run impact.
The main results are further supported using GMM estimation. Overall, our analyses provide
non-trivial evidence that the practice of shadow insurance affects systemic risk and confirm the
central hypothesis of the paper.
1.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we evaluated the contribution of shadow insurance to systemic risk of the global
financial sector over 2004–2017. We collected 215 international insurance entities from Datastream
that made up our main sample. To identify shadow insurance activities, we scrutinised every
reinsurance agreement from the NAIC Schedule S filings, available to us through Market Intelli-
gence. We identified 29 key shadow insurers, and we found that shadow insurance had become an
increasingly common practice to reduce regulatory capital with the ultimate goal to increase risk
exposure. We documented about 2.8 cents every dollar ceded were shadow in 2004 with the figure
growing significantly to 21 cents every dollar in 2017. We found shadow entities to be generally
riskier, larger, more interconnected with the financial system and more systemic relevant than
their non-shadow counterparts. Our panel analyses provided statistical evidence that the practice
of shadow insurance affected financial stability, with ∆CoV aR suggested a stronger impact during
distress period and SRI SK indicated a more profound long-run effect.
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Table 1.8 Regression results: GMM estimation
∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t
Full Distress Full Full Distress Full
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Shadowi t−1 -0.2686*** -0.6361*** -0.0015 0.1321*** 0.0817*** 0.1613***
(0.0913) (0.2269) (0.0982) (0.0508) (0.0298) (0.0387)
Si zei t−1 -0.2755*** -0.4230*** -0.2517*** 0.0483*** 0.0336*** 0.0552***
(0.0455) (0.1395) (0.0375) (0.0143) (0.0120) (0.0111)
Inter connectednessi t−1 -0.0248*** -0.0374*** -0.0243*** 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0025***
(0.0054) (0.0115) (0.0049) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008)
V aRi t−1 0.3080*** 0.3067*** 0.2974***
(0.0354) (0.0517) (0.0303)
Lever ag ei t−1 0.0007*** 0.0013*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Debt matur i t yi t−1 -0.0416** -0.0678* -0.0471*** -0.0084** -0.0131*** -0.0077**
(0.0168) (0.0355) (0.0159) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0036)
Loss r ati oi t−1 -0.0000 0.0006 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
M ar ket to booki t−1 0.0421*** 0.0234* 0.0385*** -0.0033* 0.0033 -0.0024*
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0121) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0014)
Oper ati ng expensesi t−1 -0.0201*** 0.0646 -0.0193*** 0.0432 0.0325 0.0446
(0.0070) (0.1216) (0.0065) (0.0327) (0.0332) (0.0298)
Other i ncomei t−1 -0.4504 0.4478 -0.1678 -1.1212 -0.0356 -1.3696
(1.0267) (1.5413) (0.9506) (0.8913) (0.0317) (0.9212)
Ro Ai t−1 -0.0467*** -0.0415* -0.0433*** -0.0006* -0.0014 -0.0004*
(0.0158) (0.0238) (0.0135) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0002)
Shadowi t−1 -0.7877*** -0.1240*×1(Di str ess) (0.2854) (0.0721)
# Observations 8,889 3,524 8,889 8,790 3,480 8,790
# Entities 215 215 215 215 215 215
# Instruments 151 75 154 152 74 154
AR(2) test 0.245 0.443 0.247 0.570 0.537 0.337
Hansen test 0.422 0.400 0.352 0.753 0.378 0.632
Diff-in-Hansen test 0.995 0.947 0.997 0.991 0.858 0.909
NOTES: The table reports the estimates of panel model regressions of quarterly ∆CoV aR and SRI SK % systemic risk measures for a
sample of international insurance entities on shadow indicator and various control variables using GMM. The model is given by:
Sy stemi cRi ski t =β0 +β1 Shadowi t−1 +β2 Si zei t−1 +β3 Inter connectednessi t−1 +ΩContr ol s
′
i t−1 +αi +ηt +ϵi t ,
where i represents each entity and t represents each time period; Sy stemi cRi ski t is one of the two systemic risk mea-
sures (∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t ) that quantify the contribution of entity i to systemic risk at time t ; Shadowi t−1, Si zei t−1,
Inter connectednessi t−1, and Contr ol si t−1 are, respectively, shadow indicator, size, interconnectedness, and the vector of con-
trol variables for entity i at time t −1; αi are entity dummies; ηt are time dummies; and ϵi t is the error term. The full sample period
runs from 2004Q1 to 2017Q4, whereas the distress period runs from 2006Q1 to 2011Q2. 1(Di str ess) is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one during the distress period. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by country and time. ***, ** and *




The composition of our full sample is listed in Table 1.A.1.






A:IAGX INSURANCE AUS.GROUP INS Australia
A:AMPX AMP AMP Australia
A:QBEX QBE INSURANCE GROUP QBE Australia
A:CGFX CHALLENGER CHA Australia
O:UNIQ UNIQA INSU GR AG UNI_2 Austria
O:WNST VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP A VIE Austria
B:AGS AGEAS (EX-FORTIS) AGE Belgium
U:XL XL GROUP XL Bermuda
@ACGL ARCH CAP.GP. ARC Bermuda
U:RE EVEREST RE GP. EVE Bermuda
HSX HISCOX (DI) HIS Bermuda
U:RNR RENAISSANCERE HDG. REN Bermuda
@AGII ARGO GP.INTL.HOLDINGS ARG Bermuda
U:WTM WHITE MOUNTAINS IN.GP. WHI Bermuda
K:ASIF ASIA FINANCIAL HDG. ASI Bermuda
BR:SB3 SEG AL BAHIA ON SEG Brazil
C:MFC MANULIFE FINANCIAL MAN Canada
C:GWO GREAT WEST LIFECO GRE Canada
C:SLF SUN LIFE FINL. SUN Canada
C:PWF POWER FINL. POW Canada
C:FFH FAIRFAX FINL.HDG. FAI Canada
C:POW POWER CORP.CANADA POW_1 Canada
C:IAG INDL.ALL.IN.& FINL.SVS. IND Canada
C:ELF E-L FINANCIAL E-L Canada
C:KFS KINGSWAY FINL.SVS. KIN_1 Canada
C:WED WESTAIM WES Canada
CL:CGR CONSOGRAL CON Chile
CL:PVS PREVISION PRE Chile
CP:ATL ATLANTIC INSURANCES ATL_1 Cyprus
CP:LLR LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE LIB_1 Cyprus
DK:TOP TOPDANMARK TOP Denmark
DK:ABF ALM BRAND ALM Denmark
EG:DTI DELTA INSURANCE DEL Egypt
M:SAMA SAMPO ’A’ SAM Finland
F:MIDI AXA AXA France
F:CNP CNP ASSURANCES CNP France
F:SCO SCOR SE SCO France
F:EULE EULER HERMES GROUP EUL France
F:APR APRIL APR France
D:ALV ALLIANZ ALL Germany
D:ALVX ALLIANZ (XET) ALL_1 Germany
D:MUV2 MUENCHENER RUCK. MUE Germany
D:MUV2X MUENCHENER RUCK. (XET) MUE_1 Germany
D:HNR1 HANNOVER RUCK. HAN Germany
D:HNR1X HANNOVER RUCK. (XET) HAN_1 Germany
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D:NBG6 NUERNBERGER BETS. NUE Germany
D:NBG6X NUERNBERGER BETS. (XET) NUE_1 Germany
D:SGS CASH LIFE CAS Germany
G:EUPC EUROPEAN REL.GEN.INS.CR EUR Greece
K:CINS CHINA TAIPING INSURANCE HLDGS CHI Hong Kong
K:MIXN MIN XIN HOLDINGS MIN Hong Kong
IN:MAX MAX FINANCIAL SVS. MAX India
IN:RC RELIANCE CAPITAL REL India
IN:TUB TI FINANCIAL HOLDINGS TI India
EG7 FBD HOLDINGS FBD Ireland
IS:CLN CLAL INSURANCE CLA Israel
IS:DII DIRECT INSURANCE DIR Israel
IS:HAL HAREL IN.INVS.& FNSR. HAR_1 Israel
IS:MNO MENORA MIV HOLDING MEN Israel
IS:MIF MIGDAL INSURANCE MIG Israel
IS:AYL AYALON AYA Israel
IS:ZUR ZUR ZUR_1 Israel
IS:PHN PHOENIX INSURANCE 1 PHO Israel
I:G ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI ASS Italy
I:BMED BANCA MEDIOLANUM BAN Italy
I:US UNIPOLSAI UNI Italy
I:UNI UNIPOL GRUPPO FINANZIARI UNI_1 Italy
I:CASS CATTOLICA ASSICURAZIONI CAT_1 Italy
I:VAS VITTORIA ASSICURAZIONI VIT Italy
J:MSAD MS&AD INSURANCE GP.HDG. MS& Japan
J:MIHO TOKIO MARINE HOLDINGS TOK Japan
KN:JUB JUBILEE HOLDINGS JUB_1 Kenya
KO:AFM SAMSUNG FIRE & MAR.IN. SAM_1 Korea
KO:KAF DB INSURANCE DB Korea
KO:HMR HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE IN. HYU Korea
KO:SDF HANWHA GENERAL INSURANCE HAN_3 Korea
KO:KOR KOREAN REINSURANCE KOR Korea
KO:YOF HEUNGKUK F&M.IN. HEU Korea
KO:DHF LOTTE NON-LIFE IN. LOT Korea
L:LPAC LPI CAPITAL LPI Malaysia
L:SYKT SYARIKAT TAKAFUL MAL. SYA Malaysia
L:MAAS MAA GROUP MAA Malaysia
L:BAIS MANULIFE HOLDINGS MAN_1 Malaysia
L:MNRE MNRB HOLDINGS MNR Malaysia
L:PAOZ PACIFIC & ORIENT PAC Malaysia
MT:MMS MAPFRE MIDDLESEA MAP_1 Malta
MX:GSB GENERAL SEGUROS GEN Mexico
MX:GNP GRUPO NACIONAL PROVINCIAL GRU_1 Mexico
MC:WAA WAFA ASSURANCE WAF Morocco
MC:AGM AGMA LAHLOU TAZI INTERMEDIAIRE D ASSCE. AGM Morocco
H:INGA ING GROEP ING Netherlands
H:AGN AEGON AEG Netherlands
Z:TWRZ TOWER TOW New Zealand
N:STB STOREBRAND STO Norway
PK:CUA JUBILEE LIFE INSURANCE JUB Pakistan
PK:ADI ADAMJEE INSURANCE ADA Pakistan
PK:CNI CENTURY INSURANCE CO. CEN_1 Pakistan
PK:CYA CYAN LIMITED CYA Pakistan
PK:EFL EFU LIFE ASSURANCE EFU Pakistan
PK:ILI IGI LIFE INSURANCE IGI Pakistan
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PK:IGI INTL.GENERAL INSURANCE INT Pakistan
PK:JIN JUBILLE INSURANCE JUB_2 Pakistan
T:GELA GREAT EASTERN HDG. GRE_1 Singapore
T:HBMP MEMORIES GROUP MEM Singapore
T:REIN SINGAPORE REIN. SIN Singapore
T:UOSI UNITED OVERSEAS IN. UNI_8 Singapore
R:SLMJ SANLAM SAN South Africa
R:DSYJ DISCOVERY DIS South Africa
R:LBHJ LIBERTY HOLDINGS LIB South Africa
R:MMIJ MMI HOLDINGS MMI South Africa
R:SNTJ SANTAM SAN_1 South Africa
E:MAP MAPFRE MAP Spain
E:GCO GRUPO CATALANA OCCIDENTE GRU Spain
SL:CEI AVIVA NDB INSURANCE AVI_1 Sri Lanka
SL:CIS CEYLINCO INSURANCE CEY Sri Lanka
SL:USR UNION ASSURANCE UNI_6 Sri Lanka
U:CB CHUBB CHU Switzerland
S:ZURN ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP ZUR Switzerland
S:SREN SWISS RE SWI Switzerland
S:SLHN SWISS LIFE HOLDING SWI_1 Switzerland
S:BALN BALOISE-HOLDING AG BAL Switzerland
S:HEPN HELVETIA HOLDING N HEL Switzerland
S:VAH VAUDOISE ’B’ VAU Switzerland
TW:CFC CATHAY FINL.HLDG. CAT Taiwan
TW:FUB FUBON FINL.HLDG. FUB Taiwan
TW:CNI CHINA LIFE INSURANCE CHI_1 Taiwan
TW:SHK SHIN KONG FINL.HLDG. SHI Taiwan
TW:CRC CENTRAL REIN. CEN Taiwan
TW:TFI FIRST INSURANCE FIR_1 Taiwan
TW:SIZ SHINKONG INSURANCE SHI_1 Taiwan
TW:TFM TAIWAN FIRE & MARINE IN. TAI Taiwan
TW:UIN UNION INSURANCE UNI_7 Taiwan
Q:BKIT BANGKOK INSURANCE BAN_1 Thailand
Q:CHAR CHARAN INSURANCE CHA_1 Thailand
Q:DHIP DHIPAYA INSURANCE DHI Thailand
Q:INTE INDARA INSURANCE IND_2 Thailand
Q:NAMS NAM SENG INSURANCE NAM Thailand
Q:NKIT NAVAKIJ INSURANCE NAV_1 Thailand
Q:AYIT SRI AYUDHYA CAPITAL SRI Thailand
Q:TICT THAI INSURANCE THA Thailand
TK:AND ANADOLU ANONIM TURK SIGORTA SIRKETI LTD. ANA Turkey
TK:HAY ANADOLU HAYAT EMEKLILIK ANA_1 Turkey
TK:AGA AKSIGORTA AKS Turkey
TK:GSA GUNES SIGORTA GUN Turkey
TK:RAY RAY SIGORTA RAY Turkey
PRU PRUDENTIAL PRU United Kingdom
U:AON AON CLASS A AON United Kingdom
AV. AVIVA AVI United Kingdom
LGEN LEGAL & GENERAL LEG United Kingdom
OML OLD MUTUAL OLD United Kingdom
RSA RSA INSURANCE GROUP RSA United Kingdom
STJ ST.JAMES’S PLACE ST. United Kingdom
JLT JARDINE LLOYD THOMPSON JAR United Kingdom
PGH PERSONAL GROUP HDG. PER United Kingdom
U:BRK.A BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ’A’ BER United States
U:AIG AMERICAN INTL.GP. AME United States
U:MET METLIFE MET United States
U:MMC MARSH & MCLENNAN MAR United States
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U:TRV TRAVELERS COS. TRA United States
U:PGR PROGRESSIVE OHIO PRO United States
U:AFL AFLAC AFL United States
U:ALL ALLSTATE ALL_2 United States
U:HIG HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. HAR United States
U:L LOEWS LOE United States
U:CNA CNA FINANCIAL CNA United States
U:LNC LINCOLN NATIONAL LIN United States
U:MKL MARKEL MAR_1 United States
U:AJG ARTHUR J GALLAGHER ART United States
@CINF CINCINNATI FINL. CIN United States
U:Y ALLEGHANY ALL_3 United States
U:AFG AMERICAN FINL.GP.OHIO AME_1 United States
U:RGA REINSURANCE GROUP OF AM. REI United States
U:TMK TORCHMARK TOR United States
U:UNM UNUM GROUP UNU United States
U:WRB W R BERKLEY W R United States
U:BRO BROWN & BROWN BRO United States
@ERIE ERIE INDEMNITY ’A’ ERI United States
U:THG HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP HAN_2 United States
U:ORI OLD REPUBLIC INTL. OLD_1 United States
@SIGI SELECTIVE IN.GP. SEL United States
@ANAT AMER.NAT.IN. AME_2 United States
U:KMPR KEMPER KEM United States
U:MCY MERCURY GENERAL MER United States
U:PRA PROASSURANCE PRO_1 United States
U:RLI RLI RLI United States
@EMCI EMC INSURANCE GROUP EMC United States
U:FFG FBL FINL.GROUP FBL United States
U:HMN HORACE MANN EDUCATORS HOR United States
U:IHC INDEPENDENCE HOLDING IND_1 United States
U:MBI MBIA MBI United States
@NWLI NATIONAL WSTN.LF.GP.’A’ NAT United States
@NAVG NAVIGATORS GROUP NAV United States
@STFC STATE AUTO FINL. STA United States
@UFCS UNITED FIRE GROUP UNI_3 United States
U:UVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE HDG. UNI_4 United States
@AAME ATLANTIC AMERICAN ATL United States
@BWINA BALDWIN & LYONS BAL_1 United States
U:CIA CITIZENS ’A’ CIT United States
@FNHC FEDERATED NATIONAL HDG. FED United States
@FACO FIRST ACCEP. FIR United States
@GANS GAINSCO GAI United States
@HALL HALLMARK FINL.SERVICES HAL United States
@KCLI KANSAS CITY LIFE IN. KAN United States
@KINS KINGSTONE COMPANIES KIN United States
@NSEC NATIONAL SECURITY GROUP NAT_1 United States
@PRZM PRISM TECHNOLOGIES GP. PRI United States
@UNAM UNICO AMERICAN UNI_5 United States
@UTGN UTG UTG United States
U:BRK.B BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ’B’ BER_1 United States
@BWINB BALDWIN & LYON ’B’ BAL_2 United States
@DGICB DONEGAL GP.’B’ DON United States
U:CI CIGNA CIG United States
U:CNC CENTENE CEN_2 United States
U:PRU PRUDENTIAL FINL. PRU_1 United States
@SNFCA SCTY.NAT.FINL.’A’ SCT United States
NOTES: List of insurers included in the sample. The table reports the name of all 215 insurers included in the sample, and their
mnemonic code on Datastream. Sample period: 2004Q1–2017Q4. Data source: Datastream
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1.A.2 Robustness checks
This section presents the results of other robustness checks that are not reported in the paper.
The first robustness check involves using an alternative FTSE World Financials Index to estimate
both the systemic risk measures ∆CoV aR and SRI SK . The main regression results are reported
in Table 1.A.2. Specification (i) reports the analysis results using ∆CoV aRi t measure for the full
sample period. Similar to the original results, we find statistically significant evidence showing an
entity that is highly interconnected with the financial system contributes more to systemic risk.
Besides, size shows the expected negative coefficient and is significant at 5% level, implying a larger
entity tends to be more systemic relevant. We observe that the shadow indicator is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level, confirming the main hypothesis of the paper. Specification
(ii) reports the analysis results using ∆CoV aRi t for the period of financial distress. Size and
interconnectedness continue to play a crucial role in driving systemic risk, although the former is
only marginally significant. The shadow indicator shows the expected negative coefficient and is
significant at the 5% level. The shadow-distress interaction variable in Specification (iii) is negative
and significant, suggesting that shadow insurance has a greater impact during financial distress.
Next, we refer to Specifications (iv) and (v) in Table 1.A.2 that report the analysis results using
SRI SK %i t as the dependent variable for the full sample and the distress period, respectively. For
both estimation windows, size is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a larger entity
contributes more to systemic risk. Interconnectedness shows the expected positive sign, although
it is only marginally significant for the full estimation window. The shadow indicator shows the
expected positive and statistically significant coefficient for the analysis of both the full sample and
the distress period. Finally, the distress-shadow interaction in Specification (vi) shows a negative
and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that shadow insurance has a more profound
long-run effect on systemic risk. In summary, the regulatory metrics size and interconnectedness
continue to highlight their pivotal role in the spreading of systemic risk, although with a weaker
significance level in certain cases. Instead, the coefficient of shadow is always significant at the
5% level, with ∆CoV aRi t showing a stronger impact during financial distress and SRI SK %i t
suggesting a greater long-run effect.
The second robustness check involves using total assets as the scaling variable for the shadow
indicator. The main regression results are reported in Table 1.A.3. In terms of statistical evidence,
there is virtually no difference between the results from Table 1.A.3 and those reported in the main
paper. In summary, the systemic risk metrics size and interconnectedness highlight their pivotal
roles in driving systemic risk. Moreover, the practice of shadow insurance continues to pose a
systemic threat to the financial system, with ∆CoV aRi t showing a stronger impact during distress
period and SRI SK %i t suggesting a greater long-run effect.
The third robustness check involves replacing total market equity with total assets for the com-
putation of the variable size. The main regression results are reported in Table 1.A.4. Specification
(i) reports the analysis results using ∆CoV aRi t measure for the full sample period. Similar to the
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original results, we find statistically significant evidence that interconnectedness and size drive
systemic risk. Besides, we observe that the shadow indicator is negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level. Specification (ii) reports the analysis results using ∆CoV aRi t for the period of
financial distress. Interconnectedness continues to play a crucial role in driving systemic risk. Size,
however, does not significantly affect systemic risk despite showing the expected sign. The shadow
indicator shows the expected negative coefficient and is significant at the 5% level. Specification
(iii) suggests that the shadow variable has a greater economic impact during financial distress. Next,
we refer to Specifications (iv) and (v) in Table 1.A.4 that report the analysis results using SRI SK %i t
as the dependent variable for the full sample and the distress period, respectively. For the full
sample and the distress period, size is positive and statistically significant. Interconnectedness
shows the expected positive sign and is significant at the 5% level. Besides, the shadow indicator
shows the expected positive and statistically significant coefficient for the analysis of both the
full sample as well as the distress period. Finally, the negative and significant distress-shadow
interaction variable in Specification (vi) suggests that shadow insurance has a relatively stronger
long-term effect on systemic risk. To sum up, except for the regression of ∆CoV aRi t during the
financial distress in which the coefficient of size is insignificant, there is virtually no difference
between the results from Table 1.A.3 and those reported in the main paper.
The fourth robustness check involves replacing return of assets with return of equity. The main
regression results are reported in Table 1.A.5. Specification (i) reports the analysis results using
∆CoV aRi t measure for the full sample period. Similar to the original results, we find statistically
significant evidence showing interconnectedness increases systemic risk. Besides, size shows the
expected negative coefficient and is significant at 5% level. We observe that the shadow indicator
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Specification (ii) reports the analysis results
using ∆CoV aRi t for the period of financial distress. Size and interconnectedness continue to
play a crucial role in driving systemic risk, though the former is weakly significant at the 10%
level. The shadow indicator shows the expected negative coefficient and is significant at the 1%
level. We observe a negative and significant distress-shadow interaction variable in Specification
(iii), suggesting that shadow insurance has a relatively stronger impact during financial distress.
Next, we refer to Specification (iv) and (v) in Table 1.A.5 that report the analysis results using
SRI SK %i t as the dependent variable for the full sample and the distress period, respectively. For
both estimation windows, size is positive and statistically significant. Interconnectedness shows
the expected positive sign, although it is only marginally significant for the period of financial
distress. Besides, the shadow indicator shows the expected positive and statistically significant
coefficient for the analysis of both the full sample and the distress period. Finally, the distress-
shadow interaction variable in Specification (vi) suggests that shadow insurance has a more
profound long-run effect on systemic risk.
Summing up all of the robustness analyses, we find that the systemic metric size and intercon-
nectedness play a pivotal role in the spreading of systemic risk, though in a few cases, the evidence
is marginal. On the other hand, the coefficient of shadow is always significant at the 5% level, with
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∆CoV aR showing a stronger economic impact during financial distress and SRI SK suggesting
a greater long-run effect. These analyses show the persistence of shadow insurance in driving
systemic risk, and thus, confirm the central hypothesis of the paper.
Table 1.A.2 Regression results: Robustness 1
∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t
Full Distress Full Full Distress Full
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Shadowi t−1 -0.0888** -0.1986** 0.1052 0.1979*** 0.1317*** 0.2262***
(0.0450) (0.0846) (0.0820) (0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0200)
Si zei t−1 -0.0931** -0.1423* -0.0887** 0.0865*** 0.1134*** 0.0871***
(0.0434) (0.0820) (0.0433) (0.0105) (0.0251) (0.0106)
Inter connectednessi t−1 -0.0067*** -0.0112*** -0.0067*** 0.0002* 0.0003** 0.0002**
(0.0017) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
V aRi t−1 0.3380*** 0.3552*** 0.3376***
(0.0103) (0.0143) (0.0104)
Lever ag ei t−1 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Debt matur i t yi t−1 0.0050** 0.0129*** 0.0050** -0.0065*** -0.0060*** -0.0065***
(0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Loss r ati oi t−1 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
M ar ket to booki t−1 0.0020** 0.0028 0.0019** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0006***
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Oper ati ng expensesi t−1 0.0003 -0.0553*** 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0172) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000)
Other i ncomei t−1 0.0126 0.0768* 0.0127 0.0016 -0.0004 0.0016
(0.0141) (0.0465) (0.0141) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0011)
Ro Ai t−1 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Shadowi t−1 -0.4719** -0.0688***×1(Di str ess) (0.1869) (0.0127)
# Observations 9,319 3,642 9,319 9,319 3,642 9,319
# Entities 215 215 215 215 215 215
Adjusted R2 0.8260 0.8297 0.8265 0.8039 0.8762 0.8042
NOTES: The table reports the estimates of panel model regressions of quarterly ∆CoV aR and SRI SK % systemic risk measures for a
sample of international insurance entities on shadow indicator and various control variables using LS. The model is given by:
Sy stemi cRi ski t =β0 +β1 Shadowi t−1 +β2 Si zei t−1 +β3 Inter connectednessi t−1 +ΩContr ol s
′
i t−1 +αi +ηt +ϵi t ,
where i represents each entity and t represents each time period; Sy stemi cRi ski t is one of the two systemic risk mea-
sures (∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t ) that quantify the contribution of entity i to systemic risk at time t ; Shadowi t−1, Si zei t−1,
Inter connectednessi t−1, and Contr ol si t−1 are, respectively, shadow indicator, size, interconnectedness, and the vector of con-
trol variables for entity i at time t −1; αi are entity dummies; ηt are time dummies; and ϵi t is the error term. The full sample period
runs from 2004Q1 to 2017Q4, whereas the distress period runs from 2006Q1 to 2011Q2. 1(Di str ess) is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one during the distress period. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by country and time. ***, ** and *
represents the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data source: Datastream and Market Intelligence.
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Table 1.A.3 Regression results: Robustness 2
∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t
Full Distress Full Full Distress Full
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Shadowi t−1 -0.4148** -0.9612*** 0.0392 0.3845*** 0.2630*** 0.4224***
(0.1929) (0.3529) (0.1449) (0.0440) (0.0558) (0.0452)
Si zei t−1 -0.0964** -0.1760** -0.0914** 0.0864*** 0.1125*** 0.0868***
(0.0451) (0.0856) (0.0450) (0.0105) (0.0249) (0.0105)
Inter connectednessi t−1 -0.0063*** -0.0106*** -0.0062*** 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0002**
(0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
V aRi t−1 0.3526*** 0.3734*** 0.3521***
(0.0106) (0.0151) (0.0107)
Lever ag ei t−1 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Debt matur i t yi t−1 0.0047** 0.0133*** 0.0047** -0.0065*** -0.0060*** -0.0065***
(0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Loss r ati oi t−1 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
M ar ket to booki t−1 0.0020** 0.0034* 0.0019** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0006***
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Oper ati ng expensesi t−1 0.0003 -0.0527*** 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0175) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000)
Other i ncomei t−1 0.0132 0.0753 0.0132 0.0016 -0.0002 0.0016
(0.0146) (0.0469) (0.0145) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0011)
Ro Ai t−1 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Shadowi t−1 -1.0972*** -0.0916***×1(Di str ess) (0.4101) (0.0187)
# Observations 9,319 3,642 9,319 9,319 3,642 9,319
# Entities 215 215 215 215 215 215
Adjusted R2 0.8264 0.8301 0.8272 0.8029 0.8761 0.8031
NOTES: The table reports the estimates of panel model regressions of quarterly ∆CoV aR and SRI SK % systemic risk measures for a
sample of international insurance entities on shadow indicator and various control variables using LS. The model is given by:
Sy stemi cRi ski t =β0 +β1 Shadowi t−1 +β2 Si zei t−1 +β3 Inter connectednessi t−1 +ΩContr ol s
′
i t−1 +αi +ηt +ϵi t ,
where i represents each entity and t represents each time period; Sy stemi cRi ski t is one of the two systemic risk mea-
sures (∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t ) that quantify the contribution of entity i to systemic risk at time t ; Shadowi t−1, Si zei t−1,
Inter connectednessi t−1, and Contr ol si t−1 are, respectively, shadow indicator, size, interconnectedness, and the vector of con-
trol variables for entity i at time t −1; αi are entity dummies; ηt are time dummies; and ϵi t is the error term. The full sample period
runs from 2004Q1 to 2017Q4, whereas the distress period runs from 2006Q1 to 2011Q2. 1(Di str ess) is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one during the distress period. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by country and time. ***, ** and *
represents the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data source: Datastream and Market Intelligence.
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Table 1.A.4 Regression results: Robustness 3
∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t
Full Distress Full Full Distress Full
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Shadowi t−1 -0.1034** -0.2290** 0.1121 0.1937*** 0.1266*** 0.2217***
(0.0457) (0.0901) (0.0834) (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0195)
Si zei t−1 -0.1133*** -0.0481 -0.1110*** 0.1245*** 0.2426*** 0.1249***
(0.0366) (0.1077) (0.0364) (0.0139) (0.0442) (0.0139)
Inter connectednessi t−1 -0.0062*** -0.0103*** -0.0062*** 0.0002** 0.0004** 0.0002**
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
V aRi t−1 0.3511*** 0.3712*** 0.3507***
(0.0107) (0.0150) (0.0108)
Lever ag ei t−1 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Debt matur i t yi t−1 0.0047** 0.0135*** 0.0047** -0.0065*** -0.0050*** -0.0065***
(0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Loss r ati oi t−1 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
M ar ket to booki t−1 0.0010 0.0015 0.0010 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Oper ati ng expensesi t−1 0.0002 -0.0499*** 0.0002 0.0000* 0.0015 0.0000*
(0.0003) (0.0175) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0000)
Other i ncomei t−1 0.0137 0.0770 0.0138 0.0014 -0.0087** 0.0014
(0.0147) (0.0482) (0.0146) (0.0017) (0.0039) (0.0017)
Ro Ai t−1 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0000**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Shadowi t−1 -0.5255*** -0.0684***×1(Di str ess) (0.2006) (0.0124)
# Observations 9,319 3,642 9,319 9,319 3,642 9,319
# Entities 215 215 215 215 215 215
Adjusted R2 0.8262 0.8296 0.8268 0.8065 0.8825 0.8068
NOTES: The table reports the estimates of panel model regressions of quarterly ∆CoV aR and SRI SK % systemic risk measures for a
sample of international insurance entities on shadow indicator and various control variables using LS. The model is given by:
Sy stemi cRi ski t =β0 +β1 Shadowi t−1 +β2 Si zei t−1 +β3 Inter connectednessi t−1 +ΩContr ol s
′
i t−1 +αi +ηt +ϵi t ,
where i represents each entity and t represents each time period; Sy stemi cRi ski t is one of the two systemic risk mea-
sures (∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t ) that quantify the contribution of entity i to systemic risk at time t ; Shadowi t−1, Si zei t−1,
Inter connectednessi t−1, and Contr ol si t−1 are, respectively, shadow indicator, size, interconnectedness, and the vector of con-
trol variables for entity i at time t −1; αi are entity dummies; ηt are time dummies; and ϵi t is the error term. The full sample period
runs from 2004Q1 to 2017Q4, whereas the distress period runs from 2006Q1 to 2011Q2. 1(Di str ess) is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one during the distress period. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by country and time. ***, ** and *
represents the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data source: Datastream and Market Intelligence.
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Table 1.A.5 Regression results: Robustness 4
∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t ∆CoV aRi t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t SRI SK %i t
Full Distress Full Full Distress Full
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Shadowi t−1 -0.1132** -0.2386*** 0.1014 0.1982*** 0.1321*** 0.2268***
(0.0466) (0.0905) (0.0856) (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0199)
Si zei t−1 -0.0954** -0.1515* -0.0903* 0.0828*** 0.1008*** 0.0834***
(0.0478) (0.0785) (0.0480) (0.0101) (0.0235) (0.0101)
Inter connectednessi t−1 -0.0063*** -0.0105*** -0.0062*** 0.0002** 0.0003* 0.0002**
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
V aRi t−1 0.3524*** 0.3737*** 0.3519***
(0.0105) (0.0148) (0.0106)
Lever ag ei t−1 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Debt matur i t yi t−1 0.0046** 0.0133*** 0.0046** -0.0065*** -0.0062*** -0.0065***
(0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Loss r ati oi t−1 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
M ar ket to booki t−1 0.0020** 0.0032* 0.0020** -0.0005*** -0.0008*** -0.0005***
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Oper ati ng expensesi t−1 0.0003 -0.0529*** 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0012 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0175) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000)
Other i ncomei t−1 0.0133 0.0736 0.0134 0.0018 0.0001 0.0018
(0.0147) (0.0459) (0.0146) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0011)
Ro Ai t−1 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Shadowi t−1 -0.5220*** -0.0697***×1(Di str ess) (0.2014) (0.0125)
# Observations 9,319 3,642 9,319 9,319 3,642 9,319
# Entities 215 215 215 215 215 215
Adjusted R2 0.8265 0.8300 0.8271 0.8033 0.8766 0.8036
NOTES: The table reports the estimates of panel model regressions of quarterly ∆CoV aR and SRI SK % systemic risk measures for a
sample of international insurance entities on shadow indicator and various control variables using LS. The model is given by:
Sy stemi cRi ski t =β0 +β1 Shadowi t−1 +β2 Si zei t−1 +β3 Inter connectednessi t−1 +ΩContr ol s
′
i t−1 +αi +ηt +ϵi t ,
where i represents each entity and t represents each time period; Sy stemi cRi ski t is one of the two systemic risk mea-
sures (∆CoV aRi t and SRI SK %i t ) that quantify the contribution of entity i to systemic risk at time t ; Shadowi t−1, Si zei t−1,
Inter connectednessi t−1, and Contr ol si t−1 are, respectively, shadow indicator, size, interconnectedness, and the vector of con-
trol variables for entity i at time t −1; αi are entity dummies; ηt are time dummies; and ϵi t is the error term. The full sample period
runs from 2004Q1 to 2017Q4, whereas the distress period runs from 2006Q1 to 2011Q2. 1(Di str ess) is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one during the distress period. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by country and time. ***, ** and *
represents the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data source: Datastream and Market Intelligence.
CHAPTER 2
A MULTIVARIATE NONPARAMETRIC TEST
FOR VOLATILITY SPILLOVER†
2.1 Introduction
Volatility is undoubtedly one of the most informative indicators in finance as it is fundamentally
related to, among others, market liquidity risk (Garbade and Silber, 1979), the interaction between
informed and strategic traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988), the rate of information flow to the
market (Ross, 1989), revealed private information (Stoll and Whaley, 1990), and the degree of
international markets links following attempts by participants to infer information from other
markets (King and Wadhwani, 1990). At the regional level, empirical evidence suggests there is
strong volatility comovement within and across asset classes (Bollerslev et al., 2018). Consequently,
a statistical tool that detects volatility spillover between markets or asset classes could provide
valuable information in hedging variance risk (Bakshi and Kapadia, 2003) as well as pricing the
volatility index (VIX) derivatives (Bardgett et al., 2019).
The academics and practitioners in macroeconomics and finance regularly concern with
testing volatility spillover between markets characterized by multiple indices in which a univariate
test is inadequate because it does not take into account covariances. The latter can play a nontrivial
role in driving spillover as shown in our Monte Carlo study. In this paper, we propose a new
econometric strategy for testing volatility spillover between two potentially multivariate financial
markets.1 We begin by generalizing the univariate hypothesis of Hong (2001) to the multivariate
setup. We follow the author to define volatility spillover using the notion of Granger (1969, 1980)
causality in variance, in that there is volatility spillover from Y2 to Y1 if any of the past variances of
†A research manuscript (joint with G. Urga) based on the results in this chapter entitled “A Multivariate Nonparametric
Test for Volatility Spillover” is under revision at Econometric Theory.
1Other risk measures are proposed in, for instance, Acharya et al. (2017); Bouhaddioui and Roy (2006); Brownlees and
Engle (2017); Candelon and Tokpavi (2016); Casarin et al. (2018); Corradi et al. (2019); Diebold and Yilmaz (2012); Forbes
and Rigobon (2002); Fry et al. (2010); Hong et al. (2009); Weller (2019).
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Y2 has predictive power over the current variance of Y1. Therefore, the terms variance causality and
volatility spillover may be used interchangeably. We derive testable statistics for our hypotheses
using normalized cross-spectra and we develop the asymptotic theory. Our test statistics possess
several appealing features. First, the computation of our test statistics is relatively simple since it
requires only the estimation of standardized residuals which are the main event variables. Unlike
most existing parameter restriction tests which estimate all series in a global model, our procedures
allow the event variables of Y1 and Y2 to be estimated separately. Second, our tests check a large
number of lag orders M as the sample size T increases. In fact, we allow (but we do not require)
M to grow with T at a proper rate to ensure power against a broad class of alternatives such as
delayed spillover effect. Third, our frequency domain kernel-based procedure allows flexible
weighting of the cross-spectrum at each lag order. We show that the conventional Granger-type
regression procedure can be viewed as a special case of our approach when the Truncated kernel is
used. Both tests assign equal weight to each lag. Instead, we propose to use downward weighting
kernels to enhance the power of our tests because empirical stylized facts suggest that market
participants discount past information and thus spillover effect is expected to decay over time.
Indeed, simulation evidence shows that our downward weighting tests can check a large number
of lags without losing significant power when compared with an equally weighted test.
The paper further proposes an optimal multivariate volatility model to facilitate estimating the
spillover test statistics in the higher dimension. The proposed structure resembles the constant
conditional correlation (CCC) specification in Bollerslev (1990). Compare with the CCC model, we
specify the elements in the diagonal matrix as general infinite order autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity [ARCH(∞)] processes to minimize the risk of misspecification because a mis-
specified model may yield autocorrelated squared standardized residuals (see, e.g., Li and Mak,
1994). This will in turn contaminate the resulting test statistics by invalidating its asymptotic
property. Indeed, our supplementary empirical study shows that serial correlation induced by
an inadequate ARCH may give misleading inferential result.2 In this aspect, the proposed long
ARCH(∞) process — which is sometimes referred to as a “nonparametric” approach — is more
appealing than conditional variance models with a prespecified order. Regarding model estima-
tion, we show that least-squares (LS) is feasible and we thus propose its consistent estimators. Our
method requires only about 5% of the computing time of quasi maximum likelihood estimation
(QMLE). For notational simplicity, we call our approach the NCCC-LS model, where the acronym
stands for Nonparametric-CCC-Least-Squares.
Our econometric strategy proceeds in two stages. First, we estimate the event variables by
fitting the newly proposed NCCC-LS model to the observed data. Second, we compute our kernel-
based test statistics to draw inference about volatility spillover. Throughout our econometric
strategy, we need not perform numerical integration nor optimization. An extensive Monte Carlo
study shows that our inferential strategy provides reliable finite sample inference even in the higher
2See Appendix 2.H.
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dimension up to the case of 10 series while the simulation evidence in most other papers is limited
to 2–3 series. We further provide a consistent bootstrap test whose finite sample size is found
to converge at a faster rate. We apply our inferential strategy in a timely multivariate study in
which we investigate the distortion in volatility spillover relations between the North America (NA)
market and the UK market before and after the Brexit referendum. For a broader study, we also
examine the spillover effect on the European Union (EU) market. Our main findings indicate that
after the Brexit referendum, the UK market has lost its previous influence in that volatility spillover
from UK to NA diminishes. This finding suggests that after Brexit, market participants in the NA
region have a reduced interest to follow the UK market because of the concern that it might lose
its access to the European Single Market, which is an important trading region for the NA. On the
other hand, we find that the spillover effect from EU to NA is relatively delayed before Brexit but
the nexus becomes more immediate after Brexit. This is because market participants in the NA
that previously focus on the UK market have naturally switched their attention to the European
market directly. Consequently, volatility in EU can propagate more immediately to NA, as captured
by our testing strategy.
We emphasize that the application of our inferential strategy is not limited to the macro
level financial markets. At the firm level, our statistical tool can assist policymakers to identify
volatility transmitters and recipients in the financial system and thus to shape targeted policy to
protect vulnerable volatility recipient as individual or group whenever necessary. The remainder
of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we derive kernel-based test statistics for the
hypotheses of interest and we provide their asymptotic properties. Section 2.3 presents the NCCC-
LS volatility model and its asymptotic validity. The finite sample performance of our econometric
strategy is reported in Section 2.4 using a Monte Carlo study. In Section 2.5, we apply the proposed
inferential strategy to empirically examine volatility spillover between the North American and
European equity markets. Section 2.6 concludes. Most mathematical derivations and proofs
along with additional simulation and empirical results are relegated to the Appendices of the
paper. Throughout the paper,
d−−→ and p−−→ denote convergences in distribution and probability,
respectively. Unless otherwise indicated, all limits are taken as the sample size T →∞.
2.2 Multivariate Granger causality in variance
In this section, we introduce the formal hypotheses for volatility spillover using Granger causality
in variance. We then construct kernel-based test statistics for the hypotheses using the quadratic
distance between two spectral densities. Finally, we provide the asymptotic properties of the
proposed tests.
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2.2.1 From univariate to multivariate Granger causality in variance
For two stationary time series Y1t and Y2t , let I1t and I2t denote the respective information set
available at time t . Further let It ≡ (I1t , I2t ) denote the combined information set. Following the
definition of Granger (1980), Y2t Granger causes Y1t with respect to It−1 if
E(Y1t |I1t−1) ̸= E(Y1t |It−1). (2.1)
Granger (1969) introduces a regression-based test for (2.1), which can be viewed as the causality in
mean hypothesis. We note that there are other definitions of Granger causality such as those based
on projections on Hilbert spaces (see, e.g., Boudjellaba et al., 1992; Comte and Lieberman, 2000).
This is not pursued.
Next, Granger et al. (1986) propose the notion of causality in variance, which is sometimes
referred to as second-order causality (see, e.g., Comte and Lieberman, 2000). Let µi t ≡ E(Yi t |It−1),








] ̸= E[(Y1t −µ1t )2|It−1]. (2.3)
Under the null hypothesis, the variance of Y1t is not affected by I2t−1, we say that Y2t does not
Granger cause Y1t in variance. By construction, causality in mean has been filtered out because
the hypotheses are not affected by causal relation in the mean equation. Therefore, any remaining
causal effect is driven purely by volatility that is unaffected by mean and we follow Hong (2001) to
use this information to test for volatility spillover from Y2t to Y1t in the higher dimension.
Let us now consider two stationary vectors of time series (Y1t ,Y2t ), where for i = 1,2, Yi t =
[Yi t (1), ...,Yi t (di )]′, di ∈Z+ <∞. Let I1t and I2t denote the information set available at time t of
Y1t and Y2t , respectively. The combined information set is denoted by It ≡ (I1t , I2t ). Further let
ϵi t ≡ Yi t −E(Yi t |It−1). We suppose that the demeaned series exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity
ϵi t = (H 0i t )1/2Ξi t , (2.4)
where H 0i t is a (di ×di ) positive definite conditional variance-covariance matrix of ϵi t , measurable
with respect to Ii t−1. The innovation processΞi t is such that
E(Ξi t |Ii t−1) = 0 a.s., E(Ξi tΞ′i t |Ii t−1) = Id i a.s. (2.5)






) ̸= E(Ξ1tΞ′1t |It−1). However, this concept is too general to be empirically testable
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considering the broad information set. Therefore, we specify the following feasible hypotheses
H10 :Ξ1tΞ
′
1t ⊥ Ξ2sΞ′2s , for all s < t , (2.6)
H1A :Ξ1tΞ
′
1t ⊥̸ Ξ2sΞ′2s , for at least one s < t . (2.7)





) = E(Ξ1tΞ′1t ) for all s < t , that is, the inclusion of
Ξ2sΞ
′
2s does not improve the forecast ofΞ1tΞ
′
1t . See Cheung and Ng (1996) and Hong (2001) for a
similar consideration in the univariate framework. Although the history of the squared innovation
{Ξ2sΞ′2s , s < t } is only a subset of I2t−1, one could certainly use other information in I2t−1 to
examine Granger causality. For instance, when extreme market events are used, our approach is
related to testing systemic risk spillover (e.g., Acharya et al., 2017; Brownlees and Engle, 2017). If the
level of the innovation are used, our test can be viewed as the dependence test of Bouhaddioui and
Roy (2006) with the extension to allow for series that exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity. When
tail events are considered, our approach is related to testing for tail risk spillover (e.g., Hong et al.,
2009; Weller, 2019). The use of the squared innovations {Ξ2sΞ′2s , s < t } is particularly appropriate
when one is interested in the volatility comovements between two markets. We note that Corradi
et al. (2012) also consider the transmission of volatility across markets but their method requires
the estimation of daily quadratic variation using high-frequency data which may be costly in
practice.
On the other hand, the squared innovations Ξi tΞ′i t can be consistently estimated using the
squared standardized residuals based on the more readily available daily data. Let θ0i denote
the true unknown finite-dimensional parameters of H 0i t . Given {ϵt }
T
t=1, where ϵt = (ϵ1t ,ϵ2t )′, let
θ̂i denote any
p
T -consistent estimator of θ0i , such that Ĥ i t = H i t (θ̂i ), where Hi t is the pseudo
version of H 0i t with initial value that is chosen arbitrarily. For notational simplicity, we further let
Ẑi t ≡ vech
[
(Ĥ i t )−1/2ϵi tϵ′i t (Ĥ i t )
−1/2], a column vector with d∗i components, where d∗i = di (di +
1)/2. The vector Ẑi t collects the squared standardized residuals and cross products of standardized
residuals at time t . The event variables of interest are the centered version of Ẑi t . We denote
ût ≡ ut (θ̂1) = Ẑ1t −vech(Id 1), v̂t ≡ vt (θ̂2) = Ẑ2t −vech(Id 2), (2.8)
where Id is an identity matrix of dimension d . When d1 = d2 = 1, ût and v̂t reduce to Hong’s (2001)
univariate event variables. Similarly, we denote by u0t and v
0
t the pseudo version of the event
variables based on the true volatility processes H 01t and H
0
2t , respectively. Note that we do not
require the two event variables to have the same dimension. Essentially, our spillover test allows
the number of indices to vary for the two markets of interest.
2.2.2 Test statistic and asymptotic properties
We now derive a test statistic for H10 based on the notion of cross-spectrum which is coherent
within the concept of Granger (1969) causality. To see the implication ofH10 on the cross-spectrum
46 Modelling and testing volatility spillover
between the event variables u0t and v
0
t , we first note that the multivariate normalized cross-spectral
density of (u0t , v
0
t ) is given by




ρ( j )e−i jλ, λ ∈ [−π,π], i =
p
−1, (2.9)
where ρ( j ) ≡ corr(u0t , v 0t− j ). Note that ρ( j ) and f (λ) contain the same information about the cross-
correlation between u0t and v
0
t− j since they are Fourier transforms of each other. We choose to use
the frequency domain f (λ) for some desirable properties below. UnderH10, we haveρ( j ) = 0, ∀ j > 0.
As a result, f (λ) reduces to




ρ( j )e−i jλ. (2.10)
Therefore, we can testH10 by quantifying the difference between the observed density f (λ) and the
null density f 0(λ) using a proper divergence measure such as the quadratic norm. Any nontrivial
deviation between f (λ) and f 0(λ) is evidence against the null hypothesis.
The true cross-spectra f (λ) and f 0(λ) are not known but they can be estimated consistently
using nonparametric methods. Empirically, return series exhibit the volatility clustering char-
acteristic as a volatile period tends to be followed by another volatile period. This is because
financial markets are generally more influenced by recent information than remote information.
Consequently, the magnitude of any economic movement, including volatility spillover, is expected
to decay over time. We thus consider the kernel estimator that allows for flexible weighting at each
lag order




k( j /M)ρ̂( j )e−i jλ, (2.11)




k( j /M)ρ̂( j )e−i jλ, (2.12)
where k(·) is a kernel function and M is a truncation point when the kernel is bounded, or a
smoothing parameter when the kernel has unbounded supports. The sample cross-correlation
matrix ρ̂( j ) is given by
ρ̂( j ) = Diag(Ĉuu)−1/2Ĉuv ( j )Diag(Ĉv v )−1/2, (2.13)
where Ĉuv ( j ) is the sample cross-covariance matrix that is given by













ût+ j v̂ ′t , j < 0,
(2.14)
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and Ĉuu and Ĉv v are the sample covariance matrices of ût and v̂t , respectively. The function
Diag(·) returns a diagonal matrix consisting of the diagonal elements of the original matrix. Note
that ρ̂( j ) is a matrix of dimension (d∗1 ×d∗2 ).
Recently, Robbins and Fisher (2015) propose a distance measure based on the Toeplitz matrix,
though, positive definiteness of the measure cannot be guaranteed and some forms of correction
are needed. Instead, we follow Duchesne and Roy (2004) to construct our test statistic based on the
quadratic distance between f̂ (λ) and f̂ 0(λ) for tractability. The distance measure L̂2
[
f̂ (λ), f̂ 0(λ)
]
is such that L̂2
[
f̂ (λ), f̂ 0(λ)
]≥ 0, and L̂2[ f̂ (λ), f̂ 0(λ)]= 0 if and only if f̂ (λ) = f̂ 0(λ). Let Γ̂u and Γ̂v
denote the sample correlation matrices of ût and v̂t , respectively. We use the quadratic form
L̂2
[




























where f (·) denotes the complex conjugate of f (·). The equality follows from Paserval’s theorem. As
a result, numerical integration overλ is not required in terms of the computation of L̂2
[
f̂ (λ), f̂ 0(λ)
]
.
The derivation of (2.15) is provided in Appendix 2.A. Compared with Duchesne and Roy (2004),
we do not integrate over the angular frequency. We allow for the case where d1 ̸= d2. Besides, the
authors work with the unstandardized version of spectral density. As a result, their test is based on
covariances rather than correlations. We show in the analysis of Proposition 2.2.2 in Appendix 2.B
that there is a cross-covariance representation of (2.15)
L̂2
[





Ĉuv ( j )
]′(Ĉ−1v v ⊗Ĉ−1uu)vec[Ĉuv ( j )]. (2.16)
Despite the equivalence, we choose to construct our test statistics using the standardized spectral
density so that our measure naturally reduces to that of Hong’s (2001) when d1 = d2 = 1. The























(1− j /T )k2( j /M), (2.18)
D1T (k) = 2
T−1∑
j=1
(1− j /T )[1− ( j +1)/T ]k4( j /M). (2.19)
The constants C1T (k) and D1T (k) are readily computable given k(·) and M . Under some conditions
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M−1D1T (k) → 2
∫ ∞
0 k







4(z)dz without affecting the asymptotic properties of Q1.
We now establish the asymptotic properties of Q1. Let H̃i t denote the pseudo version of Hi t
with the true unobserved initial value. Note that H̃i t (θ0i ) = H 0i t , but H i t (θ0i ) ̸= H 0i t due to the initial
value. As a result, ũt (θ01) = u0t and ṽt (θ02) = v 0t , but ut (θ01) ̸= u0t and v t (θ02) ̸= v 0t . This discrepancy
is properly addressed in the following. To begin with, we present some regularity conditions under
the model described by (2.4)–(2.5).
Assumption 2.2.1. For i = 1,2, {Ξi t } is multivariate independent and identically distributed se-
quence with E(Ξi t ) = 0, E(Ξi tΞ′i t ) = Id i and finite eighth-order moment.
Assumption 2.2.2. For i = 1,2, pT (θ̂i −θ0i ) =Op (1), θ0i ∈Θi .
Assumption 2.2.3. For eachθi ∈Θi , i = 1,2, supθ1∈Θ1 T
∑T




Assumption 2.2.4. Let ∇θi and ∇2θi denote, respectively, the gradient and Hessian operators
w.r.t. θi . Then, supθ1∈Θ1 T
−1 ∑T
t=1E||∇θ1 ũt (θ1)||2 =O(1), supθ2∈Θ2 T −1
∑T








Assumption 2.2.5. The kernel k :R→ [−1,1] is symmetric about 0, and is continuous at 0 and at
all points except for a finite number of points, with k(0) = 1 and ∫ ∞0 k2(z)dz <∞.
Assumption 2.2.6. M/T → 0 as T →∞.
In Assumption 2.2.1, we do not assume any specific distribution for the innovation process
Ξ1t andΞ2t beyond the regularity moment condition. The i.i.d. condition onΞi t corresponds to
the “strong ARCH” process defined in Hafner (2008) which is frequently used for estimation and
inference in practice. Under this condition, Chan et al. (2007) derive the limiting distribution of
the value-at-risk estimate in a ARCH process while Gao and Song (2008) extend the relevant works
to cover the expected shortfall estimate. In this paper, the i.i.d. assumption ensures condition
(2.5) that E(Ξi t |Ii t−1) = 0 a.s. and E(Ξi tΞ′i t |Ii t−1) = Id i a.s., and it also reduces the complexity of
the asymptotic analysis. It appears the condition could be weakened so thatΞi t is a martingale
difference sequence at the cost of a more tedious proof but we do not pursue this possibility here.
In Assumption 2.2.2, we do not impose any estimation restriction. Specifically, we allow for anyp
T -consistent estimator θ̂i . Assumption 2.2.3 requires that the initial condition of the variance-
covariance process is asymptotically negligible. In particular, we require that the difference
between ut (θ1) and ũt (θ1) goes to zero in probability at proper speed. Note that Assumption
2.2.3 becomes redundant under our nonparametric volatility specification discussed in Section
2.3. Assumption 2.2.4 requires that the event variables are twice continuously differentiable, with
bounded derivatives. Assumption 2.2.5 is a standard regularity condition on the kernel function
k(·). Most kernels used in spectral analysis satisfy this condition (see, e.g., Andrews, 1991; Priestley,
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1981). Assumption 2.2.6 is rather weak. It allows M to be fixed, or to grow with the T but at a slower
speed. Finally, we have thus far assume that the demeaned series ϵi t is observable for ease of
exposition, but it can be replaced by any
p
T -consistent estimate without affecting the asymptotic
properties of Q1 given Assumptions 2.2.1–2.2.6.
We now state the asymptotic normality of Q1 underH10.
Theorem 2.2.1. Suppose Assumptions 2.2.1–2.2.6 hold under the model described by (2.4)–(2.5).
Then, Q1
d−−→ N(0,1) underH10.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.1. We let Ŝ ≡ T L̂2[ f̂ (λ), f̂ 0(λ)], C 0uu ≡ E[u0t (u0t )′] and C 0v v ≡ E[v 0t (v 0t )′], the















where ρ̂∗( j ) = Diag(C 0uu)−1/2Ĉuv ( j )Diag(C 0v v )−1/2; and Γu = Diag(C 0uu)−1/2C 0uu Diag(C 0uu)−1/2
and Γv = Diag
(
C 0v v
)−1/2C 0v v Diag(C 0v v )−1/2 are the true correlation matrices of true u0t and v 0t ,
respectively. We can decompose Q1 as
Q1 =




]1/2 + Ŝ −S∗[d∗1 d∗2 D1T (k)]1/2 . (2.21)
Then, the result of Theorem 2.2.1 follows from Propositions 2.2.1–2.2.2. 
Proposition 2.2.1. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 2.2.1 hold, we have that











Proof of Proposition 2.2.1. Let Ĉ 0uv denotes the sample cross-covariance matrix in (2.14) with true
u0t and v
0















where ρ̂0( j ) = Diag(C 0uu)−1/2Ĉ 0uv ( j )Diag(C 0v v )−1/2. We consider a similar decomposition
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The result of Proposition 2.2.1 is given by Lemmas 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
Lemma 2.2.1. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 2.2.1 hold, we have that





Lemma 2.2.2. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 2.2.1 hold, we have that
S∗−S = op (M 1/2).
We shall defer the lengthy proofs of Lemmas 2.2.1–2.2.2 and Proposition 2.2.2 to Appendix
2.B. When the Truncated kernel is used to compute Q1, our test can be viewed as the Granger
(1969)-type procedure. To see the intuition, we first note that the Truncated kernel is given by
k(z) = 1(|z| ≤ 1), where 1(·) is the indicator function. For the purpose of illustration, suppose
















where ρ̂( j ) is a (1×3) vector and Γ̂−1u is a (3×3) matrix. On the other hand, the Granger-type




φ j v̂t− j +wt , (2.25)
which checks whether the (1 × 3) parameter vector {φ j }Mj=1 are jointly zero. We do not have
to include in the auxiliary regression (2.25) the lagged variables of ût given Assumption 2.2.1.
There is evidence that v̂t Granger causes ût with respect to It−1 if at least one coefficient in
{φ j }Mj=1 is significantly different from zero. A typical test statistic GR for this hypothesis obtained
from, for instance, the Wald’s procedure is asymptotically χ2(3M) under H10 (see, e.g., Bauer

















being the M sum of the properly standardized independent χ2(3)
quantity is also asymptotically χ2(3M) underH10. To ensure power of the Granger regression-based
test against a large class of alternatives, we allow M to grow with the sample size T properly. Using













. With proper transformations, we have underH10, Q1REG ≡
3Given the Truncated kernel function, we have C1T (k) = M [1− (1+M)/(2T )] and D1T (k) = 2M [1− (2+M)/T + (M +
1)(M +2)/(3T 2)]. Using a more stringent condition on M such that M3/2/T = o(1), we can conveniently approximate
C1T (k) and D1T (k) by M and 2M , respectively.
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(GR−3M)/(6M)1/2 d−−→ N(0,1) as well as Q1TR = {T ∑Mj=1 vec[ρ̂( j )′(Γ̂−1u )vec[ρ̂( j )]−3M }/(6M)1/2 d−−→
N(0,1).
When M is large, both Q1REG and Q1TR may not yield a good power against the alternatives of
practical importance. Given that economic agents tend to discount past information, the effect
of volatility spillover will fade as lag order j increases. Therefore, we propose to use downward
weighting kernels such as the Bartlett, Daniell and Quadratic-Spectral kernels to increase the power
performance of our Q1 test. See Section 2.4 for more discussion and the Monte Carlo study.
To investigate the asymptotic behavior of Q1 under the alternative hypothesis, we impose a
condition on the cross-correlation ρ( j ) and a fourth order cumulant condition.
Assumption 2.2.7. The two event variables u0t and v
0
t are jointly fourth order stationary and their
cross-correlation structure is such that ρ( j ) ̸= 0 for at least one j > 0 and
∞∑
j=1







|κr sr s(i , j , l )| <∞,




r,t− j , v
0
s,t−l , with
r ∈ {1, ...,d∗1 } and s ∈ {1, ...,d∗2 }.
The condition
∑∞
j=1 ||ρ( j )||2 <∞ implies that the dependence of u0t on v 0t− j decays to zero at a
proper speed. However, it still permits a pair of highly cross-dependent processes whose cross-
correlation decays to zero at a gradual hyperbolic rate. The cumulant condition is trivially satisfied
if the joint process {u0t , v
0
t } is Gaussian which implies zero fourth-order cumulants. Fourth-order
stationary linear processes with absolutely summable coefficients and with innovations whose
fourth-order moment exists, also satisfy the cumulant condition (Hannan, 1970, p.211).
The following theorem states the consistency of Q1 under fixed alternatives.
























Proof of Theorem 2.2.2. Recall that C1T (k) =O(M) and D1T (k) = 2M
∫ ∞
0 k
4(z)dz[1+o(1)] as M →






























Therefore, the proof of Theorem 2.2.2 is given by Lemmas 2.2.3–2.2.5. 
Lemma 2.2.3. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 2.2.2 hold, then T −1(S −S∗) = op (1).
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Lemma 2.2.4. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 2.2.2 hold, then T −1(Ŝ −S∗) = op (1).






























We shall defer the lengthy proofs of Lemmas 2.2.3–2.2.5 to Appendix 2.C. Theorem 2.2.2 implies
that Q1 goes to infinity at rate T /M 1/2 provided ||ρ( j )|| ̸= 0 for any j > 0. In the limit, negative
values of Q1 can only occur underH10. Therefore, Q1 is a one-sided test; upper-tailed N(0,1) critical
values should be used. Besides, the faster T grows, the quicker Q1 will approach infinity and
the test will become more powerful. In other words, Q1 has asymptotic unit power against any
linear pairwise volatility spillover. However, it should be noted that Q1 has no power against the
alternatives with zero cross-correlation for all values of j > 0, that is, ||ρ( j )|| = 0,∀ j > 0, though we
expect such highly nonlinear alternatives to be empirically rare in economics and finance.
2.2.3 Bidirectional Granger causality in variance
The proposed Q1 test is readily extendable for testing bilateral variance causality. This extension is
convenient when the direction of volatility spillover is not known a priori. We consider the multi-
variate version of Hong’s (2001) bidirectional hypothesis that neither Y2t causes Y1t in variance
with respect to (I1t , I2t−1) nor Y1t causes Y2t in variance with respect to (I1t−1, I2t ). Essentially, we
examine the following bidirectional hypotheses
H20 :Ξ1tΞ
′
1t ⊥ Ξ2sΞ′2s , for all s, (2.26)
H2A :Ξ1tΞ
′
1t ⊥̸ Ξ2sΞ′2s , for at least one s. (2.27)
UnderH20, we have ρ( j ) = 0, ∀ j . As a result, the cross-spectrum f (λ) reduces to zero. The normal-
ized quadratic distance between the kernel-based spectral density estimator and the null spectral
density is given by
L̂22
[














The proposed bidirectional test statistic Q2 is a centered and scaled version of L̂22
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(1−| j |/T )k2( j /M), (2.30)
D2T (k) = 2
T−1∑
j=−T+1
(1−| j |/T )[1− (| j |+1)/T ]k4( j /M). (2.31)
Similar to Q1, the bidirectional test statistic Q2 converges in distribution to N(0,1) under the
bilateral null hypothesis and it has asymptotic unit power whenever ||ρ( j )|| ̸= 0 for at least one
j . Likewise, upper-tailed N(0,1) critical values should be used for Q2. The mathematical proof
involved is similar to that of Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 by considering both positive and negative lag
order j ’s, and we shall refrain from repeating the details here. In summary, when prior knowledge
about the direction of volatility spillover is not available, one may first test the bidirectional
hypothesis that neither Y2t Granger causes Y1t in variance.
2.3 Estimation
The asymptotic analysis of Q1 and Q2 multivariate tests does not add complication relative to
the univariate ones in that it explores the multivariate counterparts of algebra, calculus and
mathematical inequalities such as the Kronecker product, matrix differentiation and Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality. However, the proposed tests rely on H 0i t which can be a complex process to
specify. The ideal specification should possess the following features. First, the structure of the
specification should facilitate its estimation considering that it may house higher dimensional
variance-covariance matrix. Second, conditions ensuring that the estimated H 0i t is nonnegative
definite should be straightforward to impose. Third, model estimation should achieve convergence
or preferably bypass any numerical optimization routine. Finally, along with these properties,
the specified processes in the structure should minimize ARCH inadequacy. We now put forward
a structure which intersects these features in an optimal manner. We suppose that H 0i t can be
decomposed as follows
H 0i t = (D0i t )1/2R0i (D0i t )1/2, for i = 1,2, (2.32)




−1/2ϵi tϵ′i t (D
0
i t )
−1/2] is the covariance matrix of the vector of element-wise standardized
residuals by construction. Under this structure, H 0i t is positive semidefinite provided that the
elements in D0i t are nonnegative and that R
0
i is positive semidefinite.
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We specify D0i t as an infinite order ARCH process. For n = 1, ..,di , we denote the n-th elements
in D0i t and ϵi t by h
0
i ,n,t and ϵi ,n,t , respectively. The ARCH(∞) representation takes the form
h0i ,n,t =ω0i ,n +
∞∑
j=1
a0i ,n, j ϵ
2
i ,n,t− j . (2.33)
This general process includes Engle’s (1982) ARCH(q), Bollerslev’s (1986) generalized autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity [GARCH(p, q)], and Engle and Bollerslev’s (1986) integrated
GARCH and fractionally differenced GARCH models. We can rewrite (2.33) as an infinite order
autoregressive [AR(∞)] process
ϵ2i ,n,t =ω0i ,n +
∞∑
j=1
a0i ,n, j ϵ
2
i ,n,t− j +ei ,n,t , (2.34)
where ei ,n,t ≡ ϵ2i ,n,t −h0i ,n,t is such that E(ei ,n,t |Ii ,n,t−1) = 0. Because the assumption of an infinite
autoregressive process is rather mild, this is sometimes referred to as a “nonparametric” approach
(see, e.g., Lewis and Reinsel, 1985). Given realization {ϵ2i ,n,t }
T
t=1, we can approximate (2.34) by a
finite order AR(p) process, where p is a function of T
ϵ2i ,n,t =ω(p)i ,n +
p∑
j=1
a(p)i ,n, j ϵ
2
i ,n,t− j +e(p)i ,n,t . (2.35)
We propose to estimate (2.35) using least-squares. Although least-squares estimation may
give larger standard errors than likelihood-based estimation, it is free from the complications of
numerical optimization and likelihood misspecification (see, e.g., Newey and Steigerwald, 1997).
Besides, it is computationally less demanding. As we show in a computational study provided
in the supplementary document, our method requires only about 5% of the computing time of
QMLE.4
For i = 1,2, we let θ̂(p)i ≡ [(ω̂
(p)
i ,1 , ...,ω̂
(p)
i ,di
), (â(p)i ,1,1, ..., â
(p)
i ,di ,1
), ...(â(p)i ,1,p , ..., â
(p)
i ,di ,p
)]′ collects the least-
squares estimator of the vector of parametersθi ≡ [(ωi ,1, ...,ωi ,di ), (ai ,1,1, ..., ai ,di ,1), ...(ai ,1,p , ..., ai ,di ,p )]′
with true value θ0i ≡ [(ω0i ,1, ...,ω0i ,di ), (a
0
i ,1,1, ..., a
0
i ,di ,1
), ...(a0i ,1,p , ..., a
0
i ,di ,p
)]′. We now provide regular-
ity conditions under which θ̂(p)i is a consistent estimator of θ
0
i .
Assumption 2.3.1. For i = 1,2, n = 1, ...di , (a) {ϵ2i ,n,t } and {ei ,n,t } are strictly stationary and ergodic;
(b) {ei ,n,t } is strong mixing with E(e2i ,n,t ) =Σe,i ,n and has finite fourth-order moment.
Assumption 2.3.2. The lag order p is chosen such that p = o(T 1/2/M 1/4) and p/log(T ) →∞.
As stated in Assumption 2.3.1(a), we do not consider nonstationary system in the present paper.
Assumption 2.3.1(b) requires the process {ei ,n,t } is strong mixing and has finite fourth-order mo-
ment. The former requirement is less restrictive than the martingale difference property of {ei ,n,t }
whereas the latter is of equal order to the moment condition in Assumption 2.2.1. Assumption 2.3.2
4See Appendix 2.H.
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is a standard condition on p in the long AR literature. The condition p = o(T 1/2/M 1/4) requires
that p not to grow too fast, whereas the condition p/log(T ) →∞ imposes a lower bound on the
growth rate of p. The following proposition states the consistency of θ̂(p)i .
Proposition 2.3.1. Let the conditional variance process of model (2.4)–(2.5) be defined by (2.32)–
(2.35). Suppose Assumptions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 hold, then
||θ̂(p)i −θ0i || =Op (p1/2T −1/2), for i = 1,2.
The proof of Proposition 2.3.1 is provided in Appendix 2.D. We have shown the consistency of
θ̂
(p)
i but it does not converge at the required rate of
p
T . With the current speed, we can provide
further conditions such that the spillover test is consistent but the asymptotic normality may not
hold under the null hypothesis. We therefore invoke Theorem 5.52 in van der Vaart (1998) to provide
conditions for the least-squares criterion function m(θi ,ϵ2i ,n,t ) ≡ (ϵ2i ,n,t −ωi ,n −
∑∞
j=1 ai ,n, j ϵ
2
i ,n,t− j )
2
such that θ̂(p)i achieves the required rate of convergence.
Assumption 2.3.3. For i = 1,2, n = 1, ...di , let m(θi ,ϵ2i ,n,t ) be any measurable function parameter-
ized by θi such that for fixed constants ∆ and α>β, and for every sufficiently small ζ> 0,
(a) sup||θi−θ0i ||<ζE[m(θi ,ϵ
2
i ,n,t )−m(θ0i ,ϵ2i ,n,t )] ≤−∆ζα;
(b) E
{
sup||θi−θ0i ||<ζ |GT [m(θi ,ϵ
2














i ,n,t )−Op (Tα/(2β−2α)),






i ,n,t )−E[m(θi ,ϵ2i ,n,t )]}.
In general, m(θi ,ϵ2i ,n,t ) can be the criterion function of any other M-estimators. See, for
instance, Antoine and Renault (2012) for a comprehensive analysis in the context of generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimation. The intuition of Assumption 2.3.3 is as follows: provided
that (a) the deterministic map E[m(θi ,ϵ2i ,n,t )] reacts rapid enough as θi moves away from θ
0
i ; (b)




i ,n,t ) and E[m(θi ,ϵ
2
i ,n,t )] is sufficiently small, then
θ̂
(p)
i has a high rate of convergence if its distance with θ
0
i is properly bounded according to (c). By
setting α= 1.5 and β= 0.5, condition (c) is satisfied using the fact that the squared residuals are
bounded by Op (p/T ) =Op (T −3/4), where the equality follows from Assumption 2.3.2. The desired
convergence rate of θ̂(p)i then follows. The following proposition states the formal result.
Proposition 2.3.2. Let the conditional variance process of model (2.4)–(2.5) be defined by (2.32)–
(2.35). Suppose Assumptions 2.3.1–2.3.3 hold with α= 1.5 and β= 0.5, then
||θ̂(p)i −θ0i || =Op (T −1/2), for i = 1,2.
The proof of Proposition 2.3.2 is provided in Appendix 2.E. With this speed, our test remains
valid in the limit, although negative volatilities are not precluded by θ̂(p)i . To adjust for this,
in the following we provide the adjusted least-squares estimator θ̂(p)ai that ensures positive-
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semidefiniteness of D0i t . We show that the adjusted estimator can be computed based on an
ex post estimate of θ̂(p)i . We require the following additional conditions to hold.
Assumption 2.3.4. For i = 1,2, the true parameter vectorθ0i lies in the parameter space [Rmini ,Rmaxi )
such that D0i t is positive-semidefinite.
Assumption 2.3.5. For i = 1,2, there exists a vectorδi with nonnegative entries such that θ̂(p)i +δi ∈
[Rmini ,R
max
i ) and (θ̂
(p)
i +δi )1(δi > 0) =Rmini 1(δi > 0).
Assumption 2.3.4 is a standard condition that restricts the true parameter such that D0i t is
positive-semidefinite. The sufficient condition is that each element in θ0i is nonnegative (i.e.
Rmini = 0, Rmaxi =∞). Assumption 2.3.5 requires the existence of a lower bound vector δi with
nonnegative entries such that θ̂(p)i +δi yields a positive-semidefinite D0i t . In practice, we can
replace the negative entries in θ̂(p)i by zeros such that they corresponds to R
min
i , that is, δi =
−θ̂(p)i 1(θ̂
(p)
i < 0). Note that δi is simply a vector of zeros if the unadjusted estimator lies in the
desired parameter space.





i +δi . The following proposition states the consistency of θ̂
(p)a
i .
Proposition 2.3.3. Let the conditional variance process of model (2.4)–(2.5) be defined by (2.32)–
(2.35). Suppose Assumptions 2.3.1–2.3.5 hold, then
||θ̂(p)ai −θ0i || =Op (T −1/2), for i = 1,2.
The proof of Proposition 2.3.3 is provided in Appendix 2.F. The proof uses the fact that the ex
post adjustment does not affect the asymptotic properties of θ̂(p)i because it is only applied to the
entries that are outside of the true neighborhood of θ0i .
To establish the asymptotic validity of (2.32)–(2.35) for our Q1 and Q2 tests, a final condition is
required for the proper convergence of R0i .
Assumption 2.3.6. For i = 1,2, (D0i t )−1/2ϵi t maintains the same stochastic properties asΞi t with
covariance E[(D0i t )
−1/2ϵi tϵ′i t (D
0
i t )
−1/2] = R0i .
It is evident that (D0i t )
−1/2ϵi t belongs to a special case of Ξi t = (H 0i t )−1/2ϵi t with diagonal
H 0i t ; it is therefore natural for the former to inherit the stochastic properties of the latter but with
covariance R0i instead of identity covariance. Then, the estimation of (2.32) proceeds in two steps.
First, we estimate (2.35) for each of the diagonal elements in D0i t using the adjusted least-squares
estimator θ̂(p)ai . The estimated positive-semidefinite process is denoted by D̂i t . In the second step,
R0i is estimated using the sample covariance of D̂
−1/2
i t ϵi t , which we denote by R̂i . Because R̂i is
always positive-semidefinite, this ensures that the estimated time-varying covariance matrix is
always positive-semidefinite.
The following proposition states the validity of Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 under the proposed
volatility model.
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Proposition 2.3.4. Let the conditional variance process of model (2.4)–(2.5) be defined by (2.32)–
(2.35). Suppose Assumptions 2.2.1–2.2.2, 2.2.4–2.2.6, 2.3.1–2.3.6 hold, then the results of Theorem
2.2.1 remain valid. Additionally, suppose Assumption 2.2.7 holds, then the results of Theorem 2.2.2
remain valid.
The proof of Proposition 2.3.4 is provided in Appendix 2.G. The key is to show that the second
step estimator R̂i is
p
T -consistent for R0i . Given this result and by collecting R̂i in the estimator
vector, the results of Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 continue to hold under their respective conditions.
Note that Assumption 2.2.3 is not needed here since we do not have to specify an initial value for
our model. Besides, when the true data generating process has finite autoregressive order, we havep
T -consistent estimators regardless of Assumption 2.3.3. We provide Assumption 2.3.3 as a formal
condition to maintain the generality of our approach where we allow p to grow with T .
In summary, a multivariate volatility model is proposed to facilitate the estimation of Q1 and
Q2. The proposed specification enjoys estimation simplicity and computational efficiency. The
approach is somewhat “nonparametric” in that it imposes minimal assumption on the structure of
D0i t . We also do not impose any parametric assumption on R
0
i . A similar structure of (2.32) was
previously studied by Bollerslev (1990), which is often referred to as the CCC model. We differ from
the author by specifying elements in D0i t using a more general volatility process and we propose to
estimate D0i t by least-squares. We also demonstrate the consistency of our two-steps estimators.
To highlight the dissimilarity and for notational simplicity, we shall denote our approach in short
as the NCCC-LS approach, where the acronym stands for Nonparametric-CCC-Least-Squares.
2.4 Monte Carlo simulations
In this section, we investigate the finite sample performance of the proposed econometric strategy
using Monte Carlo simulations. We first consider a bivariate setup (i.e., d1 = d2 = 2), where we
conduct experiments to study the effect of covariance intensity on the finite sample size and power
of our testing strategy. Then, we study the behavior of our method with increasing dimension.
To save space, we focus here on the unidirectional test statistic Q1, and we report and discuss in
Appendix 2.H the full results based on the bidirectional statistic Q2.
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2.4.1 The bivariate case







































mi ,1t = 0.8mi ,1t−1 +ei ,1t , mi ,2t = 0.8mi ,2t−1 +ei ,2t , ei ,1t ,ei ,2t iid∼ N(0,4),
h0i ,1t = 0.1+0.8h0i ,1t−1 +0.05ϵ2i ,1t−1, h0i ,2t = 0.1+0.8h0i ,2t−1 +0.05ϵ2i ,2t−1.
(2.36)
We consider the following correlation structures
NullA: r1 = r2 = 0.2, NullB: r1 = r2 = 0.5,
NullC: r1 = r2 = rt = 0.2+0.1×0.2cos[2πt/(T /4)].
Under NullA, we have a relatively moderate correlation between the conditional variances in both
Y1t and Y2t . Combination NullB increases the correlation magnitude. Under NullC, we have a
stable time-varying correlation structure that is generated by a cosine function with four periods
over sample size T . For more complex structures, the NCCC framework can always be extended by
letting R0i evolve over time based on a parametric structure which relies on likelihood estimation
(see, e.g., Aielli, 2013; Engle, 2002). To study the power of our testing strategy, we simulate the effect
of volatility spillover by generating correlated squared innovation ϵ̃21, j t and ϵ̃
2
2, j t using Cholesky
transformation, where for j = 1,2, ϵ̃21, j t = s2ϵ22, j t−1 + (1− s22)1/2ϵ21, j t−1, ϵ̃22, j t = ϵ22, j t . The parameter
s2 ∈ [0,1] controls the intensity of volatility spillover from Y2t to Y1t with respect to It−1. We
consider the following parameter combinations
AlterA: r1 = r2 = 0.2, s2 = 0.35, AlterB: r1 = 0.2,r2 = 0.5, s2 = 0.35.
Both AlterA and AlterB generate equal spillover intensity (s2 = 0.35) from Y2t to Y1t with respect to
It−1. This allows examining the power of our test. We increase the covariance of the risk transmitter
Y2t under AlterB to study the role it plays in driving volatility spillover.
For each data generating process, we conduct 10000 Monte Carlo simulations with sample size
T = 1000 and 1500, which correspond to approximately four and six years of daily financial data,
respectively. For each T , we generate T +1000 observations and then we discard the first 1000
observations to reduce possible effects from the chosen starting values (h0i ,10,h
0
i ,20,mi ,10,mi ,20) =
[0.1/(1−0.05−0.8),0.1/(1−0.05−0.8),0,0]. We consider the following three downward weighting
kernel functions k(·).
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The Bartlett (BAR) kernel,
k(z) =
1−|z|, if |z| ≤ 1,0, otherwise.













For comparison with an equally weighted test, we also include the Truncated (TR) kernel. Note
that the selected kernels satisfy the requirements in Assumption 2.2.5. To assess the sensitivity
of our approach to the kernel parameter M , we consider M = 10, 20 and 30. All spillover tests are
carried out at the 5% significance level.
For each simulation, the estimation and testing procedure proceeds in steps. First, we filter
the conditional mean of Yi t using least-squares which yields
p
T -consistent residuals (White,
2001, Theorem 5.11). Then, based on the procedures described in Section 2.3 we fit the NCCC-LS
model. We select for the order of every diagonal ARCH process in the NCCC-LS structure using
the Bayesian information criteria up to the 25th order. Finally, we test for spillover by computing
Q1 and Q2. It is worth highlighting that our econometric strategy is computationally simple in
that numerical integration and optimization are not involved throughout model estimation and
spillover testing.
In addition to asymptotic critical values, we also consider a nonparametric naive bootstrap
in which we randomly re-sample the estimated residuals with replacement. As is well known,
the bootstrap procedure can often yield a more accurate finite sample size (see, e.g., Chen and
Hong, 2012a,b, 2016). We denote the bootstrap statistic using asterisk by Q∗1 . Step (i), retain fitted
series and residuals Ŷ1t , Ŷ2t , ϵ̂1t and ϵ̂2t . Step (ii), compute Q1. Step (iii), obtain naive bootstrap
residuals ϵ̂∗1t and ϵ̂
∗
2t and construct bootstrap sample Y
∗
1t = Ŷ1t + ϵ̂∗1t and Y ∗2t = Ŷ2t + ϵ̂∗2t . Step (iv),
compute the b-th statistic Q∗1





the original sample (Y 1,Y 2) ≡ {Y1t ,Y2t }Tt=1. Step (v), repeat steps (iii) to (iv) B times to obtain B
bootstrap test statistics {Q∗1






We set B = 499 and we maintain 10000 simulations. In the following we give the consistency of our
bootstrap test. First, we state the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4.1. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 2.2.1 hold. Then, conditional on (Y 1,Y 2),
Q∗1
d−−→ N(0,1).
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Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. By design, the bootstrap approach ensures that the null hypothesis
always holds in the bootstrap world since the two series (Y 1,Y 2) are re-sampled independently.
Taken together with the regularity conditions of Theorem 2.2.1, the asymptotic normality of Q∗1
follows. 
The consistency of our bootstrap approach is given by combining the following two results.
First, under the null hypothesis, the bootstrap approach gives asymptotically correct size since Q∗1
converges in distribution to N(0,1) given Proposition 2.4.1. Second, when the null hypothesis is
false, our bootstrap approach has asymptotic unit power. This follows from the fact that while Q∗1
remains converging in distribution to N(0,1), Q1 converges to positive infinity in probability given
Theorem 2.2.2 and thus giving consistent bootstrap p-value.
Table 2.1 reports the empirical sizes of our volatility spillover tests under NullA, NullB and
NullC based on the NCCC-LS modeling. In general, we find that Q1 tends to over reject the null a
little but not excessively. The size improves gradually as T increases. We find the rejection rates
of Q1 to be stable across the three parameter combinations. This implies that the size of our
inferential strategy is not affected by increasing portfolio correlation and the time-varying cosine
case. As expected, our bootstrap test Q∗1 yields a more accurate finite sample size than Q1, and
it too is robust to changing correlations. Overall, we find the proposed econometric strategy to
be reasonably sized. This result appears to hold across the kernel functions and the value of their
smoothing parameter M .
We report the empirical powers of our testing approach in Table 2.2. For Q1, we use empirical
critical values that are computed from the 10000 simulations under NullA. This gives size-adjusted
powers. In general, we find that our inferential strategy becomes more powerful as T increases.
We also find that both Q1 and Q∗1 give rather similar power. The rejection rates of Q1 and Q
∗
1
decrease in M . This is because under AlterA and AlterB, we have one-period lagged volatility
spillover. Therefore, we expect a test that focuses on recent events to give better power. Besides,
we find that the downward weighting kernels often yield better power than the TR kernel, and
they are less affected by a large M . These results confirm our expectation that, compared with an
equally weighted test, downward weighting tests alleviate the impact of choosing a relatively large
M because they discount higher order lags. Interestingly, we find that the rejection rates of Q1 and
Q∗1 are higher under parameter combination AlterB. This implies that, other things being equal, an
increase in the correlation within the risk transmitter Y2t can drive the overall effect of volatility
spillover. This result highlights the nontrivial role covariance can play in driving spillover.
2.4.2 Higher dimensions
The finite sample performance of existing multivariate dependence tests is often demonstrated up
to the case of three series. For instance, the bivariate case is examined in Duchesne and Roy (2004),
whereas Robbins and Fisher (2015) study the relations between bivariate and trivariate processes,
that is d1 = 3, d2 = 2. By contrast, we now demonstrate the finite sample performance of our
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Table 2.1 Empirical sizes
NullA NullB NullC
T M 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
Rejection rates based on asymptotic critical values
1000 Q1BAR 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.9 6.8 7.2 6.7 6.7
Q1DAN 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.7 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.8
Q1QS 7.1 6.9 6.8 7.1 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.7 6.9
Q1TR 7.1 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.3 7.1 6.6 6.6 6.7
1500 Q1BAR 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.8 6.7 6.5
Q1DAN 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.7 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.2
Q1QS 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.6 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.3
Q1TR 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗1BAR 5.3 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.5
Q∗1DAN 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.3 5.2
Q∗1QS 5.5 5.4 5.0 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.4 5.1
Q∗1TR 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
1500 Q∗1BAR 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.4
Q∗1DAN 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3
Q∗1QS 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.3
Q∗1TR 4.9 5.3 5.3 4.9 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.3 5.3
NOTES: The table reports empirical sizes (in %) of Q1 under NullA, NullB and NullC at the 5% significance level based









denote the rejection rates of Q1 using asymptotic and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN,
QS and TR denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated
kernel. Number of bootstraps = 499. T and M denote the sample size and kernel smoothing parameter, respectively.
multivariate approach in higher dimensions, which is made feasible thanks to the proposed NCCC-
LS modeling. We focus on the case where we analyze spillover effects on a relatively large market
covering multiple countries such as the European Union. In particular, we study d1 = 3,4, ...,10
and d2 = 2. We expect our approach to perform similarly given the opposite relation or any
combinations of di with similar combination complexity.
We study the size of our inferential strategy under combination NullD, where with increasing
d1, we retain the correlation intensity ri of NullA because our bivariate simulations show stability
across combinations NullA–NullC. In spite of that, we perform a sensitivity check to find that
the performance of our approach in the higher dimensions is robust to the time-varying cosine
correlation of NullC. For power study, we maintain the covariance structure in AlterA but we reduce
the spillover intensity s2 to 0.15 to highlight the power effects as d1 increases. Given d1 > d2, we
generate spillover to each series in Y1t by repeating the influence of Y2t . This ensures that every risk
recipients in Y1t is equally affected by the spillover effect. For instance, when d1 = 4, d2 = 2, Y1,3t
and Y1,4t will be influenced by Y2,1t and Y2,2t , respectively. We denote this parameter combination
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Table 2.2 Empirical powers
AlterA AlterB
T M 10 20 30 10 20 30
Rejection rates based on empirical critical values
1000 Q1BAR 78.2 69.0 61.9 95.0 90.1 85.1
Q1DAN 74.5 62.1 53.4 93.3 85.1 78.2
Q1QS 73.1 59.8 51.7 92.7 83.8 76.6
Q1TR 51.5 38.4 32.0 76.8 61.1 51.7
1500 Q1BAR 92.1 85.4 80.0 99.4 98.0 96.7
Q1DAN 89.8 79.6 72.3 99.0 96.6 93.7
Q1QS 88.9 78.2 70.9 98.8 96.2 92.8
Q1TR 71.1 55.1 46.4 92.9 83.3 73.2
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗1BAR 76.1 66.0 59.1 94.2 88.4 83.1
Q∗1DAN 71.7 58.8 49.7 92.4 82.9 75.1
Q∗1QS 70.3 57.0 48.2 91.6 81.4 73.7
Q∗1TR 47.9 34.8 29.0 73.6 58.3 49.3
1500 Q∗1BAR 91.2 83.9 78.0 99.4 98.0 96.2
Q∗1DAN 88.4 77.9 69.1 99.0 96.2 92.8
Q∗1QS 87.2 76.3 67.6 98.7 95.6 91.9
Q∗1TR 67.6 52.0 42.8 92.0 80.9 72.0
NOTES: The table reports empirical powers (in %) of Q1 under AlterA and AlterB at the 5% significance level based









denote the rejection rates of Q1 using empirical and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN, QS
and TR denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated
kernel. Number of bootstraps = 499. T and M denote the sample size and kernel smoothing parameter, respectively.
by AlterC. Because the overall performance of our test is stable across M , we only report here the
case where M = 20 to save space. The full set of results are reported in Appendix 2.H.
Table 2.3 reports the empirical sizes of our inferential approach. We find that the size of Q1
increases in dimension, but not overly excessive nor rapid. The size of Q1 generally improves and
stabilizes as T increases. The rejection rates of our bootstrap approach Q∗1 also tend to increase in
dimension when T = 1000, but they become very stable as T approaches 1500. Table 2.4 reports
the power study. As with the bivariate study, we use empirical critical values for Q1. In general, our
approach has power despite a rather low spillover intensity s2 = 0.15. Both Q1 and Q∗1 give similar
rejection rates, and they become more powerful as T increases. We find that the power of our tests
grows with d1. Because the number of risk recipients in Y1t increases as d1 increases, this yields a
stronger evidence of spillover and thus increase the rejection rates Q1 and Q∗1 .
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Table 2.3 Empirical sizes
NullD
T d1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rejection rates based on asymptotic critical values
1000 Q1BAR 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.9 7.9 7.6
Q1DAN 7.3 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.9 8.2 7.9
Q1QS 7.1 7.0 7.3 7.2 7.4 7.8 8.3 7.9
Q1TR 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 8.1 8.8 8.9
1500 Q1BAR 6.7 7.0 6.6 6.8 6.3 7.2 7.1 6.8
Q1DAN 6.6 6.9 6.6 6.7 6.4 7.2 7.2 7.0
Q1QS 6.7 6.9 6.6 6.7 6.4 7.2 7.1 7.1
Q1TR 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.8 7.0 7.3
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗1BAR 4.8 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.5 5.2 5.3 5.8
Q∗1DAN 4.9 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.7
Q∗1QS 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.8
Q∗1TR 5.1 5.8 5.7 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6
1500 Q∗1BAR 5.1 5.2 4.8 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.1
Q∗1DAN 5.1 5.3 4.8 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.1
Q∗1QS 5.2 5.2 4.8 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.1
Q∗1TR 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.5
NOTES: The table reports empirical sizes (in %) of Q1 under NullD at the 5% significance level based on NCCC-LS









rejection rates of Q1 using asymptotic and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN, QS and
TR denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated kernel.
Number of bootstraps = 499. T and d1 denote the sample size and dimension of portfolio 1, respectively.
2.5 Empirical application
The North America (NA) has historically maintained a strong economic partnership with the UK
but Cumming and Zahra (2016) suggest that this relation is to be challenged after the UK voted to
leave the European Union on 23rd June 2016. In this section, we use the new inferential strategy to
study, before and after the Brexit referendum, the spillover relations between the North American
and the UK equity markets. We use the American S&P-500 and the Canadian S&P-TSX stock indices
for the NA market, and we use the FTSE-All index for the UK market. To examine possible Brexit
effect on the broader European market, we also study its spillover relations with the NA market.
Regarding the former, we use the European Union (EU) portfolio previously constructed by Baele
(2005): Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, where the
market indices are taken as ATX, Bel-20, FrCAC-40, DAX-30, ISEQ-All, FTSE-MIB, AEX and IBEX-35,
respectively. It is worth highlighting that this is the first study to provide insights into the distortion
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Table 2.4 Empirical powers
AlterC
T d1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rejection rates based on empirical critical values
1000 Q1BAR 27.6 40.8 55.2 65.5 73.9 77.1 80.9 83.0
Q1DAN 23.0 33.4 44.8 54.9 62.5 65.9 70.3 71.4
Q1QS 22.1 31.6 43.2 52.9 60.1 64.1 67.4 69.0
Q1TR 14.3 18.8 23.7 30.0 34.2 35.5 37.1 37.8
1500 Q1BAR 42.6 63.0 84.2 91.4 96.0 97.7 98.6 99.1
Q1DAN 34.1 51.9 73.2 82.4 90.7 93.6 95.0 96.8
Q1QS 33.1 49.5 70.7 80.3 88.9 92.2 93.8 95.8
Q1TR 18.8 28.1 39.2 47.8 57.2 61.9 66.3 67.8
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗1BAR 23.8 36.6 52.0 62.2 70.1 74.9 78.6 80.9
Q∗1DAN 19.6 29.6 42.1 50.9 58.1 63.3 67.2 69.8
Q∗1QS 19.0 28.2 40.3 48.4 55.6 60.4 64.6 67.1
Q∗1TR 12.4 15.6 21.7 26.4 30.4 32.9 35.9 37.0
1500 Q∗1BAR 38.7 62.3 81.3 89.9 94.8 97.3 98.4 98.9
Q∗1DAN 31.2 50.9 70.2 80.3 87.9 92.2 94.4 95.9
Q∗1QS 29.6 48.4 67.4 77.8 86.1 90.5 93.0 94.8
Q∗1TR 16.9 26.0 36.4 44.5 52.0 58.3 61.8 65.9
NOTES: The table reports empirical powers (in %) of Q1 under AlterC at the 5% significance level based on NCCC-LS









rejection rates of Q1 using empirical and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN, QS and TR
denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated kernel.
Number of bootstraps = 499. T and d1 denote the sample size and dimension of portfolio 1, respectively.
of spillover relation between the North American and the European equity markets in the aftermath
of the Brexit referendum.
We sample our data centering the referendum event from 2nd January 2012 to 31st December
2019 at the daily frequency from Datastream. This gives 2087 observations. Then, we divide
the sample into two subperiods: the pre–Brexit sample (2nd January 2012 – 23rd June 2016) and
the post–Brexit sample (24th June 2016 – 31st December 2019). We collect all data in US dollar
to minimize potential bias due to currency risk. Return series are calculated by taking the first
difference of the price indices in natural logarithm.
We begin with the NA–UK study. First, we estimate our NCCC-LS conditional variance model
for both subsamples. To filter out possible mean causality, each return variable is regressed on
the remaining lagged series. With the residuals that are free from mean causality, we estimate the
NCCC-LS model. The best fitting model lag orders are selected on the basis of Bayesian information
criteria and diagnostic examinations. Regarding the pre–Brexit period, we obtain orders 9, 3 and 11
for the conditional variances of the UK, US and Canada markets, respectively. As for the post–Brexit
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sample, we obtain orders 4, 16 and 12 for the conditional variances of the UK, US and Canada
series, respectively. We carry out for the NA portfolio the Engle and Sheppard’s (2001) diagnosis to
find that we cannot reject the null of stable correlation structure at the usual significance level, with
p-values of 0.8969 and 0.1325 for the pre–Brexit and post–Brexit samples, respectively. The optimal
orders of the correlation stability test are automatically selected based on Bayesian information
criteria. This, together with a series of conventional Ljung-Box examinations reported in Table 2.5,
suggests the adequacy of our NCCC-LS modeling.
Next, we compute our bootstrap Q∗1 tests using the Barlett kernel since simulations suggest
similar performance across the downward weighting kernels. We report the p-values in Table 2.6.
In the pre–Brexit sample, we find that the spillover effect from the NA market to the UK market
is statistically significant at the 5% level for all M ’s. This finding implies that the NA market has
a significant influence on the UK market in both the short term and the long run. In the other
direction, we find evidence of spillover effect from the UK market to the NA market at the 10%
level for all M ’s. Our findings imply feedback spillovers in the NA–UK nexus. This interdependent
relation, however, diminishes in the post–Brexit period.
Before Brexit, the feedback spillover in the NA–UK nexus can be explained by the closely
interconnected economic activities in the two regions. Since the two markets rely on each other,
the market participants in the two regions tend to follow each other closely. Therefore, an increase
in uncertainty or volatility of one market would inevitably affect the other. Interestingly, the
spillover effects between NA and UK disappear after Brexit. In other words, the NA (UK) market is
no longer significantly affected by the volatility in the UK (NA) market. After the Brexit referendum,
market participants in the UK may be discouraged to infer information from the NA market
because they are less confident about the UK’s bargaining position in the international market
especially among major players such as NA. Consequently, uncertainly in NA does not spill to
UK. In the other direction, market participants in the NA region tend to divert their focus away
from the UK because of the fear that it will lose its access to the European Single Market, which
is an important trading region for the NA. As a result, the NA is less driven by the UK and thus
uncertainty from the latter does not propagate to the former.
We now examine the NA–EU spillover relation. In the pre–Brexit sample, we obtain orders
16, 14, 12, 11, 7, 18, 9, 15, 3 and 15 for the conditional variances of the Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, US and Canada markets, respectively. As for
the post–Brexit period, we obtain orders 11, 16, 10, 12, 9, 10, 11, 8, 9 and 10 for the conditional
variances of the Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, US
and Canada series, respectively. As with the NA–UK study, we perform the Engle and Sheppard’s
(2001) diagnosis to find that we cannot reject the null of stable correlation structure at the usual
significance level for both subsamples and for both portfolios. Regarding the EU portfolio, we
obtain p-values of 0.5472 and 0.1183 for the pre–Brexit and post–Brexit samples, respectively. As
for the NA portfolio, we obtain p-values of 0.6592 and 0.5472 for the pre–Brexit and post–Brexit
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Table 2.5 Diagnostic tests (UK–NA)
LB(10) LB(20) LB(30) LB2(10) LB2(20) LB2(30)
Pre–Brexit (2nd January 2012 – 23rd June 2016)
UK 7.155 22.093 36.494 6.177 18.319 25.026
[0.711] [0.335] [0.192] [0.800] [0.566] [0.724]
US 13.169 20.312 32.243 12.124 20.539 30.504
[0.214] [0.439] [0.356] [0.277] [0.425] [0.440]
Canada 4.224 20.656 34.183 2.911 23.436 38.206
[0.937] [0.418] [0.274] [0.983] [0.268] [0.145]
Post–Brexit (24th June 2016 – 31st December 2019)
UK 11.071 19.740 27.036 10.468 14.336 16.783
[0.352] [0.474] [0.621] [0.400] [0.813] [0.975]
US 15.436 18.869 23.736 10.546 13.020 17.188
[0.117] [0.530] [0.784] [0.394] [0.877] [0.970]
Canada 6.779 18.437 22.004 4.432 18.823 21.513
[0.746] [0.559] [0.854] [0.926] [0.533] [0.871]
NOTES: The table reports diagnostic analyses for all fitted series. LB(M) and LB2(M) are the Ljung-Box tests for the null
of no serial correlation (up to lag order M) on the standardized and squared standardized residuals, respectively. The
values in the squared parentheses are the p-values of the tests.
samples, respectively. These examinations, along with a series of Ljung-Box diagnoses reported in
Tables 2.7 and 2.8, confirm the adequacy of our NCCC-LS model parameterizations.
Table 2.9 reports the volatility spillover test results. In the pre–Brexit period, we find that the
spillover effect from the NA market to the EU market is statistically significant at the 10% level
for M = 10,30. This finding suggests that the NA market has nontrivial influences on the broader
EU market in the short and long terms. In the opposite direction, the spillover effect from the EU
market is significant at the 10% level for M = 30. In the post–Brexit sample, the spillover effect
between the NA market and the EU market persists, with the impact from the latter occurs at a
lower M .
Before Brexit, the feedback spillover in the NA–EU nexus can be largely attributed to the
interlinked economic activities in the two regions. Therefore, uncertainty in one market would
naturally spill to the other. Interestingly, the spillover effect from the EU is somehow delayed as
the effect is not felt immediately by the NA market. One possible explanation for this finding is
that, before Brexit, market participants in the NA can access the Single market seamlessly through
the UK. Thus, they may tend to focus primarily on the UK, which results in their delayed response
to the volatility in the EU market. However, we find that the NA–EU spillover nexus becomes more
immediate after Brexit. This is because market participants that previously focus on the UK have
naturally switched their attention to the European Single Market directly. As a result, the NA reacts
more rapidly to the uncertainty in the EU market.
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Table 2.6 Spillover results (UK–NA)
Pre–Brexit Post–Brexit
M 10 20 30 10 20 30
Q∗1BAR 0.028 0.036 0.038 0.168 0.154 0.186
Q∗−1BAR 0.088 0.058 0.054 0.729 0.677 0.774
NOTES: The table reports bootstrap p-values of the proposed spillover tests. Number of bootstraps = 499. Q∗1BAR denotes
the one-way test for the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover from the NA market to the UK market. Q∗−1BAR denotes
the one-way test for the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover from the UK market to the NA market. The subscript
BAR denotes the Barlett kernel. M denotes the kernel smoothing parameter.
In summary, our findings suggest that, before the Brexit referendum, participants in the NA
market pay a relatively closer attention to the UK than the EU market. Consequently, the NA is
driven more immediately by the volatility in the UK. After Brexit, the NA tends not to focus on
the UK, and it prefers to follow the EU more closely. As a result, uncertainty in the UK does not
significantly affect the NA while that in the EU has a more immediate effect on the NA.
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Table 2.7 Diagnostic tests (EU–NA)
LB(10) LB(20) LB(30) LB2(10) LB2(20) LB2(30)
Pre–Brexit (2nd January 2012 – 23rd June 2016)
Austria 8.839 11.259 29.522 1.821 2.540 15.942
[0.547] [0.939] [0.490] [0.998] [1.000] [0.983]
Belgium 7.327 17.561 39.203 2.063 14.773 31.616
[0.694] [0.616] [0.121] [0.996] [0.789] [0.386]
France 7.405 18.745 38.255 5.597 16.625 27.864
[0.687] [0.538] [0.143] [0.848] [0.677] [0.578]
Germany 4.424 20.098 37.650 1.810 16.234 26.026
[0.926] [0.452] [0.159] [0.998] [0.702] [0.674]
Ireland 7.429 21.941 37.667 4.151 21.944 40.053
[0.684] [0.344] [0.158] [0.940] [0.344] [0.104]
Italy 5.208 24.126 39.677 4.861 18.723 29.314
[0.877] [0.237] [0.111] [0.900] [0.540] [0.501]
Netherlands 7.255 19.837 37.514 2.467 14.265 21.344
[0.701] [0.468] [0.163] [0.991] [0.817] [0.877]
Spain 11.198 22.854 39.655 8.825 18.703 37.979
[0.342] [0.296] [0.112] [0.549] [0.541] [0.150]
US 13.084 21.296 36.398 15.271 22.915 34.113
[0.219] [0.380] [0.195] [0.122] [0.293] [0.276]
Canada 3.926 17.647 30.166 3.113 20.511 33.009
[0.951] [0.611] [0.457] [0.979] [0.426] [0.322]
NOTES: The table reports diagnostic analyses for all fitted series. LB(M) and LB2(M) are the Ljung-Box tests for the null
of no serial correlation (up to lag order M) on the standardized and squared standardized residuals, respectively. The
values in the squared parentheses are the p-values of the tests.
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Table 2.8 Diagnostic tests (EU–NA)
LB(10) LB(20) LB(30) LB2(10) LB2(20) LB2(30)
Post–Brexit (24th June 2016 – 31st December 2019)
Austria 3.371 15.052 19.516 2.601 13.909 17.353
[0.971] [0.773] [0.929] [0.989] [0.835] [0.968]
Belgium 7.672 18.799 24.333 1.892 5.901 7.232
[0.661] [0.535] [0.757] [0.997] [0.999] [1.000]
France 10.970 16.590 27.751 5.436 9.278 14.264
[0.360] [0.679] [0.584] [0.860] [0.979] [0.993]
Germany 2.087 15.826 24.130 1.233 10.628 14.429
[0.996] [0.727] [0.766] [1.000] [0.955] [0.993]
Ireland 4.952 15.662 29.053 0.465 15.670 22.324
[0.894] [0.737] [0.515] [1.000] [0.737] [0.842]
Italy 5.015 21.839 26.462 2.595 11.920 18.647
[0.890] [0.349] [0.651] [0.989] [0.919] [0.947]
Netherlands 4.078 7.539 17.054 1.409 8.056 12.786
[0.944] [0.995] [0.972] [0.999] [0.991] [0.997]
Spain 6.255 21.479 23.440 2.728 15.164 25.255
[0.793] [0.369] [0.797] [0.987] [0.767] [0.713]
US 7.289 21.190 30.560 15.012 23.508 25.919
[0.698] [0.386] [0.437] [0.132] [0.265] [0.679]
Canada 5.511 27.150 33.990 3.446 26.552 30.657
[0.855] [0.131] [0.281] [0.969] [0.148] [0.432]
NOTES: The table reports diagnostic analyses for all fitted series. LB(M) and LB2(M) are the Ljung-Box tests for the null
of no serial correlation (up to lag order M) on the standardized and squared standardized residuals, respectively. The
values in the squared parentheses are the p-values of the tests.
Table 2.9 Spillover results (EU–NA)
Pre–Brexit Post–Brexit
M 10 20 30 10 20 30
Q∗1BAR 0.046 0.124 0.070 0.078 0.128 0.182
Q∗−1BAR 0.210 0.144 0.072 0.132 0.080 0.078
NOTES: The table reports bootstrap p-values of the proposed spillover tests. Number of bootstraps = 499. Q∗1BAR denotes
the one-way test for the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover from the NA market to the EU market. Q∗−1BAR denotes
the one-way test for the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover from the EU market to the NA market. The subscript
BAR denotes the Barlett kernel. M denotes the kernel smoothing parameter.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a class of asymptotic N(0,1) multivariate econometric strategy for
testing volatility spillover. The test statistics were constructed based on the quadratic distance
between a kernel-based spectral density estimator and the null spectral density. The proposed test
statistics are convenient to compute and they check a growing number of lags as the sample size
increases. The Granger regression-type method can be viewed as a special case of the proposed
procedure under the uniformly weighted Truncated kernel, but downward weighting kernels
were proposed to be in line with financial markets stylized facts and thus to improve the power
performance of the tests. To facilitate the estimation of the our test statistics, we proposed a
new NCCC-LS volatility structure that can be estimated element by element. Consistent least-
squares estimators that are computationally efficient were provided. Numerical optimization and
integration are not required throughout the proposed econometric strategy. The optimality of the
multivariate testing strategy was highlighted using Monte Carlo experiments. First, it can check a
large number of lags without losing significant power thanks to the use of downward weighting
kernel functions. Second, the testing strategy performed reasonably well in the higher dimension
up to 10 series. Furthermore, the paper provided a bootstrap version of the spillover tests whose
size was found to converge at a faster speed. Finally, the paper included a timely empirical study
in which the volatility spillover relations between the North America (NA) market and the greater
European market (both UK and EU) before and after the Brexit referendum were examined. Before
the Brexit referendum, it was found that the NA was driven more immediately by UK volatility than
EU volatility. After Brexit, it was found that volatility in the UK did not spill to NA while that in the
EU had a more immediate spillover effect on NA. This finding can be interpreted as that most NA
participants switched their attention from the UK to the EU market because of the fear that UK
might lose its access to the European Single Market.
Although our simulation study is supportive of the asymptotic theory, there are however
circumstances in which we would not recommend to use the proposed testing strategy. First, the
Hessian condition implies that the squared innovation can be twice differentiable with respect to
the parameter vector. For any variable to be differentiable, it should be continuous. Thus, if an
estimated innovation series appears to be discontinuous with jumps, we would not recommend to
use the proposed testing strategy. Second, another assumption of the theory is the existence of
the finite eighth moment of the innovation. Random vectors following the multivariate normal
distribution, t-distribution and generalised error distribution satisfy this assumption. Therefore, if
the empirical distribution of an estimated innovation sequence appears not to be “well-behaved” —
such as a distribution with unreasonably many extreme occurrences — we would not recommend
to use the proposed testing strategy. However, dataset with the discussed features might contain
valuable information about market jumps. Therefore, we propose to develop econometric tool for
market jumps and extreme events spillover in future research.
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Appendix 2.A
Derivation of (2.15). Recall that the normalized quadratic distance is given as
L̂2
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where f denotes the complex conjugate of f . The second equality follows from the fact that
complex conjugate of a sum of individuals is the sum of the complex conjugate of the individuals.
The third equality follows from the matrix relation tr(A′BC D ′) = [vec(A)]′(D⊗B )[vec(C )], (see, e.g.,
Harville, 1997, Theorem 16.2.2). The fourth equality follows from the interchangeability of complex
conjugation and transposition. The fifth equality follows from the fact that the complex conjugate
of real matrix is the real matrix itself. Let C (λ) ≡ [ f̂ (λ)− f̂ 0(λ)]′Γ̂−1u , D(λ) ≡ [ f̂ (λ)− f̂ 0(λ)]Γ̂−1v , and
put A j ≡ (2π)−1k( j /M)ρ̂( j )′Γ̂−1u , B j ≡ (2π)−1k( j /M)ρ̂( j )Γ̂−1v . We have C (λ) =
∑T−1
j=1 A j e
−i jλ and
D(λ) =∑T−1j=1 B j e−i jλ, for λ ∈ [−π,π] and i =p−1. We can rewrite (2.A.1) as
L̂2
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where the second equality follows from the interchangeability of trace and integral and the third
equality follows from Parseval’s identity (see, e.g., Wiener and Masani, 1957, Theorem 3.9). Substi-
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tuting the relevant terms back into the normalized quadratic equation, we have
L̂2
[





k( j /M)ρ̂( j )′Γ̂−1u
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where the fourth equality follows from the interchangeability of trace and summation. This
completes the derivation. 
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Appendix 2.B
Throughout Appendices 2.B–2.G, the following notations are adopted. The Euclidean norm of
vector x is denoted by ||x ||. The inner product between vector x1 and vector x2 is denoted by
〈x1, x2〉. The Frobenius norm of matrix X is denoted by ||X ||F . The notations Op and op are the
usual order in probability notations. The scalar ∆ represents a positive finite generic constant that
may differ at every occurrence.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. We begin by showing the covariance representation of S. Then, the asymp-
totic normality follows from Lemma 2.2 in Candelon and Tokpavi (2016) and Lemma 1 in Bouhad-
dioui and Roy (2006). Using the properties vec(AX B ) = (B ′⊗ A)vec(X ); (A ⊗B )′ = A′⊗B ′; (A′)−1 =
(A−1)′; (A ⊗B )(C ⊗D) = (AC )⊗ (B D); (ABC )−1 =C−1B−1 A−1; (A ⊗B )−1 = A−1 ⊗B−1, we write for











= vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]′[Diag(C 0v v )−1/2 ⊗Diag(C 0uu )−1/2](Γ−1v ⊗Γ−1u )vec[ρ̂0( j )]
= vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]′[Diag(C 0v v )−1/2Γ−1v ]⊗ [Diag(C 0uu )−1/2Γ−1u ]vec[ρ̂0( j )]
= vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]′{(C 0v v )−1[Diag(C 0v v )−1/2]−1}⊗{(C 0uu )−1[Diag(C 0uu )−1/2]−1}vec[ρ̂0( j )]
= vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]′[(C 0v v )−1 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1]{[Diag(C 0v v )−1/2]−1 ⊗ [Diag(C 0uu )−1/2]−1}vec[ρ̂0( j )]
= vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]′[(C 0v v )−1 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1]{[Diag(C 0v v )−1/2]⊗ [Diag(C 0uu )−1/2]}−1vec[ρ̂0( j )]
= vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]′[(C 0v v )−1 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1]{[Diag(C 0v v )−1/2]⊗ [Diag(C 0uu )−1/2]}−1
× [Diag(C 0v v )−1/2 ⊗Diag(C 0uu )−1/2]vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]




















Ĉ 0uv ( j )
]′[(C 0v v )−1 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1]vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]. (2.B.2)
With this representation, the result of Lemma 2.2.1 follows from Lemma 2.2 in Candelon and
Tokpavi (2016), which is based on Lemma 1 in Bouhaddioui and Roy (2006). In both papers, the
asymptotic normality result is obtained under the following conditions: (i) The event variables u0t
and v 0t are multivariate i.i.d. sequences with finite fourth-order moment. (ii) Mutual independence
between u0t and v
0
t− j for j > 0. In our framework, condition (i) is satisfied given Assumption 2.2.1,
and condition (ii) is satisfied under the null hypothesis, this completes the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.2.2. We begin by defining the following notations. Let b1t ≡ (C 0uu)−1/2u0t and
b2t ≡ (C 0v v )−1/2v 0t . Similarly, we let b̂1t ≡ (C 0uu)−1/2ût and b̂2t ≡ (C 0v v )−1/2v̂t , denote the ana-
logues of b1t and b2t based on estimated event variables ût and v̂t . Then, we obtain Cb̂( j ) ≡
(C 0uu )
−1/2Ĉuv ( j )(C 0v v )−1/2, the sample cross-covariance matrix between b̂1t and b̂2t at lag order j .
Similarly, we have Cb ( j ) ≡ (C 0uu )−1/2Ĉ 0uv ( j )(C 0v v )−1/2, the sample cross-covariance matrix between
b1t and b2t at lag order j . By reasonings similar to the derivation of (2.B.1) in Lemma 2.2.1, we



















Ĉuv ( j )
]′[(C 0v v )−1 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1]vec[Ĉuv ( j )]. (2.B.3)
With these results and based on the proof of Candelon and Tokpavi (2016, Lemma 2.1) and Bouhad-
dioui and Roy (2006, Lemma 2), S −S∗ can be written as
S −S∗ = T
T−1∑
j=1




k2( j /M)〈vec[Cb( j )],vec[Cb̂( j )]−vec[Cb( j )]〉
=A1T +2A2T , say. (2.B.4)
















∣∣∣∣∣∣(C 0v v )−1/2 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1/2∣∣∣∣∣∣2F ∣∣∣∣∣∣vec[Ĉuv ( j )]−vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]∣∣∣∣∣∣2, (2.B.5)
which we make use the property vec(AX B ) = (B ′ ⊗ A)vec(X ) and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Because ||(C 0v v )−1/2 ⊗ (C 0uu)−1/2||2F = Op (1) by Assumption 2.2.1, it suffices to show that A11T =
Appendix 2.B 75















Ĉ m,nuv ( j )− Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )
]2, (2.B.6)
where Ĉ m,nuv ( j ) and Ĉ
0,m,n
uv ( j ) are the (m,n)-th elements of matrices Ĉuv ( j ) and Ĉ
0
uv ( j ), respectively.





Ĉ m,nuv ( j ) − Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )
]2 = op (M 1/2/T ). Let u0m,t and ûm,t
denote the m-th element of u0t and ût , respectively. Similarly, let v
0
n,t and v̂n,t denote the n-th
element of v 0t and v̂t , respectively. We have





























v̂n,t− j − v0n,t− j
)











B21T ( j )+B22T ( j )+B23T ( j )
]
. (2.B.8)
Applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the last term B23T ( j ), we have
sup
1≤ j≤T−1




















)2 = Op (T −1). The proof for T −1 ∑Tt=1 (v̂n,t − v0n,t )2 is
the same. Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and noting that ûm,t − u0m,t = um,t (θ̂1) − u0m,t =[
um,t (θ̂1)− ũm,t (θ̂1)





















= 2B31T ( j )+2B32T ( j ), say. (2.B.9)
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We have B31T ( j ) =Op (T −2) by Assumption 2.2.3, it remains to show that B32T ( j ) =Op (T −1). By
the mean value theorem and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have









where ∇θ1 is the gradient operator with respect to θ1 and θ̄1 lies in the segment between θ̂1 and
θ01. Given Assumption 2.2.2, we have ||θ̂1 −θ01||2 = Op (T −1). Given Assumption 2.2.4, we have
T −1
∑T




k2( j /M)B23T ( j ) ≤ M sup
1≤ j≤T−1












2( j /M) → ∫ ∞0 k2(z)d z <∞ follows by Assumptions 2.2.5-2.2.6.
Next, we rewrite B1T ( j ) as
















=B11T ( j )+B12T ( j ), say. (2.B.12)
Applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the first term B11T ( j ), we have
T−1∑
j=1































=Op (M/T 2), (2.B.13)





)2 =Op (1) by Markov’s inequality. Applying two-term
Taylor expansion to the second term B12T ( j ), we have


























is the Hessian operator with respect to θ1 and θ̄1 lies in the segment between θ̂1 and θ
0
1.
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain for the first term
T−1∑
j=1









||∇θ1 ũm,t (θ01)||v0n,t− j
]2}
=Op (M/T 2),
given Assumption 2.2.2 and
∑T−1
j=1 k
2( j /M)T −2
[∑T
t= j+1 ||∇θ1 ũm,t (θ01)||v0n,t− j
]2 =Op (M/T ), which






























where the first equality follows from Assumption 2.2.1 and the second equality follows from the
independence between Ξ1tΞ′1t and Ξ2t− jΞ
′
2t− j under the null hypothesis. By Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, we can write the second term B122T ( j ) as
T−1∑
j=1


















































having used Assumptions 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 with Markov’s inequality. Therefore,
T−1∑
j=1
k2( j /M)B21T ( j ) =Op (M/T 2) = op (M 1/2/T ). (2.B.15)
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By the same reasonings, we also have
T−1∑
j=1
k2( j /M)B22T ( j ) =Op (M/T 2) = op (M 1/2/T ). (2.B.16)
Collecting (2.B.6), (2.B.7), (2.B.11), (2.B.15) and (2.B.16), we have A1T = op (M 1/2).




k2( j /M)vec[Cb( j )]






(C 0v v )
−1/2 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1/2vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]
}′[
(C 0v v )
−1/2 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1/2
]




k2( j /M)vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]
′
[
(C 0v v )
−1 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1
]{
vec[Ĉuv ( j )]−vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]
}
,
having used again the properties vec(ABC ) = (C ′⊗ A)vec(B) and (A ⊗B)(C ⊗D) = (AC )⊗ (B D).
For p = 1, ...,d∗1 d∗2 , let Ĉ
p
uv ( j ) and Ĉ
0,p
uv ( j ) denote the p-th element of vec[Ĉuv ( j )] and vec[Ĉ
0
uv ( j )],
respectively. Similarly, we denote by Ĉ quv ( j ) and Ĉ
0,q
uv ( j ) the q-th element of vec[Ĉuv ( j )] and
vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )], respectively. Further let G













Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
[
















k2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
[
Ĉ quv ( j )− Ĉ 0,quv ( j )
]
. (2.B.17)
Because Gp,q =Op (1) by Assumption 2.2.1, it suffices to show that ∑T−1j=1 k2( j /M)C puv ( j )[Ĉ quv ( j )−
Ĉ 0,quv ( j )] =Op (M/T 3/2). By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can write∣∣∣∣T−1∑
j=1
k2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
[


















2( j /M)[Ĉ quv ( j ) − Ĉ 0,quv ( j )]2 = Op (M/T 2) from the proof of (2.B.8) and we have∑T−1
j=1 k
2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
















(1− j /T )k2( j /M)
)
=O(M/T ), (2.B.18)
where C 0,puu and C
0,p




v v ), respectively. This gives
A2T =Op (M/T 1/2) = op (M 1/2) and completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.2.2. Recall Proposition 2.2.2 is stated as






Given Assumption 2.2.5 and since M →∞ as T →∞, it follows that




Therefore, the result of Proposition 2.2.2 can be obtained by showing that Ŝ −S∗ =Op (M/T 1/2). By



















Ĉuv ( j )
]′(Ĉ−1v v ⊗Ĉ−1uu)vec[Ĉuv ( j )]. (2.B.19)
Then, Ŝ −S∗ is equal to





Ĉuv ( j )






Ĉuv ( j )
]′[(Ĉv v ⊗Ĉuu )−1 − (C 0v v ⊗C 0uu )−1]vec[Ĉuv ( j )].
We proceed by showing that Ĉv v ⊗Ĉuu −C 0v v ⊗C 0uu =Op (T −1/2). Its inverse counterpart has the
same stochastic order by the Delta method. For m = 1, ...,d∗1 , we let Ĉ m,muu and C 0,m,muu denote
the (m,m)-th elements of matrices Ĉuu and C 0uu , respectively. Similarly, for n = 1, ...,d∗2 , we let
Ĉ n,nv v and C
0,n,n
v v denote the (n,n)-th entries of matrices Ĉv v and C
0
v v , respectively. Then, we have
the [d∗1 (n −1)+m,d∗1 (n −1)+m]-th entry in Ĉv v ⊗ Ĉuu and C 0v v ⊗C 0uu be given, respectively, by










uu −C 0,n,nv v C 0,m,muu =Op (T −1/2). Since
Ĉ n,nv v Ĉ
m,m
uu −C 0,n,nv v C 0,m,muu = (Ĉ n,nv v −C 0,n,nv v )C 0,m,muu +C 0,n,nv v (Ĉ m,muu −C 0,m,muu )+ (Ĉ n,nv v −C 0,n,nv v )(Ĉ m,muu −
C 0,m,muu ) and given C
0,n,n
v v = Op (1) and C 0,m,muu = Op (1) by Assumption 2.2.1, we know that the
controlling terms in Ĉ n,nv v Ĉ
m,m
uu −C 0,n,nv v C 0,m,muu are Ĉ m,muu −C 0,m,muu and Ĉ n,nv v −C 0,n,nv v . It therefore
suffices to show that Ĉ m,muu −C 0,m,muu = Op (T −1/2), the proof for Ĉ n,nv v −C 0,n,nv v is similar. It follows
from the triangle inequality that
|Ĉ m,muu −C 0,m,muu | ≤ |Ĉ m,muu − Ĉ 0,m,muu |+ |Ĉ 0,m,muu −C 0,m,muu |,
Appendix 2.B 81
where we have Ĉ 0,m,muu −C 0,m,muu = Op (T −1/2) by Chebyshev’s inequality and Assumption 2.2.1.
Applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the first term, we have
















































)2 = Op (T −1) from the proof of (2.B.9) and T −1 ∑Tt= j+1(u0m,t )2 =
Op (1) by Markov’s inequality and Assumption 2.2.1. It follows that Ĉ
m,m
uu − Ĉ 0,m,muu = Op (T −1/2).
Therefore,





Ĉuv ( j )






Ĉuv ( j )
]′vec[Ĉuv ( j )]. (2.B.20)






Ĉuv ( j )






Ĉuv ( j )






Ĉ 0uv ( j )
]′vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]
=F1T +F2T , say. (2.B.21)










Ĉ m,nuv ( j )











Ĉ m,nuv ( j )
2 − Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )2
]
, (2.B.22)
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where Ĉ m,nuv ( j ) and Ĉ
0,m,n
uv ( j ) are the (m,n)-th elements of matrices Ĉuv ( j ) and Ĉ
0
uv ( j ), respectively.





Ĉ m,nuv ( j )
2 − Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )2





Ĉ m,nuv ( j )












k2( j /M)Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )
[
Ĉ m,nuv ( j )− Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )
]
=F11T +2F12T , say.
We have F11T = Op (M/T 2) from the proof of (2.B.8) and we have F12T = Op (M/T 3/2) from the
proof of (2.B.17). Thus, F1T =Op (M/T ).

















k2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
2, (2.B.23)
where Ĉ 0,puv ( j ) is the p-th element in vec[Ĉ
0
uv ( j )], p = 1, ...,d∗1 d∗2 . By Markov’s inequality and
(2.B.18), we have F2T =Op (M/T ). This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.2.3. The proof of Lemma 2.2.3 follows largely from the proof of Lemma 2.2.2
with some modifications as we are now under the alternative hypothesis. We have T −1(S −S∗) =
T −1(A1T +2A2T ) as in (2.B.4). We shall show that T −1A1T = op (1) and T −1A2T = op (1). We begin





∣∣∣∣∣∣(C 0v v )−1/2 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1/2∣∣∣∣∣∣2F ∣∣∣∣∣∣vec[Ĉuv ( j )]−vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]∣∣∣∣∣∣2. (2.C.1)















Ĉ m,nuv ( j )− Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )
]2. (2.C.2)



















B2i T ( j )
]= op (1), for i = 1,2,3. As shown in (2.B.11), we have∑T−1
j=1 k
2( j /M)B23T ( j ) =Op (M/T 2) = op (1) under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.6. Next, from (2.B.12), we
have B1T ( j ) =B11T ( j )+B12T ( j ). We know from (2.B.13) that ∑T−1j=1 k2( j /M)B211T ( j ) =Op (M/T 2) =
op (1) under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.6. Applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the second term
B12T ( j ), we have
T−1∑
j=1





































2( j /M) =O(M), T −1 ∑Tt= j+1 [ũm,t (θ̂1)−u0m,t ]2 =Op (T −1) from (2.B.10) and T −1 ∑Tt=1 (v0n,t )2 =
Op (1) by Markov’s inequality. It follows that
∑T−1
j=1 k
2( j /M)B21T ( j ) =Op (M/T ) = op (1). By the same
reasonings, we also have
∑T−1
j=1 k
2( j /M)B22T ( j ) = op (1). Therefore, T −1A1T = op (1).













k2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
[
Ĉ quv ( j )− Ĉ 0,quv ( j )
]
. (2.C.5)
It suffices to show that
∑T−1
j=1 k
2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
[
Ĉ quv ( j )− Ĉ 0,quv ( j )




k2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )
[



















Ĉ quv ( j )−Ĉ 0,quv ( j )
]2 = op (1) from (2.C.2) and ∑T−1j=1 k2( j /M)Ĉ 0,puv ( j )2 =Op (1)
by Lemma 2.2.5 and
∑∞
j=1 ||ρ( j )||2 <∞. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2.4. The proof of Lemma 2.2.4 can be readily deduced from the proofs of
Proposition 2.2.2 and Lemma 2.2.3. Based on Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.6, we have shown that
T −1(Ŝ − S∗) = T −1Op (T 1/2)FT = Op (T −1/2)FT in (2.B.20) and (2.B.21). It suffices to show that
FT = F1T +F2T = Op (1). Using the results in (2.C.2) and (2.C.5), we have F1T = Op (1) under
the alternative hypothesis. Finally, F2T = Op (1) by Lemma 2.2.5 and ∑∞j=1 ||ρ( j )||2 < ∞. This
completes the proof. 
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=G1T +G2T , say. (2.C.6)



























































as a consequence of the absolute summable condition
∑∞
j=1 ||ρ( j )||2 <∞; and the second term∑T−1
j=1
[
k2( j /M)−1]vec[ρ( j )]′(Γ−1v ⊗Γ−1u )vec[ρ( j )]→ 0, which follows from the dominated conver-
gence theorem, limM→∞
[
k2( j /M)−1]→ 0 and ∑∞j=1 ||ρ( j )||2 <∞.
We now consider the second term G2T in (2.C.6). Let C 0uv ( j ) ≡ E[u0t (v 0t− j )′], we have C 0b ( j ) ≡
(C 0uu)
−1/2C 0uv ( j )(C 0v v )−1/2 the true cross-covariance between b1t and b2t at lag order j . As in








k2( j /M)〈vec[C 0b ( j )],vec[Cb( j )]−vec[C 0b ( j )]〉
=G21T +2G22T , say. (2.C.8)
For the rest of the proof, it suffices to show that the first term G21T goes to zero in probability
because G22T can be bounded by the product of the first term and a finite constant using Cauchy-
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∣∣∣∣∣∣(C 0v v )−1/2 ⊗ (C 0uu )−1/2∣∣∣∣∣∣2F ∣∣∣∣∣∣vec[Ĉ 0uv ( j )]−vec[C 0uv ( j )]∣∣∣∣∣∣2. (2.C.9)















Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j )−C 0,m,nuv ( j )
]2, (2.C.10)
where Ĉ 0,m,nuv ( j ) and C
0,m,n
uv ( j ) are the (m,n)-th elements of matrices Ĉ
0
uv ( j ) and C
0
uv ( j ), respec-
tively. We have sup1≤ j≤T−1 Var[Ĉ
0,m,n
uv ( j )] ≤ ∆T −1 given Assumption 2.2.7 (see, e.g., Hannan,




2( j /M) =O(M). This completes the proof. 
Appendix 2.D
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. The desired result follows from a simple modification of the proof of
Theorem 4.1 in Dufour and Pelletier (2020). The consistency result in Dufour and Pelletier (2020) is
obtained under the following conditions: (i) The sequence {ϵ2i ,n,t } and {ei ,n,t } are strictly stationary
and ergodic. (ii) The error term {ei ,n,t } is strong mixing with finite fourth-order moment and regular
variance. (iii) The lag order p is such that p/log(T ) →∞ and p2/T → 0. (iv) The process of interest
has an infinite vector autoregressive representation with zero mean. Given conditions (i)–(iv),
it follows from Dufour and Pelletier (2020) that ||θ̂(p)i −θ0i || = Op (p1/2T −1/2). In our framework,
conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied under Assumption 2.3.1, whereas condition (iii) is implied
by Assumption 2.3.2. For condition (iv), we show in (2.34) that the process of interest has an
AR(∞) representation. Besides, it is straightforward to show that the proof in Dufour and Pelletier
(2020) holds with the addition of an intercept term by putting Y (p)t−1 ≡ [1,ϵ2i ,n,t−1, ...,ϵ2i ,n,t−p ] and
Π̂(p) ≡ [ω̂(p)i ,n , â
(p)
i ,n,1, ..., â
(p)
i ,n,p ]
′. This completes the proof. 
Appendix 2.E
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. Given Assumption 2.3.3 with α= 1.5 and β= 0.5, we have for i = 1,2,
||θ̂(p)i −θ0i || = Op (T −1/(2α−2β)) = Op (T −1/2), which follows from Theorem 5.52 in van der Vaart
(1998). This completes the proof. 
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Appendix 2.F
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. Given θ̂(p)ai = θ̂
(p)
i +δi , we have ||θ̂
(p)a
i −θ0i || = ||θ̂
(p)
i +δi −θ0i || ≤ ||θ̂
(p)
i −
θ0i || = Op (T −1/2). The inequality follows from Assumptions 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 that the positive ele-
ments of δi , when added by θ̂
(p)
i , is always less than or equal to the corresponding entries of the
true θ0i . This completes the proof. 
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the analogue of R̂i based on true variance. We consider the following decomposition
R̂i −R0i = (R̂i − R̂0i )+ (R̂0i −R0i ).
By Chebyshev’s inequality and Assumption 2.3.6, we have for the second term R̂0i −R0i =Op (T −1/2).
It remains to show that the first term R̂i − R̂0i =Op (T −1/2). We write























i ) denote the (m,n)-th entries ofΨi t (θ̂
(p)a
i ) andΨi t (θ
0
i ), respectively.






i )−Ψm,ni t (θ̂0i ) =Op (T −1/2). By the mean value theorem












[∇θiΨm,ni t (θ̄i )]′[θ̂(p)ai − θ̂0i ]





||∇θiΨm,ni t (θ̄i )||,




i . Given Assumption 2.2.4, we have T
−1 ∑T
t=1 ||∇θiΨm,ni t (θ̄i )|| =
Op (1) by Markov’s inequality. Next, we have ||θ̂(p)ai − θ̂0i || =Op (T −1/2) from Proposition 2.3.3. This
gives R̂i − R̂0i =Op (T −1/2) and completes the proof. 
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Appendix 2.H
2.H.1 Simulation results of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for all M
We collect in this section the full set of simulation results for the dimensional study in Section 2.4.2
of the main paper where only the results for M = 20 are reported to save space. It is useful to recall
that the size study under NullD and the power study under AlterC are reported, respectively, in
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 of the paper.
Now, we report for M = 10,20,30, the size study under NullD in Table 2.H.1, and the power
study under AlterC in Table 2.H.2. Consistent with the paper, we report here both the results
based on asymptotic critical values (Q1) and bootstrap critical values (Q∗1 ). In general, we find
that the size of both the Q1 and Q∗1 to be reasonably stable across M for each of the dimension
considered. This result is consistent with the bivariate case reported in Table 2.1 of the paper. As
for the power study, we find that the rejection rates of Q1 and Q∗1 decrease in M . This is because we
have one-period lag in volatility spillover under AlterC. Thus, a test that focuses on recent events
is expected give better power. This finding is consistent with the bivariate case reported in Table
2.2 of the paper. We also observe that the rejection rates of both Q1 and Q∗1 increase in T and d1,
consistent with the higher dimensional results reported in Table 2.4 of the paper. This finding
appears to hold regardless of the choice M .
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2.H.2 Monte Carlo study of the bidirectional test
We report and discuss in this section the full set of simulation results for our bidirectional spillover
test based on the proposed NCCC-LS modeling. To ensure consistency and comparability, we
maintain the same experimental design and parameter combinations as those described in Section
2.4 of the paper. As per the unidirectional study, we conduct simulations based on both the asymp-
totic critical values (Q2) and bootstrap critical values (Q∗2 ). Overall, the finite sample performance
of Q2 and Q∗2 is very similar to that of Q1 and Q
∗
1 , as will be discussed in the following.
To keep the presentation consistent, we tabulate and present the simulation results of the
bidirectional tests in the same ordering as their unidirectional counterparts. First, we report
the bivariate simulation results in Tables 2.H.3 and 2.H.4, which represents the bidirectional
counterparts of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in the paper. Next, we report the dimensional study (for the case
of M = 20) in Tables 2.H.5 and 2.H.6, which correspond to Tables 2.3 and 2.4 in the paper. Finally,
we also report the full set of dimensional study (i.e., for M = 10,20,30) in Tables 2.H.7 and 2.H.8,
which represent the bidirectional counterparts of Tables 2.H.1 and 2.H.2 in this appendix.
We begin with the bivariate study. Table 2.H.3 reports the size performance of our bidirectional
testing strategy. We find that the size pattern of Q2 and Q∗2 is very similar to that of Q1 and Q
∗
1
reported in Table 2.1 of the paper. In general, the size of our bidirectional approach is reasonable
and it improves as T increases. The size is also stable across the different parameter combinations
considered; the four kernel functions studied and their smoothing parameters M . Table 2.H.4
reports the power performance of our bidirectional testing approach. We can see that the power of
Q2 and Q∗2 is slightly lower than that of Q1 and Q
∗
1 reported in Table 2.2 of the paper. This minor
loss in power is expected because the bidirectional tests check both positive and negative lag order
j ’s for evidence of spillover, whereas the unidirectional tests check only the positive ones. Other
than this, the overall power pattern of Q2 and Q∗2 is very similar to that of Q1 and Q
∗
1 .
We now turn to the simulation results of the higher dimensional study of Q2 and Q∗2 reported
in Tables 2.H.5, 2.H.6, 2.H.7 and 2.H.8. Because the results in Tables 2.H.5 and 2.H.6 are embedded,
respectively, in Tables 2.H.7 and 2.H.8, we shall focus on discussing the latter. Table 2.H.7 reports
the size study of Q2 and Q∗2 as the portfolio dimension increases. First, we find that the size of
Q2 and Q∗2 increases in d1, but not overly excessive nor rapid. The size generally improves and
stabilizes as T increases. The observed trend is similar to that of the unidirectional tests reported
in Table 2.3 of the paper. We also find the size of Q2 and Q∗2 to be stable across M for each of the
dimension studied, consistent with their unidirectional counterparts reported in Table 2.H.1.
Table 2.H.8 reports the power study of our bidirectional inferential approach as d1 increases.
We find that Q2 and Q∗2 have power despite a rather low spillover intensity. We also find that the
power increases in d1 as the spillover evidence becomes stronger due to the increased number
of risk recipients. This power trend is consistent with that of the unidirectional tests reported in
Table 2.4 of the paper. We also find that the rejection rates of Q2 and Q∗2 decrease in M due to the
one-period lag spillover, in line with the pattern given by Q1 and Q∗1 in Table 2.H.2. Similar to the
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Table 2.H.3 Empirical sizes
NullA NullB NullC
T M 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
Rejection rates based on asymptotic critical values
1000 Q2BAR 7.0 6.9 6.8 7.0 6.9 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.8
Q2DAN 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9
Q2QS 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 7.0 6.9 6.9
Q2TR 7.0 6.8 6.4 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.9 6.8 6.4
1500 Q2BAR 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.4
Q2DAN 6.7 6.6 6.3 6.7 6.8 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.3
Q2QS 6.7 6.5 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.3 6.8 6.6 6.4
Q2TR 6.7 6.1 6.4 6.8 6.2 6.5 6.7 6.1 6.4
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗2BAR 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4
Q∗2DAN 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.2
Q∗2QS 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.3
Q∗2TR 5.5 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.3
1500 Q∗2BAR 4.5 4.7 5.0 4.5 4.6 5.1 4.6 4.7 5.1
Q∗2DAN 4.6 4.8 5.2 4.5 4.8 5.2 4.7 4.9 5.3
Q∗2QS 4.6 4.8 5.2 4.6 5.0 5.1 4.6 4.8 5.2
Q∗2TR 4.9 5.2 5.3 4.8 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.2 5.3
NOTES: The table reports empirical sizes (in %) of Q2 under NullA, NullB and NullC at the 5% significance level based









denote the rejection rates of Q2 using asymptotic and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN,
QS and TR denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated
kernel. Number of bootstraps = 499. T and M denote the sample size and kernel smoothing parameter, respectively.
bivariate study reported in Table 2.H.4, we observe here some minor loss in power of Q2 and Q∗2
compared with Q1 and Q∗1 . This is again due to the fact that Q2 and Q
∗
2 examine both positive
and negative directions for spillover evidence while Q1 and Q∗1 check only the positive direction.
Apart from this, the overall power pattern of Q2 and Q∗2 is very similar to that of Q1 and Q
∗
1 , and
the power generally improves as T increases.
92 Modelling and testing volatility spillover
Table 2.H.4 Empirical powers
AlterA AlterB
T M 10 20 30 10 20 30
Rejection rates based on empirical critical values
1000 Q2BAR 61.2 52.4 45.7 84.5 76.7 69.9
Q2DAN 58.7 46.0 38.5 82.5 70.4 61.5
Q2QS 57.6 44.4 37.3 81.5 68.4 59.9
Q2TR 37.3 27.5 23.0 60.2 45.7 37.3
1500 Q2BAR 79.3 70.5 63.9 96.7 93.4 89.9
Q2DAN 76.6 64.0 55.1 95.8 89.9 82.8
Q2QS 75.4 61.9 53.2 95.3 88.6 81.3
Q2TR 53.2 40.8 33.6 81.9 67.5 57.1
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗2BAR 59.4 49.9 43.8 83.7 75.9 68.3
Q∗2DAN 56.4 43.4 36.6 81.6 68.5 59.2
Q∗2QS 54.9 42.2 35.0 80.4 66.6 57.4
Q∗2TR 35.1 25.0 20.8 57.5 42.4 35.1
1500 Q∗2BAR 77.7 69.4 62.0 95.9 92.2 87.9
Q∗2DAN 75.5 62.1 52.9 95.0 88.3 81.5
Q∗2QS 74.1 60.3 51.2 94.6 86.9 80.0
Q∗2TR 51.7 36.9 30.2 80.3 64.6 53.8
NOTES: The table reports empirical powers (in %) of Q2 under AlterA and AlterB at the 5% significance level based









denote the rejection rates of Q2 using empirical and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN, QS
and TR denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated
kernel. Number of bootstraps = 499. T and M denote the sample size and kernel smoothing parameter, respectively.
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Table 2.H.5 Empirical sizes
NullD
T d1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rejection rates based on asymptotic critical values
1000 Q2BAR 7.1 7.0 7.6 7.9 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.3
Q2DAN 7.0 7.1 7.8 8.0 7.4 8.0 8.3 8.5
Q2QS 6.9 7.1 7.8 7.9 7.3 7.9 8.3 8.5
Q2TR 6.9 7.1 7.5 8.6 8.1 8.6 8.7 9.3
1500 Q2BAR 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.5 7.4 7.3
Q2DAN 6.3 6.6 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.5 7.5
Q2QS 6.3 6.5 6.6 7.0 6.9 7.6 7.3 7.5
Q2TR 6.3 6.2 7.0 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.9 7.7
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗2BAR 5.3 5.7 5.2 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.0 6.2
Q∗2DAN 5.6 5.7 5.1 5.3 6.3 6.1 6.0 6.2
Q∗2QS 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.2
Q∗2TR 5.7 5.8 5.5 5.5 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.1
1500 Q∗2BAR 4.6 5.2 4.8 4.6 5.6 5.0 5.7 5.4
Q∗2DAN 4.9 5.3 4.8 5.1 5.5 5.1 5.8 5.2
Q∗2QS 5.0 5.3 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.0 5.9 5.3
Q∗2TR 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.6
NOTES: The table reports empirical sizes (in %) of Q2 under NullD at the 5% significance level based on NCCC-LS









rejection rates of Q2 using asymptotic and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN, QS and
TR denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated kernel.
Number of bootstraps = 499. T and d1 denote the sample size and dimension of portfolio 1, respectively.
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Table 2.H.6 Empirical powers
AlterC
T d1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rejection rates based on empirical critical values
1000 Q2BAR 18.6 25.5 34.6 39.7 48.9 55.1 55.9 58.0
Q2DAN 16.8 21.9 28.4 32.6 41.2 45.8 46.7 48.2
Q2QS 16.5 21.2 27.3 31.3 39.6 43.9 44.3 45.3
Q2TR 11.6 14.0 17.2 18.9 22.4 24.5 24.7 25.1
1500 Q2BAR 28.5 42.9 58.0 69.0 78.5 82.7 86.1 89.4
Q2DAN 23.7 36.0 48.2 59.0 68.0 73.0 77.4 80.5
Q2QS 23.4 34.8 45.8 56.8 65.4 70.9 75.1 78.3
Q2TR 14.3 20.3 25.0 31.4 35.9 40.1 42.9 45.4
Rejection rates based on bootstrap critical values
1000 Q∗2BAR 16.0 23.4 32.1 38.9 46.1 50.7 53.4 57.5
Q∗2DAN 14.0 20.1 26.3 32.7 37.9 41.6 44.6 47.6
Q∗2QS 13.8 19.0 25.1 31.2 36.1 39.7 42.5 45.3
Q∗2TR 10.1 12.0 16.0 18.0 20.8 22.0 23.8 25.1
1500 Q∗2BAR 23.2 38.3 56.0 66.8 75.7 80.7 85.6 87.6
Q∗2DAN 19.7 31.7 46.7 56.4 65.6 70.7 76.7 79.1
Q∗2QS 19.3 30.5 44.8 54.0 62.7 68.0 74.0 76.6
Q∗2TR 13.3 17.2 24.2 29.5 34.0 38.2 41.3 43.9
NOTES: The table reports empirical powers (in %) of Q2 under AlterC at the 5% significance level based on NCCC-LS









rejection rates of Q2 using empirical and bootstrap critical values, respectively; the subscripts BAR, DAN, QS and TR
denote, respectively, the Barlett kernel, the Daniell kernel, the Quadratic-Spectral kernel and the Truncated kernel.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Based on a correctly specified model, in the paper we find no evidence of volatility spillover
between the UK market and the NA market after Brexit. In this section, we investigate the con-
sequence of model misspecification on testing for volatility spillover. To this purpose, we repeat
the examination of spillover between UK and NA in the post–Brexit sample with a deliberately
misspecified model.
Recall that a well specified model requires order 4 for the conditional variance of the UK series.
We first include a control study that is correctly specified. We specify a model with random order 6
for the conditional variance of the UK series. Diagnostic tests reported in Table 2.H.9 suggest that
the model is well specified. Table 2.H.10 reports the volatility spillover test results. Consistent with
the findings in the paper, we find no evidence of volatility spillover between the UK market and
the NA market. Moreover, the p-values reported in Table 2.H.10 are very similar to those reported
in the paper. This control study serves two purposes. First, it ensures that our conclusion is not
affected by the sensitivity of a correctly specified model lag order. Second, it ensures that any
changes in conclusion in the next study is likely to be driven by model misspecification.
To impose model misspecification, we now use order 1 for the variance of the UK market.
Diagnostic results reported in Table 2.H.11 suggests model misspecification. Table 2.H.12 reports
the volatility spillover test results. In contrast to the findings based on a correctly specified model,
we find that the NA market has a significant spillover effect to the UK market at all M ’s. Given the
control study, this false-positive result is likely to be induced by serial correlations in the event
variables as a result of model misspecification. In summary, the exercises in this section highlight
the importance of a correctly specified model in testing volatility spillover.
Table 2.H.9 Diagnostic tests (UK–NA, Control)
LB(10) LB(20) LB(30) LB2(10) LB2(20) LB2(30)
Post–Brexit (24th June 2016 – 31st December 2019)
UK 8.342 17.378 24.770 7.035 12.227 15.502
[0.595] [0.628] [0.736] [0.722] [0.908] [0.987]
US 15.436 18.869 23.736 10.546 13.020 17.188
[0.117] [0.530] [0.784] [0.394] [0.877] [0.970]
Canada 6.779 18.437 22.004 4.432 18.823 21.513
[0.746] [0.559] [0.854] [0.926] [0.533] [0.871]
NOTES: The table reports diagnostic analyses for all fitted series. LB(M) and LB2(M) are the Ljung-Box tests for the null
of no serial correlation (up to lag order M) on the standardized and squared standardized residuals, respectively. The
values in the squared parentheses are the p-values of the tests.
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Table 2.H.10 Spillover results (UK–NA, Control)
Post–Brexit
M 10 20 30
Q∗1BAR 0.172 0.166 0.236
Q∗−1BAR 0.643 0.599 0.673
NOTES: The table reports bootstrap p-values of the proposed spillover tests. Number
of bootstraps = 499. Q∗BAR denotes the one-way test for the null hypothesis of no
volatility spillover from the NA market to the UK market. Q∗−1BAR denotes the one-
way test for the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover from the UK market to the
NA market. The subscript BAR denotes the Barlett kernel. M denotes the kernel
smoothing parameter.
Table 2.H.11 Diagnostic tests (UK–NA, Misspecified)
LB(10) LB(20) LB(30) LB2(10) LB2(20) LB2(30)
Post–Brexit (24th June 2016 – 31st December 2019)
UK 33.666 49.171 55.323 22.971 38.451 41.231
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.011] [0.008] [0.083]
US 15.436 18.869 23.736 10.546 13.020 17.188
[0.117] [0.530] [0.784] [0.394] [0.877] [0.970]
Canada 6.779 18.437 22.004 4.432 18.823 21.513
[0.746] [0.559] [0.854] [0.926] [0.533] [0.871]
NOTES: The table reports diagnostic analyses for all fitted series. LB(M) and LB2(M) are the Ljung-Box tests for the null
of no serial correlation (up to lag order M) on the standardized and squared standardized residuals, respectively. The
values in the squared parentheses are the p-values of the tests.
Table 2.H.12 Spillover results (UK–NA, Misspecified)
Post–Brexit
M 10 20 30
Q∗1BAR 0.078 0.048 0.060
Q∗−1BAR 0.721 0.607 0.687
NOTES: The table reports bootstrap p-values of the proposed spillover tests. Number
of bootstraps = 499. Q∗BAR denotes the one-way test for the null hypothesis of no
volatility spillover from the NA market to the UK market. Q∗−1BAR denotes the one-
way test for the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover from the UK market to the
NA market. The subscript BAR denotes the Barlett kernel. M denotes the kernel
smoothing parameter.
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2.H.4 Computational efficiency study
In this section, we conduct a computational efficiency experiment to highlight the speed advantage
of our adjusted least-squares estimation over its likelihood counterparts. We simulate the following






Next, we fit the simulated ARCH process ht using our adjusted least-squares estimation as well as
QMLE. During estimation, we measure the machine elapsed time using the Matlab tic and toc
functions. For improved accuracy, we repeat the procedure 10000 times and we compute the mean
elapsed time. We find that the average machine time required by our estimation method is about
0.0012 (machine unit) per simulation, while that required by QMLE is about 0.0266 per simulation.
In other words, our method requires only about 4.3% of the the computational time of QMLE.

CHAPTER 3




Crude oil is often described as the lifeblood of modern economies because it fuels essential eco-
nomic activities such as agricultural productions, chemical engineerings, construction operations,
industrial manufacturings, power generations and transportations. Despite advancement in the
renewable alternatives, crude oil remains the world’s most important source of energy after the
mid-1950s. China has been importing crude oil to facilitate its rapid economic growth ever since
1995. Now, China is the second largest economy in the world by gross domestic product (GDP),
and its petroleum consumption has more than tripled between 1995 (160.65 million tons) and 2017
(587.45 million tons).1 Armed with ambitious economic development plans, China’s demand for
international oil has been rising consistently over the past 15 years, as depicted in Figure 3.1. With
more than eight million barrels of daily crude oil imports in 2017, China has since then surpassed
the US to become the top crude oil importer. Therefore, it is evident that global crude oil and
the Chinese economy are closely interdependent. In particular, the oil-intensive sectors in China
directly influence the demand for, and the price of international oil, whereas a global reduction in
the supply of oil affects the Chinese industries due to increase in operational costs.
In this paper, we study Granger causal relations between global crude oil and the sectoral
stock market index returns in China. We focus on the industrial, construction, agricultural and
‡A research manuscript based on the results in this chapter entitled “Global crude oil and the Chinese oil-intensive
sectors: A comprehensive causality study” is under revision at Energy Economics.
1Data source: China Statistical Yearbook. Besides, petroleum is a general term consisting of crude oil and its processed
products.
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Figure 3.1 Crude oil imports. This figure plots the crude oil imports in China (solid line) and in the
US (dashed line) over the 2005–2019 period, in million barrels per day. Data source: Datastream
and EIA.
transportation (ICAT) sectors which collectively accounts for more than 80% of China’s petroleum
consumption in 2017.2 We make use of daily observations over the 2005–2019 period, which allows
studying the changes in causal linkages after key economic and political events such as the US
subprime mortgage financial crisis in 2008 and the Chinese reformation of domestic refined oil
pricing mechanism in 2013. We combine a set of Granger causality inferential procedures that
is based on the cross-correlation function (CCF) approach to analyse the oil-ICAT nexus. Our
bidirectional methodology uncovers causal relations in the mean, variance, risky quantiles and
distribution between the markets of interest. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
that unifies the extensive CCF-based causality tests proposed over the past two decades.
This paper offers several contributions to the literature. First, we investigate causal relations
between global crude oil and the Chinese industries that are oil intensive. This is in stark contrast
to most existing studies, which analyse the Chinese market at the broader sectoral or aggregate
level. The ICAT sectors deserve particular attention as they consume most of the oil in China to
fuel the country’s modern and advanced economy. For instance, the agricultural industry depends
on oil-driven machineries that are capable of accelerating food production such as automated
harvesters and tractors to feed the population. The industrial sector relies on crude oil to power
cities and to manufacture essential everyday products that includes electronic devices, textiles,
and medicines. The construction of skyscrapers that shape major cities speeds up with the ability
to mass produce high-strength materials such as steel, which is an oil-consuming process. Finally,
most of the transportation modes connecting goods, people, places and services are powered by
oil. Compared with papers that focus on the composite market index, we provide a more in-depth
and focused examination by featuring the top oil-intensive sectors individually. Besides, we offer
2Data source: China Statistical Yearbook.
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a set of conclusions that is, relatively speaking, more definite than studies using firm-level data
since the reactions can vary for firms within the same sector.
Second, we consolidate the extensive literature on CCF-based inferential procedures and we
show that various forms of causality can be examined. Under this unified framework, we provide a
comprehensive analysis covering the mean, variance, risky quantiles (both positive and negative)
and distribution, where each element reveals a unique economic relation. The causality-in-mean
analysis investigates return predictability, whereas the presence of variance causality can be viewed
as volatility spillover. The causality-in-risk test examines the existence of extreme risk spillovers
and it covers both positive and negative relations. This is convenient given that crude oil and
stock markets might be negatively correlated (see e.g., Du and He, 2015; Mollick and Assefa, 2013).
Finally, the long-term causal linkages are analysed using the causality-in-distribution test. Because
all of our analyses are based on the CCF approach, we minimise potential inferential biases due to
methodological disparities. Compared with a handful of papers that focus on crude oil’s impact on
the Chinese markets, we do not presume any dependence directions in the oil-ICAT nexus and our
approach allows for potential feedback effects.
Third, we make use of our sample length to investigate possible changes in causal relations
after the 2008 US financial crisis and the 2013 refined oil pricing mechanism reform in China. The
former is well known for affecting the global economies including crude oil (see, e.g., Broadstock
et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2019), whereas the latter is a relatively new event that is of great significance
to the Chinese economy. Although a few papers consider the effects of oil reform (see, e.g., Bouri
et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018), neither of them focuses on the ICAT industries.
Traditionally, the price of domestic oil in China is capped and strictly regulated by its central
government. Consequently, the world oil price has a limited influence on the oil-intensive sectors
in China. On 27 March 2013, the Chinese government launched a major reformation of its domestic
refined oil pricing mechanism to greatly relax its control over local oil price. Generally regarded as
the major milestone in the transformation to a market-oriented pricing of retail oil, this reform
discourages the government from setting a ceiling price for domestic oil so long as international
oil price stays under USD 130 per barrel. This has nontrivial impact to the Chinese markets,
particularly the ICAT sectors as they become more exposed to global oil price movement.
In summary, we complement a growing literature on the oil-stock nexus by providing novel
perspectives from the industries in China that are oil intensive. We combine a series of inferential
tests to thoroughly examine the oil-ICAT nexus while taking into consideration the effects of China’s
oil reform. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the existing
literature. We introduce the unified causality methodology in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes
our dataset. Empirical findings are reported and discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Literature review
In this section, we review and summarise existing studies on the relations between global crude
oil and the Chinese markets. Note that we only provide a very brief overview of the literature’s
conclusions as the main purpose of this review is to highlight the breadth of the related literature.
We emphasise that each study is highly detailed, adopting differing econometric strategies, with
different datasets spanning over different time periods, among others. For a survey on other
countries including the US, we refer the readers to see, e.g., Broadstock et al. (2016, Table 1).
Using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model together with the Baba-Engle-Kraft-
Kroner (BEKK) specification, Broadstock and Filis (2014) find that crude oil affects the two largest
economies (China and US) in the world, though the Chinese market is more resilient to the
impact than its US counterpart. Based on extreme value analysis, Chen and Lv (2015) document
positive dependence between international oil and the Chinese stock market. Ding et al. (2016)
study positive Granger causality between global crude oil and the major stock indices over 1996–
2012 to find that the causal relations between the Shanghai composite index and the West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) oil varies across quantiles. Based on a set of monthly data spanning from 1994
to 2014, Zhu et al. (2016) study if crude oil affects the broader industries in China using quantile
regression. The authors find that the dependence on oil varies across sectors and quantiles. Based
on asset pricing models, Broadstock et al. (2016) focus on firm-level data covering the 2005–2013
period to find that 89.2% of the Chinese listed entities respond to oil return.
Using daily data from 2005 to 2015, Bouri et al. (2017) find that the oil reform in 2013 strengthens
the mean but weakens the variance relations between global oil and the broader Chinese markets.
Based on the SVAR framework and monthly data from 2005 to 2015, Ding et al. (2017) document
that international crude oil affects the investor sentiments in China. Using monthly data from 1996
to 2015, Wei and Guo (2017) find that the link between crude oil and the Chinese aggregate market
changes after major events such as a financial crisis. Based on crude oil volatility index and the
vector autoregression (VAR) methodology, Luo and Qin (2017) confirm that oil price uncertainty
impacts the broader stock markets in China over 2007–2015. Using a similar set of data, Xiao
et al. (2018) find that crude oil volatility has negative impacts on the wider Chinese stock markets
under the quantile regression framework. Kirkulak-Uludag and Safarzadeh (2018) focus on the
organization of the petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) oil data spanning from 2004 to 2014
and the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) methodology to find
evidence of volatility spillover between crude oil and the broader markets in China. By combining
variational model decomposition method, copula functions and systemic risk measure, Li and Wei
(2018) document positive risk spillover effects from global oil to the Shanghai composite market
index over 2000–2017.
Using daily data from 2005 to 2017 and the CCF method, Peng et al. (2018) investigate the
spillover effects from crude oil to 529 Chinese firms. The authors find that most of the firms react
to extreme oil return with a stronger magnitude after the oil reform in 2013. Based on intraday
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data from 2006 to 2015 and realised measures, Luo and Ji (2018) evidence volatility spillover
from international oil to major agricultural products in China. Zhang et al. (2018) focus on the
broader commodity markets to find that they, too, are affected by crude oil based on autoregressive
jump intensity (ARJI) model and data from 2005 to 2016. Using daily data from 2007 to 2017 and
the VAR-BEKK framework, Yun and Yoon (2019) evidence mean and variance spillover between
international oil and the stock return of major airlines in Korea and China.
Based on nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags (NARDL) model and weekly data over 2001–
2016, Wen et al. (2019) find that crude oil can affect the broader Chinese stock indices through
nonlinear channel. Using frequency-based methodology and daily data from 2000 to 2018, Wang
and Wang (2019) find that the impact of crude oil volatility on the markets in China varies across
sectors and time periods. Based on quantile regression framework and daily data over 2011–2018,
Xiao et al. (2019) find that the crude oil volatility index affects the implied volatility indicator of
the aggregate Chinese market. Using intraday data from 2007 to 2016 and directional realised
measures, Xu et al. (2019) evidence volatility spillover between crude oil and the composite stock
index in China.
Much of the literature focuses on the links between crude oil and the Chinese composite stock
index or the broader markets. Some papers study moment relations such as the mean and/or
volatility, whereas some authors consider quantile linkages such as extreme returns. Conclusions
have been drawn based on various methods including the CCF, copula, GARCH, quantile regression
and VAR, among others. Certain studies implicitly assume one-way nexus that crude oil affects
the Chinese markets while some papers restrict their analysis to positive correlations. Besides,
dependence measures such as the copulas do not distinguish the direction of impact. In this paper,
we focus on the Granger causality relations between global crude oil and the Chinese oil-intensive
sectors. We study the industrial, construction, agricultural and transportation sectors, which are
the major oil-consuming industries in China. We offer a comprehensive bidirectional study that
covers seven perspectives in the oil-ICAT nexus: the mean, variance, distribution, downside risk,
upside risk, down-to-up risk and up-to-down risk. All of our analyses and conclusions are based
on a standard family of CCF-based causality tests, which minimise biases that may arise from
differing frameworks.
3.3 Methodology
We combine the extensive Granger causality tests developed in Hong (2001), Hong et al. (2009),
Du and He (2015) and Candelon and Tokpavi (2016), all of which are based on the CCF of a pair of
event variables. This unified methodological framework allows testing for causal relations in the
mean, variance, extreme risks (both positive and negative) and distribution between global crude
oil and the oil-intensive sectoral returns in China. First, we suppose that the return series can be
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described as follows 




{ξt } ∼ i.i.d.(0,1) with CDF F (·)
(3.1)
where µt and ht are, respectively, the conditional mean and variance of Yt ; εt denotes the innova-
tion term; and {ξt } is the standardised innovation sequence that is independent and identically
distributed with cumulative distribution function F (·).
We specify µt as an order p autoregressive process with day dummies to control for possible
day-of-the-week effects, where the Monday, ..., Thursday day dummies are denoted, respectively, by
d1, ..., d4. The resulting process is denoted by ARX(p). We consider GARCH(1,1) for the conditional
variance ht because it is widely regarded as the workhorse model (Lee and Hansen, 1994). Although
the GARCH(1,1) is able to outperform more sophisticated models in most occasions, Hansen and
Lunde (2005) find that in certain cases it is inferior to a model that can accommodate leverage
effect. Therefore, we further consider two asymmetric specifications as competing models: the
Exponential GARCH(1,1) and the Glosten-Jagannathan-Runkle GARCH(1,1), which are denoted in
short by EGARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1), respectively. Regarding the innovation distribution
F (·), we consider both the generalised error distribution (GED) and the Hansen (1994) skewed-t
distribution, which are known for capturing well the empirical features of returns series such
as heavy tails (see. e.g., Bouri et al., 2016; Du and He, 2015). The best-fitting specification is
selected on the basis of Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criteria (SBIC) and a range of diagnostic
examinations.
Given a pair of realised returns {Y1,t ,Y2,t }Tt=1 of size T , we let {Ẑ1,t , Ẑ2,t } collect the possibly n-
variate estimated event variables derived from the realised returns. Depending on the hypothesis
of interest, we derive different event variables from the realised samples. For each set of event
variables, the CCF-based Granger causality testing procedure is based on their sample cross-
covariance matrix that is given by




t=1+ j (Ẑ1,t − Π̂1)(Ẑ2,t− j − Π̂2)′, 0 ≤ j ≤ T −1,
T −1
∑T
t=1− j (Ẑ1,t+ j − Π̂1)(Ẑ2,t − Π̂2)′, 1−T ≤ j < 0,
(3.2)
where Π̂i = T −1 ∑Tt=1 Ẑi ,t , i = 1,2. Then, the sample CCF between {Ẑ1,t } and {Ẑ2,t } is given by
R̂( j ) = diag(Σ̂1)−1/2Ĉ ( j )diag(Σ̂2)−1/2, (3.3)
where Σ̂1 and Σ̂2 are the sample covariance matrices of {Ẑ1,t } and {Ẑ2,t }, respectively; and diag(X )
denotes the matrix containing the diagonal elements of X . Intuitively speaking, the CCF in (3.3)
captures the causal relation from {Y2,t } to {Y1,t } in the form of cross-correlation between their
corresponding derived event variables {Ẑ2,t } and {Ẑ1,t }. If {Y2,t } does not Granger cause {Y1,t }, the
cross-correlation between their derived quantities naturally reduces to zero since {Y2,t } has no
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explanatory power for {Y1,t }. The properly weighted and standardised test statistic for the generic
Granger causality from {Y2,t } to {Y1,t } is given by




2( j /M)vec[R̂( j )]′(Γ̂−12 ⊗ Γ̂−11 )vec[R̂( j )]−n2CT (M)
[n2DT (M)]1/2
, (3.4)
where k(·) is a kernel function with smoothing parameter M ; Γ̂1 and Γ̂2 are the sample correlation
matrices of {Ẑ1,t } and {Ẑ2,t }, respectively; n is the dimension of the event variables; and CT (M) and




(1− j /T )k2( j /M), (3.5)
DT (M) = 2
T−1∑
j=1
(1− j /T )(1− ( j +1)/T )k4( j /M). (3.6)
Under standard regularity conditions, Q̂(Y2,t −→ Y1,t ) converges in distribution to N(0,1) under the
null hypothesis that {Y2,t } does not Granger cause {Y1,t }. Because Q̂(Y2,t −→ Y1,t ) diverges to positive
infinity under the alternative hypothesis, upper-tailed critical values are used.
To test the null hypothesis that {Y2,t } does not Granger cause {Y1,t } in variance, we follow Hong
(2001) to set the event variables Ẑ1,t and Ẑ2,t as the estimated univariate squared standardised
residuals ξ̂21,t and ξ̂
2
2,t , respectively. For causality-in-mean analysis, the event variables are set to
be the standardised residuals. Intuitively speaking, the cross-correlation between the properly
normalised return series in the first (second) moment contain information about Granger causality
in the mean (variance). The causality-in-risk test of Hong et al. (2009) begins by defining the value-
at-risk (VaR) which is given by V̂t (α) = µ̂t +
√
ĥt ẑ(α), where µ̂t and ĥt are the estimated conditional
mean and variance, respectively; and ẑ(α) is the support value at risk level α of the estimated
distribution F̂ (·) that satisfies F̂ [ẑ(α)] =α. To test the null that {Y2,t } does not Granger cause {Y1,t }
in downside risk, we set the event variables as Ẑ1,t =1[Y1,t < V̂1,t (α)] and Ẑ2,t =1[Y2,t < V̂2,t (α)].
To test for up-to-up risk causality, we set Ẑ1,t =1[Y1,t > V̂1,t (1−α)] and Ẑ2,t =1[Y2,t > V̂2,t (1−α)].
The intuition is that if {Y2,t } Granger cause {Y1,t } in the upside (downside) risk, the cross-correlation
between their upside (downside) risky quantiles would be nontrivial. In a similar vein, we can
study negative risk causality effects by using the inversed relations. For down-to-up risk causality,
we follow Du and He (2015) to set Ẑ1,t = 1[Y1,t > V̂1,t (1 −α)] and Ẑ2,t = 1[Y2,t < V̂2,t (α)]; for
up-to-down risk causality, we set Ẑ1,t = 1[Y1,t < V̂1,t (α)] and Ẑ2,t = 1[Y2,t > V̂2,t (1−α)]. In our
analyses, we consider risk level α = 1% which equals to studying the 99%-VaR — the typical
regulatory reporting requirement. Besides, the 99%-VaR is also widely used in empirical study.
For instance, Dias (2013) focuses on the same level to study the role of market capitalisation
in the estimation of financial risk. Finally, the causality-in-distribution test of Candelon and
Tokpavi (2016) considers a set A = {α1, ...,αn+1} of n+1 risk levels covering the distribution support
of F̂ (·). For i = 1,2, the event variable Ẑi ,t is a n-dimensional column vector, where its s-th
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element is given by Ẑi ,t ,s = 1[V̂i ,t (αs) ≤ Yi ,t < V̂i ,t (αs+1)], s = 1, ...,n. Given that distribution tails
are studied by the causality-in-risk tests, we now cover the centre of the distribution by setting
A = {20%,40%,60%,80%}, which examines long-run causality according to Candelon and Tokpavi
(2016). It is worth highlighting that the causality-in-distribution test also acts as a filter that
captures any remaining causal links including nonlinear relations.
Because the Chinese stock market closes before the price of global crude oil is marked and
off-market trading is not a common practice in China, instantaneous causal effects from the
Chinese market to crude oil should be studied. More precisely, international data providers such as
Datastream mark the daily Brent oil price at 4:30pm [Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) + 00:00] during
the winter season and at 3:30pm (GMT + 01:00) during the summer season, whereas the equity
markets in mainland China close at 3:00pm (GMT + 08:00) with strict restriction on off-market
trading. Hence, it is natural to study instantaneous Granger causality from the oil-intensive sectors
in China to global crude oil. This is achieved by considering lag 0 in the CCF in (3.4)




2( j /M)vec[R̂( j )]′(Γ̂−12 ⊗ Γ̂−11 )vec[R̂( j )]−n2CT (M)
[n2DT (M)]1/2
. (3.7)
The instantaneous Granger causality test statistic Q̂(Y2,t =⇒ Y1,t ) has the same asymptotic properties
as Q̂(Y2,t −→ Y1,t ). Therefore, inferences for both causality directions can be drawn based on
the same limiting critical value. Throughout our empirical analysis, we use the Daniell kernel
k(x) = sin(πx)/πx because it enjoys optimal power under appropriate conditions as shown in
Hong (1996); we set the truncation parameter M = ⌈1.5T 0.3⌉ following Candelon and Tokpavi
(2016).
3.4 Data
We analyse Granger causality between global crude oil and the Chinese oil-intensive sectors using
daily observations from January 2005 to December 2019. We focus on the agricultural, construction,
industrial and transportation sectoral indices published by the Shenzhen stock exchange, which
is the larger of the two equity markets in China (the other being the Shanghai stock exchange)
by number of listed companies and by trading volume. Besides, the fact that the Shenzhen stock
exchange publishes all the indices that are required by this study is not surprising because Shanghai
is a financial hub whereas Shenzhen is well-known for its industrialised entrepreneurial companies.
Indeed, the major composition of the Shanghai stock exchange is financial companies whereas
that of the Shenzhen stock exchange is industrial manufacturing companies. Regarding crude oil,
we use daily Brent spot price for its global representativeness since it is the benchmark for more
than two-thirds of all international crude oil contracts. It is therefore not a surprise that Brent
is often the first choice when studying international crude oil in the literature. For instance, it
is used as the main proxy for global oil in Bouri (2015); Bouri et al. (2016); Chen and Lv (2015);
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Peng et al. (2018). To account for the effect of inflation, we deflate the nominal crude oil price and
equity indices by the monthly consumer price index (CPI) in the US and China, respectively. The
American CPI is reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, whereas the Chinese CPI is provided
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. All data are obtained through
Datastream. Return series are calculated by taking the first difference of the inflation adjusted
price indices in natural logarithm. For notational simplicity, we denote by COt , AGt , CONt , I N D t
and T RPt the return series of crude oil, agricultural, construction, industrial and transportation
indices, respectively.
Considering possible structural change in causal links and the fact that information spillover
between international markets is not constant over time, we divide our sample by two key events:
the US subprime financial crisis in 2008 and the Chinese oil reform in 2013. Particularly, we select
15 September 2008 and 27 March 2013, which correspond to, respectively, the day Lehman Brothers
filed for Chapter 11 protection and the date China launched its major domestic refined oil pricing
mechanism reformation. First, we truncate our full sample by one year before and after the two
key dates to yield three subsamples. Then, we increase the length of each subsample with the
guidance from unit root and stationarity examinations to minimise the loss of information.3 Our
first subsample runs from 3 January 2005 to 10 October 2007, covering the pre-crisis period. The
second subsample spans from 7 October 2008 to 17 May 2012, consisting of the post-crisis period.
The third subsample runs from 28 March 2013 to 31 December 2019, which reflects the effects of
China’s domestic oil pricing reform. Overall, our setup allows the study of possible changes in the
market linkages after each key event.
Table 3.1 summarises the daily return series of Brent crude oil and the ICAT sectors in China.
Before the oil reform, all variables exhibit positive mean returns; in the post-reform period, COt ,
CONt and I N D t yield negative mean return. On average, the Chinese ICAT industries and COt
display larger unconditional variance after the financial crisis, and the volatility reduces after the
oil reform. All series exhibit negative skewness and heavy tails except for COt which becomes
positively skewed after the oil reform. Not surprisingly, the Jarque and Bera (1980) (JB) test statistics
suggest that all return variables are not normally distributed. We reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root for all series at every standard significance level using the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979)
(ADF) and Phillips and Perron (1988) (PP) tests. Additionally, the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS)
test suggests that all return variables are stationary for each subsample. The optimal number of
lagged difference terms for the ADF test and the optimal autocovariance lag order for the PP and
KPSS tests are independently selected based on SBIC up to order ⌈T 0.5⌉.
3.5 Results
In this section, we report the model estimates and causality analysis results for each subperiods.
All specifications are estimated using Kevin Sheppard’s Matlab MFE Toolbox.
3We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Skew. Kur. JB ADF PP KPSS T
Pre-crisis (3 January 2005 – 10 October 2007)
COt 0.08 1.88 -0.07 3.37 4.73* -27.91*** -27.95*** 0.07 723
AGt 0.15 2.04 -0.58 5.16 180.96*** -25.24*** -25.27*** 0.11 723
CONt 0.24 2.25 -0.62 5.50 234.81*** -24.78*** -24.81*** 0.04 723
I N D t 0.18 1.87 -0.60 5.81 281.89*** -25.40*** -25.43*** 0.06 723
T RPt 0.15 1.87 -0.75 7.12 581.01*** -26.10*** -26.14*** 0.06 723
Post-crisis (7 October 2008 – 17 May 2012)
COt 0.02 2.49 0.00 10.41 2159.00*** -31.69*** -31.73*** 0.12 943
AGt 0.06 2.12 -0.33 3.99 55.70*** -28.64*** -28.67*** 0.03 943
CONt 0.11 2.15 -0.58 5.03 213.57*** -27.90*** -27.93*** 0.04 943
I N D t 0.04 1.96 -0.39 4.84 156.87*** -28.62*** -28.65*** 0.04 943
T RPt 0.00 1.77 -0.79 5.57 357.97*** -30.75*** -30.79*** 0.05 943
Post-reform (28 March 2013 – 31 December 2019)
COt -0.03 2.00 0.32 5.94 664.04*** -41.00*** -41.02*** 0.07 1764
AGt 0.04 1.86 -0.73 6.66 1140.93*** -39.12*** -39.14*** 0.06 1764
CONt -0.02 1.78 -0.92 6.68 1246.37*** -38.18*** -38.20*** 0.06 1764
I N D t -0.00 1.72 -1.01 7.68 1910.78*** -38.61*** -38.63*** 0.07 1764
T RPt 0.01 1.90 -1.11 8.40 2508.84*** -38.21*** -38.23*** 0.06 1764
NOTES: This table reports the descriptive statistics for all variables. COt represents global crude oil daily return. AGt ,
CONt , I N Dt and T RPt are, respectively, the daily agricultural, construction, industrial and transportation sectoral
returns in China. Std., Skew., and Kur. are standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, respectively. JB is the Jarque and
Bera (1980) test statistic for normality under the null hypothesis. ADF and PP are, respectively, the Augmented Dickey
and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988) test statistics; both assess the null hypothesis of a unit root. KPSS is
the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test statistic for stationarity under the null hypothesis. The optimal number of lagged
difference terms for the ADF test and the optimal number of autocovariance lags for the PP and KPSS tests are selected
(up to ⌈T 0.5⌉) based on SBIC. The significance levels of all statistical tests are abbreviated with asterisks: ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T denotes the number of observations.
3.5.1 Model estimates
Table 3.2 reports the model estimations and diagnostic analyses for the pre-crisis sample. Regard-
ing mean equations, the parsimonious ARX(1) is suggested for all return series. Except for AGt and
CONt , the constant terms of all other return variables are significant. As expected, the estimated
autoregressive coefficients for all equations are statistically significant and are smaller than one in
absolute value. The latter outcome suggests that the mean stationarity condition is satisfied. We
observe that most of the day dummies are significant, which highlight the importance to control
for the day-of-the-week effects.
The suggested model for the variance equation of COt and AGt is GJR-GARCH(1,1), whereas
that of CONt , I N D t and T RPt is GARCH(1,1). All of the estimated parameters are significant at
the 1% level and satisfy the requirement for a stationary variance process. Besides, the selected
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models capture well the volatility clustering property of return series as suggested by a relatively
large GARCH coefficient that ranges from 0.706 to 0.978. We observe a positive estimate for
the asymmetric term in the variance equation for COt , implying that past negative news have
higher impact on the current variance of Brent crude than positive ones. This is known as the
leverage effect. Interestingly, the opposite relation is found for AGt , though this phenomenon is
not uncommon in the agricultural sector (see, e.g., Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2016; Zhang et al.,
2018). In terms of probability densities, the skewed-t distribution is suggested for all variables
with reasonable parameter estimates. For instance, the degree of freedom coefficient η is larger
than 4, which implies excess kurtosis. The estimated skewness parameter λ yields negative values,
suggesting asymmetric distribution that has a longer left tail. These parameter estimates are
consistent with the stylised fact that most financial returns are negatively skewed and exhibit heavy
tails.
We report a range of diagnostic test statistics at the bottom panel in Table 3.2 that plays a pivotal
role to the reliability of our subsequent causality study. We compute the Ljung and Box (1978) test
statistic on the standardised residuals (LB) and the squared standardised residuals (LB2) to find
that for both innovation series, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to the
15th lag order, which is approximately the largest order of the causality tests. This diagnostic result
suggests that our mean and variance equations successfully capture the serial dependence in the
first and second moments of all return variables. The former outcome is important for the causality-
in-mean study, whereas the latter result is essential for the variance causality analysis. We carry
out the Kupiec (1995) (Ku) test to ensure that the fitted density functions adequately describe the
empirical distribution of the return series. Under the null hypothesis, we have that the estimated
probability of occurrence within a distribution range (x%, y%) is equal to the theoretical frequency.
We find that we cannot reject the null at the lower (0%,1%) and upper tails (99%,100%), and at
the centre (20%,80%) of the estimated densities. The former result is essential for the extreme
risk causality analysis, whereas the latter outcome is important for the causality-in-distribution
study. To further demonstrate that our distributional modellings are appropriate and adequate, we
perform the Pearson Chi-squared (χ2) examination as an independent misspecification diagnosis.4
The Pearson Chi-squared test checks the null hypothesis of a correctly specified distribution, and
the test accounts for the entire distributional support. We find that we cannot reject the test at
the usual significance level for each series. This double validation provides further statistical
justifications for our distributional modellings.
Table 3.3 reports the model estimations and diagnostic tests for the post-crisis period. The
ARX(1) process is selected for the mean equation of AGt , CONt and T RPt , whereas COt and I N D t
are adequately described by ARX(7) and ARX(4), respectively. For brevity and to save space, only
the first order coefficient is reported. Consistent with the pre-crisis sample, we observe that most
of the right hand side variables are statistically significant. Regarding variance equations, the
4We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
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EGARCH(1,1) is suggested for COt while AGt requires the higher order GJR-GARCH(3,3). The
GARCH(1,1) is selected for all other variables. The estimated negative asymmetric term in the
GJR-GARCH modelling of AGt is consistent with the pre-crisis sample. Similarly, the leverage effect
in COt is also consistent with the pre-crisis period, as implied by a negative asymmetric parameter
estimate in the EGARCH model. The first order GARCH coefficient for AGt has a low estimate
because the dynamic is largely captured by the third order coefficient with an estimate of 0.632.
For all return variables, the skewed-t distribution provides a better fit with parameter estimates
that reflect heavy tails and negative skewness, consistent with the pre-crisis sample. Diagnostic
test results confirm the adequacy of our model parametrisations.
Table 3.4 reports the model estimates and diagnoses for the post-reform sample. The ARX(1)
mean equation is selected for COt and AGt , whereas the ARX(8), ARX(4) and ARX(6) are suggested
for, respectively, CONt , I N D t and T RPt . The EGARCH(1,1) with GED is suggested for COt while
the EGARCH(1,1) with skewed-t distribution is selected for T RPt . The GARCH(1,1) with skewed-t
distribution is fitted to all other return series. We observe leverage effect for T RPt , where the effect
also persists in COt . The estimated GED shape parameter γ of COt lies between one and two,
suggesting excess kurtosis. This is consistent with all other subperiods. The stylised features of
the remaining variables such as volatility clusters, heavy tails and negative skewness are also well
captured by the suggested models. Diagnostic results further support the selected specifications.
To sum up, our model parametrisations capture many stylised features of the data in the mean,
variance, extreme quantiles and the distribution. Most of the estimated parameters are reasonable
and significant. A series of diagnostic analyses suggest that the selected models are adequately
specified, which are essential to the reliability of our subsequent causality study.
3.5.2 Causality results
Given the model estimates, we conveniently compute the event variables for each Granger causality
hypothesis. Then, we compute the corresponding test statistics using the closed-form expressions
given by (3.4) and (3.7). Inferences are drawn based on the asymptotic upper-tailed critical values
of N(0,1) distribution at the standard significance levels. We report the causality analysis results
for all subperiods in Table 3.5. The test statistics are not reported because they do not add to our
conclusions. Instead, we report the statistical significance of each causality analysis.
We begin with the pre-crisis sample that spans from 3 January 2005 to 10 October 2007. We
observe that the Chinese ICAT sectors Granger cause global crude oil in the mean, and the results
are statistically significant at the 1% level. We note that the variance causality test of Hong (2001) is
based on analysis that is not affected by causal relation from the mean equation. Hence, for the
testing of variance causality, we pre-filter any relations in mean by including the lagged causing
term (instantaneous version for ICAT causing terms) when estimating the mean equation of the
caused term. Our modellings are then re-examined using the LB and LB2 tests to ensure adequacy.
We observe significant bidirectional causality in variance between the ICAT sectors and crude oil.
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Table 3.2 Model estimations and diagnostics
COt AGt CONt I N D t T RPt
ARX ARX ARX ARX ARX
GJR-GARCH GJR-GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH
Pre-crisis (3 January 2005 – 10 October 2007)
Mean equation
Constant 0.335*** 0.027 0.004 0.123*** 0.059***
AR(1) -0.039*** 0.054*** 0.071*** 0.044*** 0.020***
d1 -0.570*** 0.350*** 0.658*** 0.437*** 0.411***
d2 -0.282*** 0.207*** 0.199*** 0.083** 0.118***
d3 -0.421*** 0.091* 0.348*** -0.054 0.045
d4 0.007 -0.064 -0.098* -0.208*** -0.116***
Variance equation
Constant 0.032*** 0.163*** 0.736*** 0.065*** 0.089***
ARCH(1) 0.000*** 0.162*** 0.156*** 0.069*** 0.084***
Asymmetric term 0.022*** -0.111***
GARCH(1) 0.978*** 0.870*** 0.706*** 0.918*** 0.897***
GED γ
Skewed-t η 23.507 5.230*** 5.503*** 4.532*** 4.261***
Skewed-t λ -0.078*** -0.180*** -0.128*** -0.101*** -0.085***
Diagnostics
LB(10) 5.18 4.36 3.19 6.10 11.19
LB(15) 8.06 8.36 4.42 11.37 18.85
LB2(10) 7.93 6.27 6.86 5.21 3.51
LB2(15) 18.21 15.31 10.02 9.81 4.94
Ku(0,1%) 0.77 0.22 0.01 0.41 0.97
Ku(20%,80%) 1.11 0.16 0.16 1.11 0.22
Ku(99%,100%) 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 1.73
Pearson χ2 2.25 1.75 1.54 3.33 3.13
NOTES: This table reports the model estimations and diagnostic analyses for all variables. COt represents global crude
oil daily return. AGt , CONt , I N Dt and T RPt are, respectively, the daily agricultural, construction, industrial and
transportation sectoral returns in China. di is the day dummy, i = 1,2,3,4. γ is the shape parameter of the GED. η and λ
are, respectively, the degree of freedom and skewness parameters of the skewed-t distribution. LB(M) and LB2(M) are
the Ljung and Box (1978) test statistics for the null of no serial correlation (up to lag M) on the standardised and squared
standardised residuals, respectively. Ku(x%, y%) is the Kupiec (1995) test statistic for correct proportion of return
occurrence within the distribution range (x%, y%) under the null hypothesis. The Pearson χ2 test statistic checks the
null hypothesis of a correctly specified distribution. The significance levels of all model estimates and diagnostic tests
are abbreviated with asterisks: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The downside risk of CONt , I N D t and T RPt causes the downside risk of COt , whereas the upside
risk of T RPt and COt affects each other. Interestingly, the downside risk of CONt , I N D t and T RPt
also causes the upside risk of COt . There is no evidence of up-to-down risk spillover between the
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Table 3.3 Model estimations and diagnostics
COt AGt CONt I N D t T RPt
ARX ARX ARX ARX ARX
EGARCH GJR-GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH
Post-crisis (7 October 2008 – 17 May 2012)
Mean equation
Constant 0.198*** 0.442*** 0.200*** 0.223*** 0.186***
AR(1) -0.025*** 0.072*** 0.092*** 0.069*** 0.001
d1 -0.230*** -0.569*** -0.225*** -0.398*** -0.382***
d2 0.018 -0.329*** -0.044 -0.063* -0.065**
d3 -0.086* -0.535*** -0.197*** -0.319*** -0.276***
d4 -0.439*** -0.484*** -0.051 -0.120*** -0.192***
Variance equation
Constant 0.011*** 0.551*** 0.148*** 0.117*** 0.079***
ARCH(1) 0.085*** 0.149*** 0.088*** 0.063*** 0.060***
Asymmetric term -0.024*** -0.034***
GARCH(1) 0.993*** 0.000*** 0.878*** 0.902*** 0.913***
GED γ
Skewed-t η 7.569*** 17.991 9.542 7.890** 5.971***
Skewed-t λ -0.046*** -0.141*** -0.179*** -0.148*** -0.247***
Diagnostics
LB(10) 10.02 7.03 9.25 9.88 15.58
LB(15) 11.84 10.11 15.49 19.89 20.25
LB2(10) 6.33 9.13 7.58 11.48 11.53
LB2(15) 9.04 15.97 21.85 16.64 15.68
Ku(0,1%) 0.21 0.27 1.28 0.04 0.27
Ku(20%,80%) 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.00
Ku(99%,100%) 0.66 0.04 1.40 0.66 0.66
Pearson χ2 3.87 3.44 6.52 2.65 3.70
NOTES: This table reports the model estimations and diagnostic analyses for all variables. COt represents global
crude oil daily return. AGt , CONt , I N Dt and T RPt are, respectively, the daily agricultural, construction, industrial
and transportation sectoral returns in China. Higher order coefficients for the mean and variance equations are not
shown for brevity. di is the day dummy, i = 1,2,3,4. γ is the shape parameter of the GED. η and λ are, respectively, the
degree of freedom and skewness parameters of the skewed-t distribution. LB(M) and LB2(M) are the Ljung and Box
(1978) test statistics for the null of no serial correlation (up to lag M) on the standardised and squared standardised
residuals, respectively. Ku(x%, y%) is the Kupiec (1995) test statistic for correct proportion of return occurrence within
the distribution range (x%, y%) under the null hypothesis. The Pearson χ2 test statistic checks the null hypothesis of a
correctly specified distribution. The significance levels of all model estimates and diagnostic tests are abbreviated with
asterisks: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
ICAT industries and international oil. We observe feedback causality between the distribution of
global crude oil and the ICAT sectors.
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Table 3.4 Model estimations and diagnostics
COt AGt CONt I N D t T RPt
ARX ARX ARX ARX ARX
EGARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH EGARCH
Post-reform (28 March 2013 – 31 December 2019)
Mean equation
Constant 0.071*** -0.044*** 0.055*** 0.026*** 0.092***
AR(1) 0.022*** 0.068*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.091***
d1 0.052** -0.141*** -0.307*** -0.260*** -0.265***
d2 -0.119*** 0.052*** -0.132*** -0.049*** -0.126***
d3 -0.223*** 0.206*** -0.024* 0.054*** -0.138***
d4 -0.223*** 0.284*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.123***
Variance equation
Constant 0.006*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.026***
ARCH(1) 0.064*** 0.084*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.170***
Asymmetric term -0.054*** -0.003***
GARCH(1) 0.998*** 0.916*** 0.922*** 0.926*** 0.988***
GED γ 1.271***
Skewed-t η 4.397*** 4.493*** 4.731*** 4.341***
Skewed-t λ -0.112*** -0.154*** -0.155*** -0.164***
Diagnostics
LB(10) 10.84 6.08 4.82 10.47 15.19
LB(15) 17.32 12.61 6.28 15.34 19.77
LB2(10) 3.40 9.81 7.66 9.38 9.10
LB2(15) 6.29 14.16 9.53 11.59 12.28
Ku(0,1%) 0.14 1.05 0.64 1.55 0.64
Ku(20%,80%) 1.00 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.99
Ku(99%,100%) 0.40 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.31
Pearson χ2 0.53 0.15 0.38 4.02 1.29
NOTES: This table reports the model estimations and diagnostic analyses for all variables. COt represents global
crude oil daily return. AGt , CONt , I N Dt and T RPt are, respectively, the daily agricultural, construction, industrial
and transportation sectoral returns in China. Higher order coefficients for the mean and variance equations are not
shown for brevity. di is the day dummy, i = 1,2,3,4. γ is the shape parameter of the GED. η and λ are, respectively, the
degree of freedom and skewness parameters of the skewed-t distribution. LB(M) and LB2(M) are the Ljung and Box
(1978) test statistics for the null of no serial correlation (up to lag M) on the standardised and squared standardised
residuals, respectively. Ku(x%, y%) is the Kupiec (1995) test statistic for correct proportion of return occurrence within
the distribution range (x%, y%) under the null hypothesis. The Pearson χ2 test statistic checks the null hypothesis of a
correctly specified distribution. The significance levels of all model estimates and diagnostic tests are abbreviated with
asterisks: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
During the 2005–2007 period, the Chinese economy was developing at a rapid rate with an
average annual GDP growth of 12.8%.5 The strong economic growth drove the consumption of oil,
5Data Source: World Bank.
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Table 3.5 Causality results
Mean Variance Risk Risk Risk Risk Distribution
D-to-D U-to-U D-to-U U-to-D
Pre-crisis (3 January 2005 – 10 October 2007)
Q̂(COt −→ AGt ) *** ***
Q̂(COt −→CONt ) *** ***
Q̂(COt −→ I N D t ) *** ***
Q̂(COt −→ T RPt ) *** *** ***
Q̂(AGt =⇒COt ) *** *** ***
Q̂(CONt =⇒COt ) *** *** *** *** ***
Q̂(I N D t =⇒COt ) *** *** *** *** ***
Q̂(T RPt =⇒COt ) *** *** *** *** *** ***
Post-crisis (7 October 2008 – 17 May 2012)
Q̂(COt −→ AGt ) *** *** * ***
Q̂(COt −→CONt ) *** ***
Q̂(COt −→ I N D t ) *** ***
Q̂(COt −→ T RPt ) * *** ***
Q̂(AGt =⇒COt ) *** *** *** ***
Q̂(CONt =⇒COt ) *** *** ***
Q̂(I N D t =⇒COt ) *** *** ***
Q̂(T RPt =⇒COt ) *** *** ***
Post-reform (28 March 2013 – 31 December 2019)
Q̂(COt −→ AGt ) *** * ** ** ***
Q̂(COt −→CONt ) *** *** * ***
Q̂(COt −→ I N D t ) *** ** ***
Q̂(COt −→ T RPt ) * *** *** *** ***
Q̂(AGt =⇒COt ) * *** ***
Q̂(CONt =⇒COt ) *** ***
Q̂(I N D t =⇒COt ) *** ***
Q̂(T RPt =⇒COt ) *** * ***
NOTES: This table reports the causality analysis results. COt represents global crude oil daily return. AGt , CONt ,
I N Dt and T RPt are, respectively, the daily agricultural, construction, industrial and transportation sectoral returns
in China. Q̂(Yt −→ Xt ) is the Granger causality test that examines the null hypothesis that {Xt } does not cause {Yt }.
Q̂(Yt =⇒ Xt ) is the instantaneous Granger causality test that examine the null hypothesis that {Xt } does not cause {Yt }
contemporaneously. D-to-D, U-to-U, D-to-U and U-to-D denote, respectively, down-to-down, up-to-up, down-to-up
and up-to-down risk causality. The significance levels of all tests are abbreviated with asterisks: ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. For brevity, only the statistical significance of the test
results are reported.
especially in the oil-intensive sectors. This explains the ICAT industries’ influence in the mean of
international crude oil. Our finding agrees with He et al. (2010), who find that major economic
activity affects global oil. Next, we find evidence of bidirectional volatility spillover between crude
oil and the ICAT sectors. Because the ICAT industries and international crude oil depend heavily
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on each other, an increase in uncertainty of one market would inevitably affect the other. We
find downside risk spillover from the majority of the oil-intensive sectors (construction, industrial
and transportation) to crude oil. An extreme negative return in a particular industry could be a
signal of low demand for the sector’s finished products. This reduces energy consumption and
oil import, which in turn drive down international oil price. Our finding agrees with Du and He
(2015) based on aggregate US data. Interestingly, the downside risk of the construction, industrial
and transportation sectors also Granger causes the upside risk of crude oil. This phenomenon
is largely driven by government intervention. In 2007, China suffered from high inflation as a
result of the overheated domestic economic growth and the price increase in imported food (Giles,
2008). This had adverse impact on the major sectors in the economy. To reduce inflation and
prevent social instability, the central government reduced oil tariffs and even offered subsidy
for oil consumption. Lin and Jiang (2011) estimate that in 2007 alone, the oil subsidy in China
amounted to CNY 189.03 billions, which is approximately equivalent to USD 24.87 billions at the
average exchange rate of 7.6 CNY/USD in that year. This intervention — which cost nearly 0.8%
of the country’s economy — had aided to reduce prices of domestic goods but inevitably drove
up international oil price according to the analysis by Balke et al. (2015). In terms of upside risk
spillover, the only causal linkage exists between crude oil and the transportation sector, where the
relation is bidirectional. In other words, the positive outlook in the oil and transportation market
benefited each other. This is due to the rapid growth in China that stimulated the movement of
people and goods. Together with a strong GDP growth, in two years time from 2005 to 2007, China
expanded its highway by 7.13% and its aviation route by 18.78%.6 This ambitious expansion drove
oil consumption and pushed for more crude oil import, which in turn increased the outlook of
international oil. In the opposite direction, one might expect a positive outlook in international
crude oil to adversely affect the oil-consuming transportation sector. On the contrary, we observe
that the positive outlook in crude oil to have positively influenced the transportation industry.
This positive effect can be explained by the heavy government fuel subsidy during this period as
documented by Lin and Jiang (2011). In other words, the transportation sector in China enjoyed
low cost government subsidised oil to support its expansion despite the rise in international oil
price. Finally, our causality-in-distribution test results suggest long-run links between global oil
and the ICAT industries. This finding is consistent with China’s growing long-term demand for
international oil in Figure 3.1. From the perspective of econometrics, the existence of causality in
any order of moment or quantile implies the more general causality in distribution, which is also
reflected in our findings.
We now consider the post-crisis sample over the 7 October 2008 – 17 May 2012 period. Similar
to the pre-crisis results, the ICAT sectors in China Granger cause crude oil in the mean. Besides,
the bidirectional volatility spillover and long-run causality in the oil-ICAT nexus persist. There is
marginal evidence that COt influences T RPt in the mean, and that the upside risk of COt causes
6Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook.
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the downside risk of AGt . Regarding up-to-up risk causality, we have bidirectional effect between
COt and AGt . No down-to-down and down-to-up risk causality is found.
Despite the subprime crisis that affected most of the western economies, the Chinese GDP
continued to grow at an average of 9.81% annually from 2008 to 2011.7 The strong persistence
of economic activities provides explanation as to why the ICAT industries in China continued to
Granger cause global crude oil in mean. Besides, China’s demand for international oil continued
to rise while other major economies such as the United States reduced its oil imports during the
same period. This explains the continuation of bidirectional volatility spillover effects between
global crude oil and the ICAT sectors. We find that the upside risk of global crude oil plays a key
role in pushing the agricultural index upwards. As crude oil becomes more expensive, there is
increasing demand for alternative energy sources such as biofuel which is derived from agricultural
commodity. Kristoufek et al. (2012) find that the connection between biofuel and the agricultural
products becomes more profound after the 2008 global food insecurity. This coincides with our
findings and provides explanation for the driving forces behind the agricultural sector in China.
Indeed, we learn from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook that from 2008 to 2010, the farmland area
allocated for corn — the primary ingredient for ethanol biofuel — had increased by 12.90%, whereas
the area allocated for its main staple rice had only increased by 2.55%. In the opposite direction,
we find upside risk spillover from the Chinese agricultural sector to the global crude oil. For two
years in a row from 2009 to 2010, the Chinese agricultural sector was badly hit by severe drought
and flood that affected more than 16 million hectares of its farm land.8 This inevitably increases
food prices and the upside risk of the agricultural industry in China. Consequently, the Chinese
government had to rely on food import to feed the country. This naturally drove international
energy consumption and global oil price. Our finding is consistent with Silvennoinen and Thorp
(2016), who find that the global food and energy markets were especially integrated between 2008
and 2010 where the price levels of food and oil were high. Finally, the long-term relation between
global crude oil and the ICAT industries is confirmed by our causality-in-distribution analyses.
We now discuss causality results for the post-reform sample from 28 March 2013 to 31 De-
cember 2019. Unlike previous periods, the mean causality effect from the ICAT sectors in China
to crude oil is virtually nonexistent. We find marginal evidence that COt causes T RPt in the
mean. The bidirectional volatility spillover and long-run causality in the oil-ICAT nexus persist. We
observe with marginal evidence downside risk spillover from COt to AGt and upside risk spillover
from T RPt to COt . The upside risk spillover from COt to AGt persists. In terms of inverse risk
spillover, the downside risk of COt significantly causes the upside risk of CONt , I N D t and T RPt ,
whereas the upside risk of COt causes the downside risk of AGt , CONt and T RPt .
Between 2014 and 2019, China’s economy grew by an annual average of 6.85%, which saw a
significant slowdown compared with its peak GDP growth of 14.23% in 2007.9 As a result, the
7Data Source: World Bank.
8Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook.
9Data Source: World Bank.
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ICAT industries were unable to maintain the previous positive outlook and productivity, causing
their explanatory power for the mean return of crude oil to fade during this period. Compared
with the period where the GDP growth peaked, the weakened evidence of upside risk spillover
from the transportation sector to crude oil is another indication of the economic slowdown.
Although the ICAT sectors were slowing down, their dependence on international oil is however
not zero. Therefore, uncertainty in one market still had nontrivial effects on the other. This provides
explanation for the persistence of bidirectional volatility spillover and long-term causality in the
oil-ICAT nexus. It is worth highlighting that China’s demand for international oil was still on the
rise despite the economic slowdown, which can be attributed to its plan of establishing a strategic
national oil reserve (Zhou and Yep, 2019). The upside risk spillover from international oil to the
agricultural sector persist as China continued to invest in renewable energy such as the biofuel.
Indeed, the farmland area allocated for corn in China has been growing consistently since 2010
according to the Chinese Statistical Yearbook. Because a growing portion of farmland has been
allocated for corn to make biofuel, a sharp decrease in the price of international crude oil would
incur losses on this renewable industry since the price of biofuel are no longer competitive. This
is why we observe marginal evidence of negative risk spillover from international crude oil to
the agricultural sector. Interestingly, the negative outlook in the global oil market had a positive
impact on the construction, industrial and transportation sectors. On several occasions between
2014 and 2016, international crude oil suffers from oversupply due to geopolitical rivalries and
the invention of hydraulic fracking technology. This decreased oil price but increased the profit of
most oil-consuming industries as they benefited from cheaper oil. On the other hand, most ICAT
sectors were negatively affected when the global oil price was high due to increase in operational
costs. This explains why the positive outlook in crude oil adversely affected most of the ICAT
industries.
3.5.3 Implications for investors and policymakers
There are several implications that we can draw from the findings in this study that can contribute
to future policymaking and investment management. First, we observe that the extreme impact
from international crude oil on the Chinese ICAT sectors became more apparent after the major
domestic oil pricing reformation in 2013. As the market-oriented pricing mechanism with minimal
government intervention was introduced, the ICAT industries became, to a greater extent, exposed
to international crude oil movement and the price risk that accompanied. This also provides
explanation for the marginal influence of global oil on the mean of T RPt . By the same rationale,
it is worth mentioning that China introduced a preliminary oil pricing reform in 2009 that is of
smaller scale than the 2013 counterpart. This posed nontrivial impact to certain local oil-intensive
sectors. For instance, we observe marginal evidence that, for the 7 October 2008 – 17 March 2012
sample, global oil affected the transportation industry in the mean, and the positive outlook in oil
began to adversely affect the agricultural sector. These findings shall advise policymakers to be
120 Unifying and testing causality-based risk measures
cautious in the future when implementing similar reformations because they may distort statistical
relations on an international level.
Second, our study in the 3 January 2005 – 10 October 2007 sample reveals heavy oil subsidy by
the Chinese government to deal with its overheated economy. From the perspective of policymak-
ing, this had aided to reduce the prices of domestic goods but that came at a cost of nearly 0.8% of
the country’s economy. Besides, the government subsidy may be miss-used by some companies to
increase their own private profit, which does not necessary help to ease the overheated economy.
Moreover, as shown in Balke et al. (2015), such heavy oil subsidy is detrimental to the rest of the
world because it drives international oil price. Thus, oil subsidy should be implemented with
care and should only be used in extreme situations. Indeed, knowing that such policy is only a
short-term alleviation, the Chinese government subsequently reduced to a great extent its fuel
subsidy after 2008, as depicted in Lin and Ouyang (2014, Figure 2). This is a crucial step because
according to our analysis, there exists significant long-term linkages between the ICAT sectors and
international crude oil. Thus, our findings agree with the decision implemented by the Chinese
policymakers and shall advise them to continue investing in long-term visions and solutions.
Finally, our findings suggest strong evidence of volatility spillover between the ICAT sectors
and international crude oil. This should be viewed a healthy economic relation between the
ICAT and oil markets because it implies that the market participants have been following each
other closely due to the interdependent relation. As a result, uncertainty in one market would
naturally propagate to the other market. For participants in the ICAT and oil markets, our analysis
emphasises the importance of using hedging instruments to minimise investment losses that
could arise from uncertainty in the opposite markets. For instance, the managing directors of
international oil drilling companies are advised to invest in crude oil futures contracts should
they wish to hedge against uncertainty in fuel price which could be a result of the volatile demand
from the oil-intensive ICAT sectors. By taking short positions in the crude oil futures contracts,
the directors are entitled to sell the companies’ oil at a predetermined price in the future to avoid
severe losses should fuel demand becomes uncertain. By the same reasonings, the farmland
owners in China are advised to short corn futures should they wish to hedge against uncertainty in
corn price which could be a result of volatile fuel price.
3.6 Conclusions
The paper analysed Granger causality between global crude oil and the sectoral equity index
returns in China from 2005 to 2019. We unified the extensive Granger causality tests proposed
over the past two decades that are based on the cross-correlation function approach to study
causal relations in the mean, variance, risky quantiles and distribution. The paper focused on the
industrial, construction, agricultural and transportation (ICAT) sectors as they are the country’s
primary oil consumers. Various stylised features in the data were captured by our modellings
which were properly examined to ensure adequacy.
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Main findings can be summarised as follows. First, volatility spillover and long-term depen-
dence in the oil-ICAT nexus were confirmed throughout the sample by the causality-in-variance
analysis and causality-in-distribution analysis, respectively. As for mean causality, results showed
that the oil-intensive sectors in China affected international crude oil before 2013 when the coun-
try’s economy was growing at a rapid rate; the effects faded after the economic growth slowed
down. In terms of downside risk causality, extreme losses in the construction, industrial and
transportation sectors negatively influenced international oil in the pre-crisis sample. No relation
was found after the financial crisis. As for upside risk spillover, crude oil and the transportation
industry affect each other in the pre-crisis sample partly due to the ambitious aviation route
expansion. After 2008, the upside risk causality between the agricultural sector and international
oil strengthened, which could be attributed to the global food insecurity. Regarding negative risk
causality, the downside risk of the construction, industrial and transportation sectors caused the
upside risk of international oil before 2009, which could be attributed to heavy government oil
subsidy. After the major Chinese domestic refined oil pricing mechanism reform in 2013, it was
found that the downside risk of global oil benefited most of the oil-intensive sectors and that the
upside risk of international oil negatively influenced most ICAT industries. Overall, our analyses
disentangled the complex oil-ICAT nexus to find that it had been nontrivially related to various
factors such as demand and supply of oil, economic growth rate, government subsidies and local
oil pricing reformation.
Market participants especially investors and policymakers may find the results of this paper
useful. In particular, policymakers are advised to be cautious when implementing similar oil
reformations in the future as they may distort statistical relations on an international level. Besides,
policymakers are advised to invest in long-term solutions when dealing with an overheated econ-
omy because of the documented long-term relation between global oil and the ICAT industries.
Finally, due to the persistent volatility spillover in the oil-ICAT nexus, investors are advised to use
financial instruments such as futures contracts to hedge against uncertainty from the opposite
markets.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS AND FUTURE
WORKS
This dissertation centred on the modelling and testing of risk with the emphasis on gauging novel
issues in finance. Chapter 1 modelled the stability of financial system using prominent systemic
risk measures, and tested for various risk factors affecting financial stability including the risky
practice of shadow insurance. In Chapter 2, I proposed a new multivariate econometric strategy
for examining the spillover of volatility — the most fundamental risk measure — and I applied
it to study the North American and European financial markets. Chapter 3 consolidated the
comprehensive literature on Granger causality methods, and applied the unified methodology to
examine different components of risk spillover between international crude oil and the Chinese
equity markets that are fuel intensive. In what follows I highlight the contributions and implications
that we can draw from the results in this dissertation — covering the aspects of econometric
methodology, finance, and policymaking — and I provide some discussions regarding future
developments.
Methodological implications
This dissertation has several methodological implications and contributions. Chapter 1 compared
and contrasted existing systemic risk measures to find that the delta conditional value-at-risk
(∆CoV aR) and systemic risk measure (SRI SK ) were the more suitable methods in terms of cap-
turing financial system risk since the marginal expected shortfall (MES) method captured largely
the systematic risk. Next, based on a representative data universe of 215 insurance entities, the
chapter provided a close empirical examination on ∆CoV aR and SRI SK to find that the extent to
which the two measures react to financial distress varies. For instance, ∆CoV aR was more reactive
to the US subprime crisis whereas the response from SRI SK was less profound. I conjectured
that the difference was due to the distinct ways the two measures were constructed. For instance,
although they are classed as systemic risk measures,∆CoV aR is a function of value-at-risk whereas
SRI SK is based on expected shortfall. Hence, the results in this chapter call for cautious future
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implementations of the methods and whenever possible, the chapter suggests that both measures
should be used for a rigour empirical analysis.
The application of systemic risk measures is limited to cases where the transmission or spillover
of risk is unidirectional, therefore I proposed in Chapter 2 a new (bi)directional econometric
method to examine volatility spillover — the most fundamental risk measure — between two
potentially multivariate time series, where volatility spillover was defined using the notion of
Granger causality in variance. The chapter further proposed a new nonparametric specification to
facilitate the estimation of volatility and hence the computation of the test statistic. In terms of
estimation, I proposed consistent least-squares estimators which are computationally efficient
and are free from convergence issue. I developed the asymptotic theory of the new approach.
Throughout the proposed econometric strategy, numerical integration and optimisation are not
involved. An extensive simulation study showed that the proposed method performed reasonably
well even in the higher dimension. Overall, the chapter contributes to the financial econometrics
literature by providing a new and convenient inferential methodology for volatility spillover.
While volatility is considered the most fundamental risk measure, the causality literature had
proposed other methods to capture different components of risk spillover. Chapter 3 unified the
extensive literature on causality methods and demonstrated how various forms of spillover can be
examined. This unified methodology can examine spillovers in the mean, variance, risky quantiles
(both positive and negative) and distribution, where each element reveals a unique relation. The
causality-in-mean analysis uncovers return spillover, whereas the presence of variance causality
can be viewed as volatility spillover. The causality-in-risk analysis detects the existence of extreme
risk spillovers and it covers both positive and negative relations. The long-term spillover effects can
be evaluated by the causality-in-distribution examination. This unified methodology minimises
inferential biases because all of the analyses are based on causality methods within the same family.
Besides, the finite sample performance of this univariate methodology based on asymptotic critical
values is generally reliable as reported in the mainstream literature. In summary, the chapter
provides academics, investors, market participants and policymakers with a unified methodology
to examine various components of risk spillover.
Implications in finance and policymaking
This dissertation has profound implications in finance and policymaking. In Chapter 1, I extracted
the lesser-known shadow insurance dataset from the data universe of about 200,000 reinsurance
agreements to find that the practice of shadow insurance had grew nearly 17 times from $15 billion
in 2004 to over $250 billion in 2017. Second, I documented that about 2.8 cents every dollar ceded
was shadow in 2004 and this figure had grew to 21 cents every dollar in 2017. Third, the chapter
tabulated the key entities practising shadow insurance — the shadow insurers — by the dollar
amount of shadow insurance and by a shadow index quantifying the aggressiveness of the practice.
Fourth, I documented that shadow insurers are typically larger, riskier, more interconnected with
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other market participants and more likely to contribute to financial instability. Naturally, the
chapter hypothesised that the practice of shadow insurance affects financial stability. Finally,
I tested the hypothesis using panel analysis and found statistical significant evidence that the
practice of shadow insurance had indeed contributed to the spreading of systemic risk. Overall,
these results have direct implications in the shadow banking and financial stability literature and
call for new policies to regulate the risky practice of shadow insurance.
In Chapter 2, I proposed an econometric testing strategy that has practical applications in
finance. The chapter included a timely empirical study in which I applied the new inferential
strategy to examine, before and after the Brexit referendum, the spillover relations between the
North American (NA) and the UK financial markets. To examine possible Brexit effect on the
European Union (EU) market, I also studied its spillover relations with the NA market. Before the
Brexit referendum, it was found that the NA was driven more immediately by UK volatility than EU
volatility. After Brexit, it was found that volatility in the UK did not spill to NA while that in the EU
had a more immediate spillover effect on NA as most NA participants switched their attention from
the UK to the EU market because of the fear that UK might lose its access to the European Single
Market. These findings have direct implications in the financial market literature by providing
statistical evidence suggesting that the participants in key international financial markets have
a reduced interest to follow the UK market after Brexit. In terms of policymaking, the chapter
encourages UK policymakers to develop new policies aiming to bolster the confidence of overseas
investors in the UK market as the starting step to retain the market’s global influence. I shall
emphasise that the applications of the proposed inferential strategy is not limited to the macro
level financial markets. At the firm level, the proposed statistical tool can assist policymakers to
identify volatility transmitters and recipients in the financial system and thus to shape targeted
policy to protect vulnerable volatility recipient as individual or group whenever necessary.
In Chapter 3, I unified a series of Granger causality methodology that has practical applications
in finance. I applied the unified methodology to study risk spillovers between international crude
oil and the oil-intensive equity markets in China. The Chinese market is worth studying for a few
reasons. First, I documented that since 2017, China had surpassed the US to become the top crude
oil importer in the world with more than eight million barrels of crude oil imports per day. Second,
the Chinese market had experienced a major government intervention. On 27 March 2013, the
Chinese government launched a major reformation of its domestic refined oil pricing mechanism
to greatly relax its control over local oil price. Generally regarded as the major milestone in the
transformation to a market-oriented pricing of retail oil, this reform discourages the government
from setting a ceiling price for domestic oil so long as international oil price stays under $130
per barrel. My analysis suggested that, before the oil reform, the Chinese industries were not
significantly affected by extreme international oil price movement. This was because domestic
oil price in China was capped and strictly regulated by its central government. Consequently, the
global oil price had a limited influence on the Chinese sectors. After the oil reform, I found that
extreme negative returns of global oil benefit most oil-intensive sectors while positive outlook in
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Brent adversely affect most the industries. These findings were driven by the fact that the Chinese
markets had naturally become more exposed to international oil after the reformation. Therefore,
an extreme negative (positive) outlook in global oil directly reduced (increased) the operational
costs of the Chinese sectors. Hence, the findings in this chapter encourage policymakers to be
cautious when implementing similar reformations in the future because they may distort statistical
relations on an international level.
Further developments
Based on the results in this dissertation, several future works can be suggested. First, the inferential
strategy that I put forward in Chapter 2 can be readily applied to the shadow insurance data that I
collected in Chapter 1. Compared with the analysis in Chapter 1 which focuses on the effect from
the mean, using the statistical tool from Chapter 2 the new study can focus on the effect from
the volatility. Using the collected data, I can first form a vector containing key shadow insurers
which can represent the shadow insurance sector. Since I documented in Chapter 1 that most of
the shadow insurers are public entities, I can conveniently download their daily stock prices which
are the main input of the methodology in Chapter 2. Because a large portion of shadow insurance
is funded through the banking system, I formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. There is volatility spillover from the shadow insurance sector to the banking or
financial sector.
Besides, it is important to check the relation between the shadow and the non-shadow sectors.
Hypothesis 2. There is volatility spillover from the shadow insurance sector to the non-shadow
insurance sector.
As documented in Figure 1.5, the risk of shadow insurance is time varying. Hence, I propose to
examine the possible time-varying spillover effects using rolling window method so long as I keep
a rolling window of about four years of daily data, which is suggested by the Monte Carlo study in
Chapter 2. Given the evidence in Figure 1.5, I formulate a further hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The spillover effect from the shadow insurance sector is the most significant in the
run-up to the subprime crisis.
Addressing these hypotheses can make up a small but interesting research paper in the shadow
banking literature.
Second, I can apply the set of Granger causality methods that I unified in Chapter 3 to study
another set of commodity data. Because the unified methodology is able to detect possible negative
causal relations, I can propose a thorough study to examine the nexus between international gold
market and the leading global financial markets since it is often hypothesised that gold and equity
are negative related. For instance, Basher and Sadorsky (2016) find that gold could be effective in
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terms of hedging stock prices in the emerging markets. This research idea can form a small but
interesting research paper in the commodity and financial market literature. Along the same line, I
would like to note that the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in mean (ARCH-in-mean)
model is often recommended for commodity data given its relevance to the theory of storage.
For instance, Bernard et al. (2015) find that on several occasions, the ARCH-in-mean model gives
better forecast performances with respect to several other workhorse models based on oil futures
data. Therefore, the ARCH-in-mean model is very much worth exploring in future works especially
when it comes to forecast-based analysis of commodity futures data.
Third, I can put forward a new measure for financial market jump spillover which complements
the volatility spillover approach in Chapter 2. To study financial jumps, I shall assume that asset
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where (µA,s ,µB ,s) are predictable drift processes; (WA,s ,WB ,s) are standard Brownian motions;
(σA A,s ,σAB ,s ,σB A,s ,σBB ,s) follow a multivariate càdlàg process; (J A,s , JB ,s) are Poisson processes
with possibly time-varying intensity; (κA A,s ,κAB ,s ,κB A,s ,κBB ,s , ) describe the sizes of jumps at time
s.
It is natural to decompose the quadratic variation process 〈·, ·〉t of a given asset price, say p A ,
over the time interval (t −1, t ) into the part due to the discontinuous jump component p(d)A and
the part due to the continuous diffusive component p(c)A . In particular, 〈p A , p A〉t ≡ At = VA,t +
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contribution to the quadratic variation. Similarly, we have 〈pB , pB 〉t ≡ Bt =VB ,t+DB ,t , where VB ,t =
















BB ,s . It
is easy to appreciate from the above setup that At is not affected by DB ,τ for any τ≤ t , denoted by
B ̸D−−→ A, if and only if
(i) κAB ,s = κB A,s = 0 almost surely;
(ii) κAB ,s and κB A,s are independent; and
(iii) J A,s and JB ,s are independent.
If any of the above conditions fail to hold, then At remains dependent upon DB ,τ, even after
conditioning on its own past values. We have jump spillover from asset B to asset A. To quantify the
effect of jump spillover, I can propose to quantify the extent to which and (i)-(iii) are violated using
proper dependence measures. By studying the limiting distribution of the proposed measures,
I can put forward inferential procedures for the null hypothesis that (i)-(iii) hold (i.e., no jump
spillover). This can form a research paper with methodological contribution.
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